WRITING THE FRAGMENTS: WILLIAM JAMES AND COMPOSITION IN AN AGE OF (DIS)CONNECTION by Overstreet, Matthew
  
 
WRITING THE FRAGMENTS:  
WILLIAM JAMES AND COMPOSITION IN AN AGE OF (DIS)CONNECTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Matthew Overstreet 
BGS, University of Kansas, 2002 
MA, University of Illinois at Chicago, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
The Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences  
in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
2018 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented 
 
by 
 
 
Matthew Overstreet 
 
 
 
 
 
It was defended on 
January 10, 2018 
and approved by 
Nancy Glazener, PhD, Professor of English 
Paul Kameen, PhD, Professor of English 
John Lyne, PhD, Professor of Communications 
Dissertation Advisor: David Bartholomae, PhD,  
Professor of English and Charles Crow Chair 
 
 
 ii 
Copyright © by Matthew Overstreet 
2018 
 iii 
 This dissertation seeks to reimagine writing instruction in light of Trump, Brexit, and “fake news.”  I 
argue that neoliberal economic trends, along with the rise of digital media technology, have led to a 
general inability to engage productively with difference.  Inspired by the work of American scientist and 
philosopher William James (1842-1910), I formulate a writing pedagogy to challenge this state of affairs.  
Drawing on biological principles, this pedagogy foregrounds the always limited, always interested nature 
of perception.  It makes real the world’s innate plurality and moves students to account for this 
experience.  The goal is to enhance students’ meaning making ability, allowing for more generous modes 
of thought and being.  In the fall of 2016, I put a Jamesian writing pedagogy into practice in a first-year 
writing course at the University of Pittsburgh.  I reference my experience in this course, and the student 
writing generated, throughout my discussion. 
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Stop this day and night with me and you shall possess the  
origin of all poems,  
You shall possess the good of the earth and sun, (there are 
 millions of suns left,)  
You shall no longer take things at second or third hand, nor  
look through the eyes of the dead, nor feed on the 
spectres in books,  
You shall not look through my eyes either, nor take things  
from me,  
You shall listen to all sides and filter them from your self.  
 -- Walt Whitman, Song of Myself 
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  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
As fate would have it, I began this project on Wednesday, November 9, 2016—the day after 
Donald Trump was elected president of the United States.  That afternoon, I went to a staff meeting at the 
university where I work.  There were twenty or so teachers of writing, gathered around a conference table 
in an ornate conference room.  Outside and far below, the faint sound of bull-horned speech marked an 
impromptu student protest.  The feeling of defeat, despair, fear even, was palpable.  Some of my 
colleagues had obviously been crying.  And at one point, as we were discussing revision techniques, my 
friend Dan sighed and put his head on the table.  “Sorry,” he said, “the election.” 
 For many Americans—particularly the urban and educated—the rise of Donald Trump was a 
traumatic event.  Of particular note is how surprising Trump’s victory was.  Despite polls showing a tight 
race—largely within the margin of error—in the days leading up to the election, many (if not most) 
mainstream commentators refused to entertain the possibility of a Trump presidency.  Sean Trende has 
labeled this an example of “interpretive failure,” driven by “unthinkability bias.”  Simply put, for a wide 
segment of the population, a Trump presidency was unimaginable.  For many writing teachers, for 
example, Trump and his campaign represented a repudiation of their core values—logic, reason, honesty, 
inclusion.  The possibility that he might succeed, therefore, seemed remote.  Look at his orange skin, his 
nonsensical claims, we thought, he’s a clown.  Unfortunately, a large segment of the US electorate saw 
the same images, heard the same words, but reached a different conclusion. 
 I start with the election of Donald Trump not because I think the event in itself is of monumental 
import (indeed, by the time you read these words, Trump may have already been forgotten).  Instead, I 
start here because I believe that the story of this man—and our radically differing perceptions of him—
neatly captures the tenor of the times.  Simply put, Western society, as of the second decade of the 
twenty-first century, is marked first and foremost by the circulation (and often head-on collision) of 
multiple realities.  I use the term “realities” here to indicate that it is not that opponents and supporters of 
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Trump merely disagree.  Instead, these groups perceive the world in fundamentally different ways.  
Where we see clown, they see change agent (with “see” meant to represent the entire embodied, 
emotionally charged, socially mediated experience of coming to know an object or event).  Of course, 
gaps in perception exist in any human population; ours is a “pluralistic universe,” after all.  My claim, as 
will be made clear in the following pages, is that due to certain economic and technological factors trends 
these gaps have grown dangerously large and dangerously sedimented.  Now, more than ever, it is easier 
for subjects to band together, create and sustain bespoke realities.  At the same time, it is more difficult 
for groups, once formed, to merge realities, to communicate, and thus to cooperate.  We and They are 
increasingly alien entities.  This state of (dis)connection defines our lifeworld. 
 I don’t need to look very far to find evidence of divergent perception.  In the United States, right 
now, survey data shows unprecedented levels of political polarization.  Racial tension, legislative 
paralysis, and talk of “fake news” (true to some, of course) dominate the headlines.  Shared problems 
such as climate change and gun violence go unresolved, while both popular and academic sources 
bemoan the degraded state of public discourse.  This is social fragmentation.  My argument is that the 
process of fragmentation is sustained by the same dynamic that made it so hard for liberal elites to 
imagine a Trump presidency.  We can call it a failure of empathy, or imagination, or understanding.  
Whatever the name, it manifests as an inability to productively engage and come to terms with alien 
realities.  We can’t stand, much less understand the other.  As a result, mutual growth, and thus the 
possibility of cooperation, is foreclosed.   
 In the following pages I argue that composition theory can and should oppose the parochial 
tendencies of a society in fragments.  This claim is rooted in my belief that writing instruction is 
important—a powerful social force—and that with our institutional strength and long history of 
productive pluralism, we are well-positioned to intervene.  I propose a specific sort of intervention.  In the 
tradition of classic progressive pedagogies (John Dewey), and more recent critical pedagogies (Paulo 
Freire, Henry Giroux, Ira Shor), my project is overtly ideological, even moralistic.  The intervention I 
propose doesn’t involve feeding students a certain story, though.  It doesn’t involve trying to persuade 
them, in any direct way, of the importance of “democracy” or “unity” or even civic deliberation.  Instead, 
it attempts to use writing instruction to fundamentally restructure how people experience the world.  It 
attempts to help them become a little less fearful, a little more open, and therefore, smarter and more 
creative.  I speak in terms of “restructuring of experience” to capture the holistic nature of the change I 
seek.  In my class, we may not talk about Donald Trump.  If I’m right though—and if my spirit-guide, 
William James, is right—when students leave my classroom, they see Trump (and his supporters and 
opponents) a little differently.  They’ll notice certain subtleties, certain particulars that once went 
unnoticed.  And like a cat working her claws against a scratching post, engagement with these newfound 
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textures will feel good, productive, healthy in some inarticulable way.  Whatever their political views 
(which I honestly care nothing about) my students will be changed, and changed for the better. 
 Now, I recognize the boldness of my project.  I think though that boldness is part of its charm.  
As will become apparent, apart from a few ideas about how to engage perception and its vagaries, the 
following pages have little to offer in the way of teaching tips.  Instead, what they seek to do is reframe—
and thus revitalize—much of what we already do.  This revitalization, rejustification even, is of supreme 
importance, I believe.  At its base, writing instruction is about intellectual engagement between a skilled 
practitioner (the teacher) and a relative novice (the student).  The student writes, gets feedback, rewrites 
and rethinks.  Whether teaching Haitian refugees or “Harvard men,” in theory, writing pedagogy really is 
that simple.  For the process to work though, the parties must be engaged.  The student must have an 
investment in what she writes and the teacher must have an investment in the student.  More than 
anything else, this project is an attempt to explain why I’m invested in my students.  My hope is that by 
providing a new argument as to why writing instruction is important, I can relieve some of the 
hopelessness I felt in that conference room on the ninth of November.  I can give my colleagues a reason 
to be excited for class, excited even for another stack of student essays.  Jacques Barzun writes that every 
thinker is “by nature an absolutist and imperialist.”  The habits of democracy, including the ability to 
engage productively with difference, “must be taught in the teeth of this simple animal faith” (122).  Yes.  
And I believe that the university writing classroom is exactly the right place to wage this battle. 
 The following study proceeds thusly: 
 In chapter one, I chart the cognitive-discursive terrain on which writers currently tread.  My 
primary claim is that with neoliberalism, and the accompanying rise of digital media technology, intra-
group bonds have intensified; at the same time, inter-group bonds have frayed.  Whether talking in terms 
of political parties, neighborhoods or families, in-group interactions are now more frequent and intense 
than ever before.  As scholars like Cass Sunstein have shown, this makes for homogeneity of being and 
radicalization of thought.  Correspondingly, communication between groups becomes increasingly 
difficult.  The result is a vicious cycle of social fragmentation, and because exposure to difference is 
necessary for growth, cognitive ossification.  I call this process the hegemony of the fragments. 
   I believe that resistance to the hegemony of the fragments can give writing teachers renewed 
purpose.  To stage such resistance, though, we need a new set of theoretical tools.  William James 
provides these tools, along with a provocative model of how to write, teach and live.  James worked in an 
age fragmented by Darwin and civil war, making his thought particularly relevant to our fractured times.  
His ideas about the real, true and good are specifically designed to help humans break down barriers, to 
think and feel and be more.  At the present moment, I argue, this is exactly the sort of help we need. 
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   In chapter two, I start at the very bottom, so to speak, discussing how James’s metaphysical 
scheme—termed radical empiricism—can help us rethink the relationship between word and world.  
Here, and throughout this project, I emphasis the material aspect of James thought, thus putting him in 
conversation with rhetoric and composition’s recent new materialist movement.  Like new materialism, 
James’s thought is holistic and relational; it dissolves dualisms.  Unlike new materialism though, James 
firmly emphasizes the world-making power of individuated, thinking-feeling humans.  Working out of the 
natural sciences, he situates the individual within an overwhelming flux of sensory inputs.  Here, all 
understanding is partial and all forms of connection possible.  But it is up to world-making agents to 
actualize this possibility.  
 I argue that James’s metaphysics can productively inform how we think about writing.  It posits a 
great intimacy of being, but promises nothing.  In turn, it encourages us to keep looking, listening and 
revising.  Writing in such a world is the making of meaning, the active creation of connection, with its 
result (thought and story) just as real as physical fact.  Writing reshapes experience.  Writing instruction, 
in turn, must be understood as a powerful material force.  Among other practical consequences, such a 
view encourages us to move writing pedagogy off the page, demanding that in addition to texts and tools, 
we actively engage perception. 
 In chapter three, I explore the ethical impulse at the core of James’s thought.  Drawing on his 
moral philosophy, as well as his wonderfully literary essay “On A Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” I 
argue that James displays an ethics of attunement.  This is a critical, constructive habit of mind which 
attends closely to context in order to name and rename the world.  To constantly rename requires 
cognitive flexibility and a certain degree of daring.  We must refuse to abide by any limit or form, and 
instead strive to feel the unfelt, to think the unthought.  We must privilege growth. 
 I argue that James’s emphasis on growth can provide an ethical touchstone for rhetoric and 
composition.  Writing teachers can best encourage growth, I suggest, by encouraging attention to the 
interface between self and world, to both our thoughts and the things about which we think.  Such a view 
combines the postmodern tradition of self-reflection and critique (what I call “negative attunement”) with 
a strong material element.  It holds that sensation disrupts form.  To show what a pedagogy of attunement 
might look like in practice, at the end of the chapter I turn to my own classroom.  I discuss an exercise in 
which my students were asked to “become an animal.”  By drawing attention to the tools by which we 
make sense of the world, I argue, such an exercise can help disrupt the hegemony of the fragments. 
 In chapter four I present a Jamesian theory of identity.  How do we conceive of our selves and 
those selves we interact with in the classroom?  In line with recent intersectional thought, particularly as 
expressed in queer theory, James values the messiness of lived experience over conceptual reduction.  
When we think in terms of big rather than small, abstract rather than concrete, he believes, we limit 
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intimacy and thus restrict growth.  I argue that many recent discussions of identity in our field are guilty 
of this sort of distancing.  Other popular (new materialist) theories dissolve the individuated self in a web 
of relations.  Both approaches, I argue, limit writing instruction’s transformative potential. 
 A Jamesian theory of identity recognizes the influence of systems and structures, but also values 
the inscrutable power of the individuated self.  The self for James is an open system.  But it’s also most 
definitely a “self”—embodied and individuated, capable of autonomy, self-direction and absolutely 
original creation.  Such a conception, I argue, when applied to teacher and student, opens up new 
relational possibilities.  It allows for novelty on the page and empathy in the classroom.  To show the 
practical benefit of such thought—as well as to model the sort of thought and writing a Jamesian 
approach demands—I depict a series of encounters with one of my students.  In other words, I make my 
self visible on the page.  I thus challenge the effacement of self which often marks new materialist theory.   
 In the final chapter, the above theoretical strains are brought together in the service of a Jamesian 
writing pedagogy.  Drawing on his educational theory in Talks to Teachers and “Social Value of the 
College Bred,” I argue that education, for James, is a full-bodied process centered around the organization 
of habit.  I connect James—a longtime Harvard professor—with the tradition of liberal education 
described by fellow Harvard pragmatist William Perry.  At its core, I argue, liberal education in this mode 
is about bringing young people into a controlled encounter with difference.  Through this process, 
students develop a new relationship with thought and language. 
 In a Jamesian writing class, I suggest, students are moved to confront and come to terms with the 
object and the other.  Through reading and writing, as well as embodied activities, they are encouraged to 
make connections, to synthesize various perspectives and data points.  The goal is to increase their 
meaning-making ability and thus their ability to account for difference.  In the fall of 2016, I designed and 
taught a freshman writing course based on these principles.  I close by discussing this course and the 
student writing produced within.  My ultimate goal here, as throughout this project, is to show that a 
Jamesian writing pedagogy can both challenge the hegemony of the fragments and help students become 
better writers.  It can thus (re)vitalize writing instruction. 
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1.  HEGEMONY OF THE FRAGMENTS 
 
 
 
 
1.1   WHAT’S THE POINT? 
 
 
 The internet is a sewer.  The world is getting hotter.  And the gap between rich and poor 
continues to grow.  Meanwhile, in the writing classroom, we help young people draft thesis statements 
and properly cite sources.  Even the most committed writing teacher might be moved to ask, what’s the 
point?  If Florida is going to be underwater soon, if students just want unlimited broadband and jobs in 
finance, does writing instruction even matter?  I mean, does it really matter, more than say, selling cars or 
stocking vending machines?  I think it does.  In this chapter, I try to show why.   
My primary claim is that economic and technological trends have resulted in a state of affairs I 
term the hegemony of the fragments.  With a shift towards more personal control and “choice,” our 
lifeworlds have become increasingly atomistic.  Our cognitive practices have, in turn, ossified.  The 
consequences: an inability to think the unthought, to recognize and come to terms with the desire of the 
other, to communicate or cooperate.  This process of fragmentation and ossification, I argue, defines the 
world in which we live and work, and underlies many of today’s most pressing social problems (the 
inability of government to address those rising sea levels, for example).  And rhetoric and composition is 
uniquely well placed to respond.  We possess the tools and intuitional leverage to help dissolve the 
fragments.  But to do so we need guidance.  I argue that we can find guidance in the figure of philosopher 
William James.  James, Richard Gale writes, is a “veritable experience junkie,” who made it his life’s 
mission to help others realize “the full range of feelings, thoughts, and emotions” of which they are 
capable (3).  This sort of radical openness is exactly what is needed in our age of rigid, solipsistic thought.  
 6 
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A shot of William James, I’ll argue, can energize both writing instruction and composition as an 
enterprise.   
 A word about methodology.  The above argument, and indeed the whole of this project, is based 
on a certain set of assumptions.  Let’s make these explicit.  First, in the following pages you’ll find a lot 
of big ideas.  You won’t find, though, any reference to double-blind research studies or MRI scans.  
There’s also very little mention of historical data—archival research, for example.  What’s my proof, 
then?  How can we be sure that we are living in a fragmented age, that we truly are (dis)connected?  In 
response, I’d suggest that I simply tell a story.  Does my tale work for you?  Does it (or parts of it) 
resonant with what you see and think and feel?  If so, that’s my proof.   
 Relatedly, I must make clear that while I endeavor to speak to all writing teachers, I do not speak 
for any writing teacher.  Nothing William James has to say can be translated into some sort of Platonic 
ideal of a lesson plan.  His work can be used to inform teaching practices, of course, but this application 
must be recognized as an interested, situated process. The reader-teacher must be an active agent.  I, for 
example, am a white, middle-aged, American male.  I teach a mandatory first-year writing course at a 
large, fairly selective public university.  My students are, for the most part, members of the American 
middle-class and the global upper-middle class.  They are engineering and nursing and economics majors, 
and enroll in my course not out of any great love for the written word, or even to “improve their writing 
skills,” but simply because they have to.  Any solutions or strategies I propose are proposed with this 
teaching body, and this student body, in mind.  Other teachers, in other contexts, will read me, read 
James, and draft other solutions, other strategies.  Yes.  This is how it must be. 
The above caveats are important, because one of the key assumptions driving a Jamesian vision 
of the educational enterprise is the idea that instruction must always be contextual: it must serve the needs 
of a specific time, a specific place.  It follows that to understand what these needs are, we must carefully 
chart the discursive and cognitive terrain on which we and our students tread.  We must look and listen.  
This is a fact that I feel often gets lost in “theoretical” discussions.  And its recognition translates into the 
method on display in the following pages.  A deep contextualization, an exploration of our shared 
lifeworld: that, in short, is the purpose of this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2   LIFE AMONG THE FRAGMENTS 
 
 
Humans are tool using beings.  As such, we must pay great attention to our technological milieu: 
Facebook and Twitter, mobile phones and broadband internet.  Empirical evidence indicates that digital 
communication technologies, while providing for more frequent and intense forms of connection among 
groups, have exacerbated the gaps between groups.  I argue that the tendency to engage same-to-same is 
self-perpetuating: safe among our preferences, it becomes harder to make sense of the non-preferred.  As 
a result, group-think reigns; the partisan takes precedent over the public.  We can call this state of being 
“neo-tribalism.”  I believe it is a destructive force and something rhetoric and composition should oppose.  
That said, before we discuss the role digital technology plays in the hegemony of the fragments / the 
formation of neo-tribes, it’s necessary to take a step back and examine the larger political-economic 
framework out of which these technologies emerge. 
Michel Foucault’s epoch-defining lectures on neo-liberal governmentality provide an apt starting 
point.  According to Foucault, during the 1970s there was an fundamental shift in the way power is 
exercised in Western society (see Lemke).  On an economic level, this break was marked by the move 
from a liberal (specifically Keynesian) welfare-state model of organization to a neoliberal, post-Fordist 
system.  For our purposes, what’s most important is the way in which subjectivity is now constructed.  At 
the most basic level, neoliberalism involves the application of market principles (free trade, open 
competition) to every aspect of human existence.  Under such a regime, the individual economic actor is 
paramount and the greatest good is thought to be achieved by restricting that actor’s range of self-
construction as little as possible.  The underlying idea is that individual actors, free from government 
control, will be best able to recognize and exploit local profit-making opportunities.  The role of 
government, in turn, should be to stand back and not “govern too much” (see Lotier 2017).  This means 
that individual subjectivity is no longer structurally determined.  Instead of trying to enforce conformity, 
the powers that be allow (and even celebrate) the new, the different. 
 From the defunding of public universities, to the widespread acceptance of gay rights, 
neoliberalism frames our every move.  It allows for new opportunities, for sure, but also saddles us with 
new responsibilities.  Whereas once cognitive and experiential limits were determined by our place within 
the social structure, individual choice and “personal responsibility” are now paramount.  We are now told 
that we must choose not only what shoes we wear and what car we drive, but also what god we worship, 
and what we think and feel.  As political scientists Lance Bennett and Jarol Manheim write, in late 
modern society, individuals must assume responsibility for managing their own “emotional and cognitive 
realities” (221).  For many individuals this process of mandatory self-creation takes place largely outside 
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traditional determinants such as church, state, and even family.  “The individuation of social experience, 
and the decline of broad social memberships, even at the all-embracing levels of class and church,” 
Bennett and Manheim write, echoing sociologist Anthony Giddens, is the defining feature of our age 
(221).  This “individuation of social experience” is marked by the decline of institutions of all stripes, 
from Elks Clubs to bowling leagues (see Putnam).  Identity becomes less a function of group membership 
(“I’m a Catholic”) and more a function of consumption choices (“I’m the guy with Topshop slacks and an 
Audi Q7”).  Difference is encouraged, demanded in fact.  One must consume in order to take on a unique 
identity, to come into being by standing out from the crowd.  In short, under neoliberalism, the self is the 
center of the world, and the differentiation of that self from other selves is a lifelong task.  The only 
forbidden choice, it seems, is not to choose. 
 The above analysis makes clear why postmodern thinkers such as Zygmunt Bauman have 
referred to neoliberalism as “life in fragments.”  The structures that once normalized subjectivity, that 
provided shared sets of values and reference points, and in turn allowed large groups of people to 
mobilize to solve problems, have been discredited.  Now, mine is not a reactionary tract.  Like most 
people of my age and class, I appreciate choice, consumer or otherwise.  I’m glad gender roles are more 
flexible, that sexual mores are less restrictive, that I can eat sushi or curry in Mexico City at four in the 
morning.   But the radical decentralization of authority that Western society has undergone in the past 
half-century must not be overlooked.  As we’ll see, it provides the basis for how we think now and the 
problems that those modes of thought bring. 
 
 
 
 
1.3   INFORMATION CHAOS 
 
 
 So we live among the fragments.  What of our tools?  If the age of the nation-state, decolonization 
and world war was intimately tied to print, advanced neoliberalism seems best paired with digital 
technologies.  As Patricia Dias notes, mobile computing devices, linked by high-speed internet, are one 
with “an exacerbated stage of modernity where the relations between agents and structures” are more 
flexible and fluid (2).  Put otherwise, such technologies are emblematic of the cult of choice which we, as 
neoliberal subjects, are automatically members.  Our laptops, tablets and mobile phones, the dominant 
narrative goes, have freed us from those forces (governments, parents, broadcast networks) which seek to 
shape what we watch, read, listen to, or restrict who we communicate with or what we communicate 
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about.  What information we consume, and to whom we connect, is now up to us.  We have control.  In 
theory, this radical democratization of communication channels should have resulted in a new era of 
understanding.  We now have, after all, the ability to learn anything, talk to almost anyone, anytime.  We 
can commune with the alien, forming new bonds and new more inclusive groupings.  But no.  Instead, 
Western society is more polarized, more divided than ever before.  In fact, despite the opportunity for 
unlimited connection, it seems we have entered a new era of disconnection.  So what happened? 
 First, a vignette.  My sophomore year of college, 1999, my two roommates and I had three TVs in 
our dorm room.  A typical evening we’d play video games on one, watch sports on another and perhaps a 
movie on the third.  We agreed that all this technology—three TVs!—was overkill.  Visitors always 
remarked upon it.  We liked the element of excess though; that’s why we had three TVs. 
 Last year I visited my sister, now in college at the same university.  She only had one TV.  In a 
familiar scene, she and her two roommates would watch it together.  Now though each was also engaged 
with the glowing screen of a mobile phone, sending texts, tweets and snaps, checking Instagram and 
Facebook, fact-checking on Wikipedia.  Two of the three girls also had laptops out, a gesture towards 
homework, I assume.  They have twice as many screens per person as we had, I remember thinking.  And 
no one thinks anything of it!  This was perhaps a banal observation, but for me, seeing my sister and her 
friends so immersed, and so at home, in the digital flow, made real the massive and rapid change our 
discursive environment has undergone.  It made me realize that I too often watch TV with phone in hand, 
laptop at my side: triple screening, the kids call it.  I believe that this shift in how and in what amounts we 
consume information has changed the way we relate to the world and to one another.  It has made certain 
ties stronger, but also made our beliefs more homogenous and rigid. 
 The idea that technology changes how we think is not new.  From Plato to Nietzsche, the 
relationship between our tools and our minds is one of which scholars have long been aware.  Perhaps no 
one speaks more cogently on the subject than Neil Postman.  Technological change, Postman reminds us, 
“is neither additive or subtractive. It is ecological” (18).  By this he means that the introduction of a new 
tool—Nietzsche getting a typewriter, for example—can have an impact far outside that tool’s area of 
operation.  This renders the consequences of technological advance wildly unpredictable.  Once a new 
technology is adopted, “it plays out its hand,” sparking systemwide change, both positive and negative, 
foreseen and unforeseen (Postman 7).   
  Postman also notes the extent to which technology shapes our cognitive practices.  Technological 
advances, he writes, “alter those deeply embedded habits of thought which give to a culture its sense of 
what the world is like” (12).  With the adoption of writing, or the typewriter, or the smartphone, we don’t 
just do the same thing in new ways.  Instead, the introduction of a new tool or technique reverberates 
throughout our lifeworld, remaking, at least to some degree, our interests, values, habits and symbols—
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both what we think about and what we think with.  Simply put, technology restructures reality.  This 
means that close attention must be paid to the consequences of our constructions.  Especially, I’m sure 
Postman would add, in times of great technological change. 
 As my visit with my triple-screening sister made clear, the past few decades have been, by any 
way we know to measure such things, a time of great technological change.  What’s the underlying nature 
of this change though?  In the “The Braindead Megaphone,” novelist George Saunders probes this 
question by trying to imagine the difference between his mental life and that of a “guy standing in a field 
in the year 1200” (1).  Both subjects have certain voices in their heads, the residue of conversations with 
parents, children, neighbors.  Both maintain some sort of mental dialogue with the alien: gods, ancestors, 
historical figures.  The key distinction, Saunders determines, is the shear amount of mediated 
communication to which he, as a modern, has been exposed.  As an inhabitant of the twenty-first century, 
Saunders’s head is full of “people from far away,” who have arrived in his mind “via high-tech sources” 
(2).  He lives among an entire category of sounds, images and ideas of which his ancient doppelganger 
would have had no experience.  This is mediated information, far-off experience converted into symbols.  
And with the steady advance of communication technologies—from scrolls, to newspapers, to television, 
to triple-screening—our world is increasingly awash in it. 
 Postman was one of the first thinkers to critically examine the consequences of information 
saturation.  As early as 1990, he writes of a world in which information has “become a form of garbage,” 
appearing “in enormous volume and at high speeds, disconnected from theory, meaning or purpose” (70).  
In a blistering and still timely critique of tech utopianism, he argues that America has become a 
“techopoly,” in which all forms of cultural life have been subjugated “to the sovereignty of technique and 
technology” (52).  Under techopoly, information is granted almost mystical status (see recent discussions 
of “big data”).  In such a world, the production and distribution of information serves no purpose outside 
itself; more information, Postman writes, is “both the means and end of human creativity” (61). 
 In his depiction of techopoly, Postman hits upon two points which are key for our purposes.  
First, he notes the social problems associated with too much information.  “When the supply of 
information is no longer controllable,” he writes, “a general breakdown in psychic tranquility and social 
purpose occurs… people have no way of finding meaning in their experiences, lose their capacity to 
remember, and have difficulty imagining reasonable futures” (72).   
As sea levels rise and civility breaks down, Postman’s words feel strikingly prescient.  Despite 
objective measures indicating a state of peace and prosperity, a record number of Americans report that 
the country is “on the wrong track” and that America has “lost its way.”  In response, in 2016, the country  
elected a figure whose campaign rhetoric was defined, first and foremost, by anger and resentment, and 
whose signature policies—a ban on Muslim immigration, a wall across the southern border as tall as an 
hangar—were widely considered impossible (even by many of his own supporters).  Has there been a 
“breakdown in psychic tranquility”?  Have we lost the ability to imagine “reasonable futures”?  To many 
educated Americans, on both the right and left, it certainly appears so.   
 Postman notes a connection between the decline of institutions and “information chaos” (73).  
Whereas once church, state, family, newspaper editorial board and broadcast network acted as curators of 
sorts, deciding what information one received, under neoliberalism, these institutions have largely 
surrendered their regulatory function.  Instead, the individual must now regulate his or her own 
information stream.  Once again, we see responsibility delegated to individual agents.  We live among 
ever-increasing torrents of data and must learn to swim.   
In Tyranny of the Moment: Fast and Slow Time in the Information Age, Norwegian cultural critic 
Thomas Hyyland Eriksen probes the growing sense of “information chaos” and the cognitive effects 
thereof.  As he sees it, an ever-increasing volume of mediated information threatens “to fill all the gaps,” 
leading to a situation in which life becomes a “hysterical series of saturated moments” (3).  In such a 
world, many of the categories and mental traits long-associated with critical thought—“cause and effect, 
internal organic growth, maturity and experience”— cease to have any value (120).  “Coherence and 
causality slip away,” he writes, leaving “restlessness, flickering gazes and striking one-liners [to] rule the 
roost” (124).  Overall, Eriksen, like Postman, associates information overload with the collapse of 
traditional forms of meaning making.  Under constant discursive bombardment, individuals are unable to 
make sense of the world outside immediate experience.  They can’t tie past to present to future, local to 
global.  They can’t contextualize.  
Interestingly, Eriksen, an anthropologist by trade, sees the cognitive practices associated with 
neoliberalism as a return to an earlier, “pre-modern” form of thought.  Instead of “the strict, logical, linear 
thinking characteristic of industrial society,” he writes, thinking in the information age is “free-
associating, poetical, metaphorical” (109).  Certainly, anyone who has ever starting out on one Wikipedia 
page, only to follow a succession of links to a distance one—from “Mia Farrow” to “Dien Bien Phu,” 
perhaps—can appreciate the seemingly random, “free-associating” nature of digital culture.  Of late, some 
compositionists have even argued that our field should actively cultivate such modes of thought (see Sirc, 
Boyle).   
But there are dangers associated with thought-as-free-verse.  With the loss of “narratives, orders, 
developmental sequences,” it becomes increasingly difficult to locate oneself in space and time (120).  
This leads to a sort of paralysis, as individuals no longer have stable criteria on which to base action.  
Integrally though, this state of uncertainty cannot hold.  As Postman writes, “cultures must have 
narratives and will find them where they will…. The alternative is to live without meaning, the ultimate 
negation of life itself” (173).  In short, we need stories.  When the world becomes a “hysterical sequence 
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of saturated moments,” we are drawn to those voices which shout the loudest, present the least taxing 
narratives.  Such a state of affairs, Eriksen argues, provides fertile ground for fundamentalism, 
opportunism, and “politics devoid of vision” (141).  In these post-postmodern scourges, if Eriksen is to be 
believed, we see digital communication technology—our mobile devices and high-speed broadband—
“playing out its hand.”  Maybe not.  Maybe Eriksen is an alarmist.  When I look at my social media feed, 
though—an unending stream of insults and non sequiturs—his ideas have eerie resonance. 
*** 
Taken together, the work of Postman and Eriksen begins to reveal how the fragments created by 
neoliberalism can turn hegemonic.  As the influx of mediated information becomes increasingly intense, 
complexity, coherence and context are sacrificed.  Texts become pastiches of highly abstract, easily 
digestible soundbites.  I’d like to suggest that such texts function almost as a sort of code: they resonant 
with in-group audiences, but are unintelligible to out-group audiences.  In this regard, language itself 
works to separate us from one another.  An educated, urban liberal who tries to read say, Fox News or 
Brietbart, will likely be flummoxed by the constant, impassioned references to “Benghazi” and “sanctuary 
cities.”  For a rural conservative, on the other hand, these same buzzwords act as self-contained networks 
of meaning.  Integrally, they can be arranged in a seemingly illogical manner (to an outsider), and still 
accomplish their communicative function.  As an example, consider the following tweet from Leigh 
Cowart, a self-described freelance writer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Figure 1. Fragmented Tweet 
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As we can see, this communication has been “liked” over 3000 times, indicating that it resonates with its 
intended audience, reflecting or amplifying some element of their lived experience.  It therefore has 
meaning.  On its face though, applying conventional language rules, Cowart’s tweet is incoherent.  By 
starting with “yeah,” the second line seems to agree with the first, though such agreement would render 
the whole nonsensical.  So what’s happening here?  I’d like to suggest that Cowart’s tweet works 
primarily by juxtaposing certain keywords (emotional labor, patriarchal capitalism) with an expletive 
(dogshit pile).  The fact that its two parts don’t seem to cohere doesn’t matter: her audience knows what 
she’s trying to say.1 
 The above tweet is important because it lays bare the logic at the heart of much modern 
communication.  As Eriksen writes, in a world of excess, “striking one liners”—or in this case, abstract 
buzzwords—“rule the roost.”  This makes perfect sense.  Among the digital torrent, every second of 
attention is precious; communication-by-keyword is therefore a rational strategy.  On the whole though, I 
believe that this movement towards discursive shorthand has a fragmentary effect.  Because it 
presupposes a shared reality to be effective, the sharing of abstract keywords cannot be used to bridge 
competing realities.  If my father, a truck driver from Kansas were to see the above tweet, for example, he 
would say simply, “what the hell?”  Cowart’s important claim about the devaluation of emotional labor 
would be unintelligible to him.  Of course, there’s a time and place for in-group communication.  I 
believe, though, following Postman and Eriksen, that in contemporary discursive space, such 
communication is increasingly crowding out more complex, resource-intensive messaging.  The result is a 
general loss of communicative capacity.  Our narratives are more simple, but paradoxically, can no longer 
be as widely shared.  
 
 
 
 
1.4   FILTER BUBBLES & YOU-LOOPS 
 
 
 In the above section, we saw how information chaos can make it more difficult for individuals to 
create meaning, to contextualize, to tie one event to another.  We also saw how the writing practices such 
chaos encourages may make it more difficult for groups to communicate.  These trends, though in no way 
1 It seems to me that Cowart’s tweet presents the first line not as evidence for the second (the expected move), but as 
a claim to be disputed.  This logic is difficult to follow because of the use of “yeah” to start the second line.  The fact 
that it took me three years to figure it out, I feel, only proves my point. 
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absolute or irreversible, should be of concern to writing teachers.  As Ann Berthoff argues, the expansion 
of meaning-making ability is composition’s primary mission.  Through the construction of more and more 
sophisticated meanings our students come to know—and care for—more of our world.  My claim is that 
the current state of information chaos perverts this process.  In a world of excess, thinking and speaking 
are simplified (by necessity).  In turn, our ability to know, feel, be and be together is restricted.  This 
contraction of experience is a serious social problem, and one that rhetoric and composition can and 
should address. 
  Wait, says the technological utopian.  How can you claim experience is contracting?  With the 
death of the censor, group belonging is now open, fluid.  Citing online activists groups perhaps, she says 
that the seeming chaos allows for new and organic forms of connection, hence more expansive (often 
supra-cognitive) forms of meaning.  Yes and no.  As has become increasingly apparent, just because we 
can use digital technology to expand who and what we know, does not mean we will.  Quite the opposite.  
In fact, I’d like to suggest that with neoliberalism and the cult of choice, the censor has moved inward 
(and thus gained authority).  Without external regulation, individuals have had to become more personally 
selective.2  The result, on the whole, is a sort of cognitive and aesthetic conservatism.   
As evidence of the above, consider your own behavior in a typical low information 
environment—say an airplane seat at take-off or landing.  Unable to access more desirable forms of 
stimulation, you scan the safety card, flip through the airline magazine.  You read advertisements and the 
message from the airline’s CEO—texts you wouldn’t even glance at otherwise.  In this airline seat, in 
short, your guard comes down: because of a paucity of information, you become more willing to take 
chances, to engage new and unknown symbols.  For most of human existence, low info was the default.  
In the digital age, though, we find fewer and fewer low-information sanctuaries.  We are always plugged-
in and therefore our guard must always be up.  We must always be scanning and selecting, trying to 
determine which bits of mediated information (out of the massive stream) best suit our needs.  This makes 
us relatively less likely to engage with something new or different.  Consider a massive all-you-can-eat-
buffet: allowed to pick between an array of your favorite dishes, are you going to choose the alien gruel?  
I think not.   
 
2 This is not to say that citizens have somehow become more critical or discerning.  A recent report from the 
Stanford History Education Group, for example, recently found that college students displayed a “dismaying 
inability” to separate fact from fiction on social media and other digital platforms (see SHEG).  The likely cause, I’d 
argue, is perhaps best termed “willful illiteracy.”  Given the ability to construct their own reality, subjects 
understandably pay little attention to outside standards of fact and fiction.  They simply append the label “fact” to 
those bits of information that support their worldview. 
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Eriksen, in particular, should be lauded for his early recognition of the role individuals must now 
play in managing their information exposure.  He recognizes that with the decline of institutions, the 
censor has been internalized—that we must now decide for ourselves what we see and what we ignore.  In 
an information society, Eriksen writes, “protecting oneself” against unwanted information is a “crucial 
skill” (17).  His use of the word “protecting” here is telling.  In a world in which meanings are 
increasingly fragile (and valuable), information which disturbs our vision and views must be treated with 
extreme caution.   
Eriksen also recognizes the dangers of filtering.  When “each individual is forced to develop their 
own paths, creating their own personal cuts in the world,” it becomes increasingly difficult to identify and 
solve common problems (107).  Paradoxically though, he concludes, that ultimately, for our own well-
being, “what matters more than anything else… is to equip oneself with sturdy, efficient filters which 
consist of taste, values, interests and intuition” (149).  It seems that Eriksen is arguing for a conception of 
filtering—of information regulation, of censorship—as a conscious, critical practice.  We should be aware 
of what we are excluding and why we are excluding it.  This is undoubtedly good advice.  In the years 
since the publication of Tyranny of the Moment though, the media environment has furthered evolved.  
This evolution has made the filters Eriksen suggests both a standard feature of our lifeworld and hidden 
them from view.   
In The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding From You, Eli Parser, founder of the public 
interest website Moveon.org, traces the failure of the internet’s democratic possibilities.  As a young left-
wing activist, he believed that unlimited, uncensored digital connection would usher in a new age of 
informed citizenship and government accountability.  As of 2010, he finds his hopes largely dashed.  He 
blames this failure on what he terms the “filter bubble.”  As he explains, personalized filters, driven by 
complex computer algorithms, have become an integral part of our digital life.  Whenever we select a 
movie on Netflix, check our Facebook feed, or do a Google search, we are not encountering some 
objective slice of the web.  Instead, we are being provided with recommendations specifically tailored to 
our own interests.  The more we use these services, the better they get at predicting what movie we’ll 
watch, what news article we’ll read, what link we’ll click.  The effect of such personalization, Parser 
argues, is to “serve up a kind of invisible autopropaganda, indoctrinating us with our own ideas” (13).  
Eventually, he writes, you get stuck in a “static, ever narrowing version of yourself—an endless you-
loop” (14).    
 Parser’s filter bubble represents a fascinating evolution of the social trends discussed so far.  As 
Postman predicts, newer technology will always appear to solve the problems created by newish 
technology.  In this case, innovation led to information chaos; innovation provides a solution to 
information chaos.  The “sturdy, efficient filters” Eriksen calls for are now in place.  These filters are 
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invisible though, mandatory, and as Parser notes, completely solitary: no one is in my bubble except for 
me.  In this we see the individuation of experience—the hallmark of neoliberalism—taken to its logical 
extreme.  The construction of our own “emotional and cognitive realities” is now automatic.   
 Parser does important work in tracing the practical consequences of digital personalization.  In 
line with Postman’s comments about the connection between our tools and our reality, he shows how the 
filter bubble works to alter what we see, what we feel, and what we value.  The filter bubble, he writes, 
“can act as magnifying glass,” making certain problems or issues loom large in our imagination (48).  For 
other individuals, and other social groups, stuck in mutually exclusive bubbles, other problems and issues 
rule.  Relatedly, the filter bubble makes it more difficult for us to see “the big picture,” to construct 
inclusive, coherent narratives of explanation.  As Parser puts it, in contemporary digital space, “it’s easy 
to lose your bearings, to believe the world is a narrow island when in fact it’s an immense, varied 
continent” (61).  It’s important to underscore how insidious this process is.  In a state of pure information 
chaos, we are at least aware of our impaired meaning-making ability.  If Parser is right, in the rarified 
world of the filter bubble, we are deprived of even this self-knowledge. 
 The cognitive blinkering of the filter bubble has important implications for how we think and 
learn.  As Parser puts it, intense personalization can upset the “cognitive balancing act” that allows us to 
adapt to new stimuli (49).  We need “meaning threats”—images or ideas that don’t fit within our existing 
worldview—in order to spur us to draft more inclusive narratives.  The filter bubble blocks such threats.  
By surrounding us with ideas with which we already agree, personalization “removes from our 
environment key prompts that make us want to learn,” ultimately making us “overconfident in our mental 
frameworks” (49).  In short, within the filter bubble, we are blind to the other and happy to remain so.  
Our thoughts become rigid, less able to accommodate the unknown, the alien.  Our stories become 
simplistic.  Difference (that shibboleth of neoliberal lore!) becomes the enemy. 
As any frequent user of social media can attest, there is something of a vicious circle associated 
with the process described above.  The more and more our views are confirmed—by the news articles we 
read, by our interactions with similarly situated peers—the more disgusting and illogical opposing views 
become.  As such, when the other, and his grotesque desire manage to sneak through the filtration 
process, we are quick to push him out of sight.  Of course, social media platforms make the removal of 
disturbing elements as painless as possible.  Allowing you to exercise your choice, after all, is essential to 
keeping you as a customer.  In this way, through the “defriending” of a racist uncle on Facebook, for 
example, we further contribute to our cognitive isolation.  Perhaps this helps explain why so many 
American elites were shocked by Donald Trump’s presidential victory.  As a friend of mine put it, Trump 
voters are the ones we long ago blocked from our Facebook feeds. 
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1.5   RISE OF THE NEO-TRIBES 
 
 
 So far we’ve mainly discussed the alienating effects of information filtering—its tendency to 
isolates individuals within “you-loops” of their own design.  It’s important to remember though that 
digital tools do in fact allow for a previously unimaginable degree of connectivity.  Whether through 
email, text message, social media, video call or plain old voice call, “staying in touch” is easier now than 
ever before.  As we enter the second decade of widespread mobile phone and internet availability, 
empirical evidence is starting to emerge about who we connect with, what information we share, and what 
this does to us.  Summarizing her research on the impact of digital connectivity on Japanese culture, Misa 
Matsuda notes the rise of “selective sociality,” in which people are increasingly able to manage their 
social networks “according to affinities, maintaining relationships with those they share interests with, 
regardless of time and place” (qtd. in Dias 5).  She finds that this reinforces the homogeneity of our 
lifeworlds, exacerbating the differences between groups.  Vicent Gozalvez puts it more colorfully, writing 
that subjects now live on “digital islands” where they engage in  “digital inbreeding,” ignoring issues of 
common concern, and sparking widespread “cognitive regression” (132).  So again, as with Parser, we see 
concerns that solipsism rules the day.  Individuals and self-selected groups of individuals turn inward.  
The boring, uncomfortable or simply different, are ignored. 
 The contracting range of social experience is more than just a sociological novelty.  Instead, it can 
have a real impact on our public order system.  Perhaps the most important voice on the political effects 
of social fragmentation is Cass Sunstein.  His work on group polarization is especially timely.  As 
Sunstein explains, group polarization is a social phenomenon in which, upon discussion and deliberation, 
“members of a deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction 
indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies” (74).  In other words, as similarly situated 
individuals discuss an issue, their views get both more homogenous and more extreme.  Sunstein posits 
that this shift is due to social influence on behavior (E.G., a desire not to harm’s one reputation by taking 
an unpopular stand) and the disproportionate number of arguments trending to one side.  He finds 
evidence of this tendency among juries, corporate boards and terrorist groups.  The power of social 
sanction is so strong, in fact, that people will even disregard evidence of their own senses (79).  Sunstein 
argues that wars, feuds and racial conflicts can all be explained with reference to group polarization.  
Overall, he writes, “widespread error and social fragmentation are likely to result when like-minded 
people, insulated from others, move in extreme directions simply because of limited argument pools and 
parochial influences” (105). 
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 Sunstein’s findings are both startling, and I’m afraid, all too familiar.  Many elements of modern 
life, from the vulgarity of the comments sections of online news sources, to the rabid hatred fans feel for a 
rival sports team, bear traces of group polarization.  In a world of “digital islands,” in which it is easier 
than ever to connect with those, and only those, who share your interests and values, this phenomenon 
becomes only more pronounced.   
Sunstein himself addresses this concern.  In Republic.com 2.0 he discusses the potential harm 
social fragmentation, particularly of the digital sort, might have on democratic governance.  Here he 
argues that exposure to otherness, and the cultivation of shared experience, “are central to democracy 
itself” (5).   Like Parser, he notes the natural tendency of people to seek out stimuli that don’t disturb their 
existing worldview.  According to Sunstein, America’s founding fathers, aware of this tendency, took 
pains to ensure that our constitutionally mandated system of free expression includes both freedom from 
censorship and a right to access.  Common spaces, like streets and parks, are open to all comers.  Here, 
citizens risk exposure to unexpected, even unwanted, ideas.  This injects an element of heterogeneity into 
our lifeworlds, allowing for cognitive growth, and ultimately, better public policy.  As individuals gain 
more control over their social reality though, this key feature of democracy is threatened.  Whether 
online, on niche TV channels, or in their own communities, instead of an array of competing voices, 
citizens are now confronted only with “more and louder echoes of their own voices” (Sunstein 55).  
  Violent religious extremists, Sunstein notes, represent perhaps the most vulgar example of digital 
solipsism.  Caught in online echo chambers which reaffirm and reinforce their violent views, these 
subjects suffer from “a crippled epistemology.”  Sunstein writes: “They know very little, and what they 
know comes… from people who appeal to, and amplify, their preexisting inclinations” (76).  Here—in the 
thousands of young Europeans who have rushed to join the radical Islamic State group in recent years, for 
example—we see the hegemony of the fragments in its grossest manifestation.  Such subjects are 
intensely connected, but in the aggregate, their connection becomes perverse.  Terror groups, Sunstein 
writes, quoting an insider account of such groups, “do not even consider that they may be wrong and that 
other views may have some merit…. They attribute only evil motives to anyone outside their group…. 
Compromise is rejected,” and driven by their own internal dynamics, they often acts in ways which are 
“objectively nonproductive or even counterproductive to their announced goal” (74,75).  Digital 
inbreeding, we can say, has completely comprised these subjects’ ability to make sense of the world.  
They are trapped within a simplistic, exclusive and utterly rigid set of narratives.  
  What is particularly striking is the fact that the above description of group dynamics could also be 
said to apply to elements of the Republican party or segments of the left-wing “social justice” community.  
In short, while radical religious groups may be different in quantity (of hate, of violent propensity) they 
are not fundamentally different in quality from other neo-tribes.  And, I would argue, pointing to gridlock 
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in Washington DC and activist vitriol on college campuses, that neotribalism is the order of the day.  
Simply put, to an increasing extent, social associations are coming to be defined by inflexibility of 
thought and story.  This limits their ability to engage productively with other groups.  Following Sunstein, 
we can posit that the fragmentation of social experience, both exemplified in, and sustained by, digital 
communication technology, has led to this state of (dis)connection. 
*** 
Despite the above, I am not a technological determinist.  Certainly we can learn to use our tools in less 
destructive ways.  As I hope I’ve made clear though, communication practices, digital or otherwise, 
cannot be understood separately from the reigning political-economic order.  This complicates any 
attempt by writing teachers (or anyone else) to combat problematic cognitive and discursive practices.  As 
noted, the tenor of our times is best captured under the admittedly vague, and oft abused, catch-all 
“neoliberalism.”  Under this boss, choice rules, whether it be at Burger King, which promises you can 
“have it your way,” or in terms of public policy, which assumes that the greatest good arises from letting 
people do as they wish (and as their bank accounts allow, of course).  Given a base state of information 
chaos, many people like filter bubbles, they like soundbites and simple, exclusive narratives.  As Marc 
Lafuente notes, the homogeneity of social networks, by constantly affirming one’s views, provides 
“emotional benefits” (6).  Writing teachers are not parents or priests, why should we be tasked with 
drawing students out their protective bubbles?   
Sunstein speaks to such concerns.  First, he draws a distinction between consumer sovereignty 
and political sovereignty.  The former, he writes, means that individual consumers are able to choose 
exactly as they wish.  They are able to exercise their desires, with “desire” seen as timeless and given.  
Political sovereignty, on the other hand, understands desire as a dynamic force.  In English-department 
speak, we would say that it is primarily concerned with the construction of healthy subjectivities.  When 
political sovereignty is privileged, Sunstein argues, freedom is seen to consist “not simply in the 
satisfaction of whatever preferences people have, but also in the chance to have preferences… formed 
under decent conditions” (45).  Respect for political sovereignty is at the heart of the Western democratic 
tradition, he claims, drawing a distinction between pure populism and a democratic system that takes 
steps to ensure deliberation, reflection and accountability.  Only under the latter—what he terms 
“deliberative democracy”—is one truly free. 
Sunstein’s concept of deliberative democracy provides a foundation on which educators could 
begin to challenge the reigning consumer-choice model and its associated set of communication practices.  
Indeed, some educators, influenced by the work of Parser and Sunstein, have already began to do so.  
Spanish philosopher of education Vicent Gozalvez, for example, has recently argued for “education and 
training measures to limit apparently reasonable individual decisions… that could eventually 
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deteriorate… the freedom of citizens” (132).  “It is essential,” he writes, to be aware of the danger of 
digital inbreeding, “and fight it on the educational front” (133).  Towards this end, he argues for 
educational initiatives which “seek to impart knowledge of broader social realities,” by pushing students 
to engage in “the constant search for new experiential and mental horizons” (135).   
Though he is speaking mainly of education in the schools, Gozalvez’s call can, and should, 
resonant with teachers of composition.  Composition obviously has many goals—to prepare students for 
college, careers and citizenship, to encourage personal growth and respect for the written word—at heart 
though, they all implicate the use of tools, whether be it pencil, pen, word processor or simply language 
itself.  As the above has shown, it is becoming increasingly clear that the way we use our tools is 
restricting what we can think, feel and do.  We need theory and pedagogy that opens up new vistas, both 
for ourselves and our students.  Below I will argue that the work of William James can help point the way 
to these open spaces.  The work of Cass Sunstein suggests why we must pursue them.  Of course, some 
may believe that the expansion of our mental and experiential horizons is a sufficient end in itself, the 
ultimate purpose of being alive even (this is what William James would likely claim).  Others may not be 
so sure. For these teachers, Sunstein’s argument as to the importance of deliberative democracy, and the 
perils it currently faces, provides an alternative justification for opening things up.  Simply put, if 
Sunstein is right, writing teachers can help ensure the continuation of democratic governance by working 
to promote cognitive and discursive habits which allow for deliberation, reflection, and ultimately, 
compromise.  I can’t imagine a more important task.   
1.6   COMPOSITION & THE FRAGMENTS (A CASE OF MISDIRECTION) 
 I began this chapter by suggesting that before acting, writing teacher seek to learn the specific 
needs of the time and place in which they act.  Towards this end, I’ve mapped our present cognitive and 
discursive terrain.  Stretching from Neil Postman to Cass Sunstein, from Spain to Silicon Valley,  
I’ve found a similar thread of concerns.  Simply put, writers today confront a world broken into 
fragments.  In light of the rise of digital technology, and the flood of mediated information it has 
unleashed, coherent, inclusive meanings are difficult to construct.  At the same time, we are increasingly 
insulated from difference.  The effect is widespread cognitive ossification.  I’ve termed this state 
of affairs the hegemony of the fragments.  It is intimately connected to the formation of neo-tribes, 
groups  of  individuals  drawn  together  by  shared  interests or values, who through the effects of digital 
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inbreeding and group polarization, find it difficult to find common ground with other groups.  Taken 
together, these factors have resulted in the scene I described at the beginning of this essay: political 
polarization and paralysis, hatred and division. 
I’d like to report that composition theory, the enterprise in which I am engaged, has made strides 
towards addressing these problems.  Unfortunately, I don’t believe this to be the case.  In fact, I believe 
that the currently dominant theoretical tendencies within composition scholarship are largely blind to 
social fragmentation.  To explain why this might be, I’d like to turn to a recent journal article: “Around 
1986: The Externalization of Cognition and the Emergence of Postprocess Invention,” by Kristopher M. 
Lotier.  In this piece, published in the field’s flagship journal, Lotier does important work in mapping the 
current state of composition theory.  Specifically, he argues that since the mid-1980s, a postprocess 
understanding of writing has come to replace the once dominant process model.3  This claim, in itself, is 
not new.  Lotier’s more original contribution is to suggest that rather than just being one approach among 
many, postprocess represents something of a master key.  “Since roughly 1986,” he writes, “postprocess 
has acted as a disciplinary cultural dominant, with its tenets…providing the largely unspoken 
foundation(s) on which a host of divergent theories arise” (363).  And what are these tenets?   For present 
purposes, the most important is the externalization of cognition. 
According to Lotier, process-era theories of writing and the writer presupposed cognitive 
internalism, “the idea that one’s mind is separate from other minds and from the world in which those 
minds exist” (362).  Externalism challenges this idea, suggesting that no thinking (or writing) can occur 
sans interaction with various objects and others.  Such theories, Lotier writes, suggest that “aloneness is 
an ontological impossibility…. All writing is always already overwritten by other people and, crucially, 
other stuff” (366).  Today’s two hottest theoretical approaches—ecological composition and posthuman 
composition—are intimately related to one another (and subsumed under postprocess) in that both seek to 
trace the operation of extended cognition (the former by focusing on the writer in her environs; the latter, 
the writer and her tools). 
In noting the dominance of externalist theories of mind, Lotier puts into words what many comp 
watchers must feel: simply put, that over the past thirty years, there’s been an ongoing race to spread the 
writer as thin as possible.  Every act of writing, our theory now holds, is “a plural act… accomplished by 
an indefinite number of human and nonhuman actors” (373).  The job of the composition theorist, it 
3 As the title of his piece suggests, Lotier is primarily concerned with theories of invention.  I believe his claims also 
hold true for composition theory as a whole, though. 
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seems, is primarily to identify overlooked ones.4  Lotier credits this shift in theoretical orientation to 
larger social trends.  Changes in the “techno-linguistic-intellectual ecology,” he writes, have revealed our 
inherent connectivity, with digital technologies, “making the idea that writing had ever been 
individualizable seem… untenable” (364).   
So compositionists are increasingly aware of the various forces that impact the writing act.  Good.  
It seems to me though, that in the race to draw new connections, composition theory has overlooked 
rampant disconnection.  As we rush to externalize mind, to describe more and more ways in which our 
tools and environs could possibly think for us and with us, we’ve stopped caring about the ways in which 
we actually think.  Our theorists have become sci-fi novelists.  And that explains why composition theory 
has been silent on the issue of social fragmentation.  As I’ve tried to show, the hegemony of the 
fragments, while tied to abstract political-economic-technical processes, works primarily on the level of 
individual cognition: it arises from and sustains important changes in the way individual humans 
construct their world.  Composition theorists, meanwhile, have focused mainly on texts, tools, and the 
possibilities therein.  They have drawn ever more broad webs of technological potentiality.  This has 
blinded them to the increasingly restricted nature of human life. 
Tony Scott and Nancy Welch have recently made a similar accusation.  In arguing for a turn to 
“critical materialism,” they claim that composition theory remains “textually fixated,” thereby 
overlooking the “bodily impacts” of tools and texts (566).  To illustrate their point, they discuss the 
popular “Kony 2012” online video.  This text, despite promoting militaristic and imperialist policy goals, 
has generally been heralded as a successful example of online “hacktivism.”  Scholars marvel at the speed 
with which the video spread around the internet, the new forms of connection it sparked; they fail to 
consider, however, the substance of the video’s claims and the bodies those claims impact.  In this, Scott 
and Welch see “a McLuhanesque enthrallment” with the scale or pace of technological change working to 
discourage “critical engagement with human affairs” (565).  I see a similar enthrallment in much of our 
field’s best theory. 
Returning to Lotier’s essay, we can find traces of this misdirection.  As noted, Lotier provides a 
useful survey of the theoretical scene.  In a standard composition studies move, he also seeks to tie his 
work to the classroom.  Per postprocess theory, every writing act is singular, therefore universal 
pedagogical prescriptions cannot be issued; in recognition of this fact, Lotier (correctly) refuses to issue 
any.  Instead, he presents “two promising, contemporary models of invention” which he sees as 
illustrating the successful application of “theory attuned to its environs” (375).  The first is labeled 
4 Laura Micciche, for example, theorizes writing as a “merging of various forms of matter—objects, pets, sounds, 
tools, books, bodies, spaces, feelings, and so on—in an activity not solely dependent on one’s control” (498).  
Margaret Syverson reminds us not to forget “weather, animals, oceans, mountains, and forests” (9). 
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“proairetic invention,” and has the goal of leaving “as many options for the text available as possible—
both in terms of what it could mean and what it could do”(376).  This is a promising, I thought as I read, 
anticipating a discussion of what such a strategy might look like in action, what it might do to and for my 
students, and why I might be interested in sparking this sort of change.  Instead though, Lotier spends the 
rest of the essay discussing tools.  New media technologies “further this proairetic openness,” he writes, 
before discussing in detail how and why this might be the case (376).  The student—as in the embodied 
being expected to interact with blogs, databases and search engines—is never mentioned.  The reason for 
this focus is clear: due to the externalist theories of mind driving postprocess theory, tools and environs 
are “where the action is.”  Within networks and assemblages, that’s where texts collide, mate, merge.  To 
the outside, therefore, is where Lotier turns his attention.  
So, in essence, my complaint tracks Scott and Welch’s.  We agree that composition theory must 
foreground the interplay of texts, thought and thing.  We feel though that currently dominant materialist  
approaches—the posthuman and ecological, in particular—devalue the human.  They focus too much on 
texts, tools and abstract notions of circulation rather than the actual bodily effects of life with and among 
such entities.  This results in statements, in presuppositions, even, which seen in light of empirical 
evidence as to how people actually use digital technology, seem quite naïve.  Lotier, for example, writes 
gushingly of how technology allows any user, “with just a few keystrokes, to connect [a text] to an 
effectively infinite constellation of other texts” (376).  Sure, I’d say, but so what?  Our options are 
hypothetically unlimited, but in the world of actual practice—of thought and feeling and Donald Trump— 
they grow more limited by the day.  As the fragments become more and more hegemonic, Lotier’s 
“constellation of other texts” becomes a straitjacket.  Composition theory, enthralled with connection, has 
been unable to understand this as a problem or provide possible solutions.  As such, composition theory 
has been complicit in the hegemony of the fragments. 
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1.7   ENTER WILLIAM JAMES 
 
 
According to the argument sketched above, composition has focused too heavily on texts, tools 
and the possibilities therein, and not enough on the human limitations that may stop writers from realizing 
those possibilities.  To some extent, this focus is understandable.  As Lotier suggests, the past decades 
have seen great changes in how we write: these changes, and the opportunities they open up, must be 
explored.  At the same time though, for some, this tendency to fetishize gadgets may fit a little too 
comfortably with the impulses that drive consumer culture.  As I read it, Lotier’s piece, for example, 
argues that hyperlinks, databases and search engines can help writers “think different.”  Of course, this is 
exactly what Apple, Inc.—the world’s most profitable company—has long promised.  
 In light of the above, this project will argue for a vision of composition theory which is decidedly 
more human (and perhaps less corporate).  To think in this new mode, we need a model.  For this role, I 
nominate William James.  As I will detail below, James was an American, brother of Henry, and long-
time Harvard professor.  A voracious reader and generous thinker, he wrote eloquently on many subjects.  
To my knowledge though, writing instruction was not one of them.  This means that while James can (and 
should) inform composition theory, the correspondence will not be one-to-one.  Instead, as presented 
here, I intend William James to function as a character as Alasdair MacIntyre has defined the term.  A 
character, MacIntyre writes, embodies a set of moral, epistemological and ontological beliefs, thereby 
furnishing a community with a sort of ideal.  In such a figure, personality type and social function fuse.  
As MacIntyre sees it, Victorian England, for example, was defined by the Public School Master, the 
Engineer and the Explorer.  These figures, as they circulated in discourse, provided landmarks by which 
Victorians could navigate social existence. 
 In rhetoric and composition we already have a great deal of characters.  Peter Elbow is one.  
David Bartholomae is another.  Recently, attempts have been made to enshrine Bruno Latour (see Lynch 
and Rivers).  In each case, a proper name acts as shorthand for a certain attitude towards writing and the 
teaching of writing (writing without teachers vs. writing with teachers vs. writing with things, we might 
say).  Of course, no pedagogy is a pure reflection of any of these ideals.  And that’s fine.  The goal in 
calling forth characters is not doctrinal purity, nor universal assent; instead, it is to focus attention, to 
provide an object of discussion.  In fact, it is only because these figures “provide focal points for 
disagreement that they are able to perform their defining task” (MacIntyre 31).  It is in this vein that I 
present William James.  As we’ll see, the personality type performed in his work is one of radical 
openness.  As Jacques Barzun writes, through a lifetime of study and struggle, James “painfully taught 
himself the principle of total acceptance—not to subordinate or explain away anything but to welcome the 
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contents of every kind of experience” (21).  This heroic willingness to look and listen makes James the 
embodiment of a certain set of moral and metaphysical assumptions I wish to promote.  Simply put, I 
believe that given our existence among the fragments, James provides an apt model for how writers and 
writing teachers should strive to write, think and be.  Others will feel differently.  Either way, by studying 
how William James, as a character, writes and thinks, we can gain a shared point of reference, and 
ultimately, I hope, hammer out a better understanding of what composition is and can do. 
*** 
 By all accounts, William James is an important intellectual figure.  John McDermott writes that 
James’s work “is the vestibule to the thought and values of the twentieth century” (146).  Cornel West 
writes that, with the exception of James’s godfather, Ralph Waldo Emerson, “no one but James deserves 
to be considered the preeminent American man of letters” (54).  Despite his cultural prominence, James 
has been little mentioned in the composition literature.  Before we discuss why this might be, some 
biographical information is in order.  This is important, because, by all accounts, James’s life and thought 
are thoroughly intertwined, with the latter representing, at bottom, nothing more than an effort to come to 
terms with the former.  His is perhaps the most personal of philosophies.  As Richard Gale writes, 
James’s life work “is the soulful expression of someone who has ‘paid his dues,’ someone who, like old 
wagon wheels, has been through it all” (1).  A quick sketch of his journey:   
William James was born in 1842 in New York City, the eldest son of Henry James Sr., an 
independently wealthy and socially prominent (though not doctrinally influential) Swedenborgian 
theologian.5  After a peripatetic childhood, and a young adulthood marked by physical and mental 
breakdowns, in 1869 he received an M.D. from Harvard, his only academic qualification.  Though not an 
exceptional student, he was shortly thereafter appointed instructor of physiology and anatomy.  He would 
teach at Harvard for the next thirty-five years.  Marked by a “romantic temperament” which relied on 
“natural aptitude and intuition rather than… disciplinary training,” his work wandered freely among the 
physical sciences, philosophy and psychology, a discipline he is credited with helping create (Baldwin 
369).  In 1890 he published the monumental two-volume textbook, Principles of Psychology.  His 
popularly acclaimed Talks to Teachers lecture series, in which made his psychological thought available 
to an audience of school teachers, took place the following year.  
  In later life, James’s interests turned more towards philosophy.  His famous justification for 
religious faith—The Will to Believe—was published in 1897, followed by The Varieties of Religious 
Experience, a series of case studies in the mystical.  A year later he identified himself as a pragmatist, a 
term drawn from the work of his college friend, C.S. Peirce.  This line of thought would culminate in 
                                                 
5 All dates in this biographic summary are drawn from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, published in 1907, after which he began work 
on his metaphysical scheme, termed “radical empiricism.”  He died of heart failure in 1910, leaving much 
of this work incomplete.6 
 How has James been read?  What’s his intellectual legacy?  Given James’s many interests, this is 
a difficult question.  In psychology, James’s Principles is still a canonical text, though, according to 
Frank Pajares, the field has never had a “Jamesian tradition” of which to speak (57).  In philosophy, 
James’s pragmatism—the only indigenous American philosophical tradition, according to Cornel West—
caused a stir upon its introduction.  It’s bold supposition that truth is found in human experience, rather 
than in the conceptual clouds, was both feted as “a shaft of light thrown into the darkness” and 
condemned as something akin to heresy (Barzun 87).  Since then, interest in the pragmatist creed have 
waxed and waned.7  James has always been in the scholarly conscious, though.  As a leading cultural 
figure during one of America’s most formative periods, his thought, Pajares writes, has influenced 
“politics, sociology, religion and theology, literature, and… even jurisprudence” (56).  As an example of 
this influence, one might cite the ubiquitous phrase “stream of consciousness” (drawn from Principles), or 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown vs. The Board of Education, which in true pragmatist fashion, 
hinges on the consequences of segregation (see Ives). 
 Earlier I noted the intensely personal nature of James’s thought.  No matter the subject, James 
himself always seems present on the page.  This might account for a tendency among readers to develop 
what can only be described as a deep emotional bond with the man and his work.  Psychologist Frank 
Pajares is representative.  “For over 30 years,” he writes, “I have been smitten with William James…. My 
admiration borders on adulation” (42).  This sort of devotion is not limited to academic audiences.  Jessa 
Crispin, a popular essayist, writes that in James, she finds “a friend, a mentor, a professor, and some sort 
of idealized father…. He makes quiet sense of the world, in all its glories and deprivations, its calamities 
and its beauties.”  Can you imagine such words being written about Kant or Hume or any of James’s other 
peers in the philosophical pantheon?  James is a truth-teller, but also a soothing presence.  And, I’d 
suggest, many of us need to calm down. 
 
6 Apart from his scholarly activities, James was noted for his interest in mediums and other physic phenomena, as 
well as his vocal opposition to racial oppression and American imperialism.  His life and work influenced numerous 
students (W.E.B. DuBois, Theodore Roosevelt, Gertrude Stein), the public at large, and philosophers on both sides 
of the Atlantic (Edmund Husserl, John Dewey, Ludwig Wittgenstein).  
7 Pragmatism is generally understood as going out of fashion with the death of John Dewey in the mid-twentieth 
century.  It was then re-popularized by Richard Rorty in the 1980s.  As of 2018, Jamesian pragmatism, in particular, 
seems to be an object of interest across many academic disciplines. 
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 Given James’s standing as one of America’s great intellectuals (and as Crispin suggests, a 
wonderfully literary writer), it is somewhat surprising that his work has not found more traction within 
rhetoric and composition.  On the rhetoric side of things, James has started to receive some attention, with 
his work recently examined by Robert Danisch and Paul Stob.8  In terms of writing instruction though, I 
know of only two texts which deal with James in any substantive way.9  Why has James been 
overlooked?  William Gavin provides a hint when he writes that James has often been viewed as a 
“romantic intuitionist” who believed that life—or the interesting parts of it anyway—exists “beyond all 
language” (208).  Though Gavin goes on to explain that this view is largely incorrect, it is easy to see why 
it persists.  Language, as James understands it, makes thought possible, but is also sluggish, clunky, and 
overall, “wholly inadequate” to capture the ever-changing flux of lived experience (212).  Though a 
careful thinker, James has no time for “intellectualizing” or “verbal formulas.”  Indeed, one of the main 
goals of his scholarly project is to reinstate “the vague and inarticulate to its proper place in our mental 
life” (PP 165).  The “vague and inarticulate” is of course that which lies beyond language, that from 
which thought arises and must return.  It is the realm of sensation, affect, habit and the object.  
Traditionally, these non-linguistic elements have been overlooked in discussions of writing instruction.  
In light of that, we can see why James has been little mentioned in the composition literature.  We can 
also see, given the recent move towards theories of extended cognition, why James might be more 
relevant now than ever before.  As will be detailed in coming chapters, after a social turn, the field has 
taken a material turn.  The “great outdoors,” in the form of texts, tools, objects and others, now more than 
ever takes a starring role in our theory.  With his detailed explorations of both the conceptual and 
sensorial elements of experience, James is well-positioned to contribute to this conversation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Indeed, Stob has an entire book on James: William James and the Art of the Popular Statement (2013) 
9 The first is Thomas Newkirk’s The Performance of Self in Student Writing, from 1997.  Here, Newkirk uses 
Jamesian pragmatism to argue that composition should pay more attention to what narratives (even simplistic or 
cliché ones) do for students.  The second, from 1998, is Hephzibah Roskelly and Kate Ronald’s Reason to Believe: 
Romanticism, Pragmatism, and the Possibility of Teaching.  This text argues that composition can use a mash-up of 
pragmatism and romanticism “to reinvigorate its work with [a] sense of hope, mission, and passion” (1).  Much 
other work is undoubtedly indirectly influenced by James.  James Moffet’s “Writing, Inner Speech, and Meditation,” 
for example, makes very interesting (and Jamesian) use of the idea of the stream of consciousness. 
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1.8   WILLIAM JAMES AMONG THE FRAGMENTS 
 
 
 As suggested, I believe that the life and thought of William James are not just interesting, and  
relevant to the contemporary work of composition, but capable of providing much-needed solutions to the 
social problems wrought by technological advance.  James, in fact, saw his own project very much in 
these terms.  He lived and worked in a time of unprecedented social change.  Modern science, especially 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, had undermined the foundations on which Western civilization had long 
rested.  Likewise, the American Civil War, followed by rapid industrialization, had transformed the 
economic and political landscape.  The result, as Gale notes, was a traumatic bifurcation of man and 
nature, self and world.  Much of James’s thought—from his early psychological studies, to pragmatism, 
to radical empiricism—represents an effort to stitch together the resulting fragments.  This is thought born 
of division.  As such, it is particularly well-suited to the reality teachers and students now face. 
James effort to come to terms with multiplicity is reflected on all levels of his work.  As will be 
detailed in later chapters, on the metaphysical level he posits a world of radical ontological pluralism.  
This “metaphysics of democratic equality” holds that Darwin and God, common sense and theoretical 
physics, the mystical and the material, all sit side by side, are all equally “real” (Gale 150).  On the most 
basic level, for James, there are worlds, rather than a world, a pluriverse rather than a universe.  No single 
story can capture this multiplicity: there is always more.  James’s radical pluralism is not just descriptive, 
but also prescriptive.  In essence, he believes that otherness—and the often traumatic engagement with 
otherness—is a necessary precondition for all intellectual, moral and social growth.  Such a vision, and 
the ethical impulse it sustains, I will argue, can do much to help us survive a world broken into pieces. 
 On an epistemological level, James is, of course, most well-known for his articulation of the 
doctrine of pragmatism.  As Louis Menand explains in The Metaphysical Club, pragmatism is chiefly an 
“attitude towards ideas” (12).  It holds that ideas are tools.  They are not fixed and can’t be “found,” 
whether in the Platonic realm or a rule book.  Rather, they are socially produced, dependent on their 
environment, and, if they are to serve us well, must be allowed to remain fluid.  The essence of 
pragmatism, Menand writes, is that “ideas should never become ideologies” (12).  A pragmatist, as James 
writes in his typically vibrant prose, “turns his back resolutely and once for all upon… abstraction and 
insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and 
pretended absolutes and origins” (P 24).  The rejection of the dogmatic and fixed allows the pragmatist 
thinker to merge concepts, mediate between apparent opposite, compromise.  This flexibility is facilitated 
by a thorough self-awareness; pragmatism, we can say, acknowledges human potential, but at the same 
time makes one wary of belief (which is always interested, always partial, always fallible).  As such, 
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Menand writes, it represents “a kind of skepticism,” designed to help people cope with life in a 
“heterogeneous, industrialized, mass-market society” (12).  My claim is that when presented in the 
character of William James, it can also help writers and writing teachers cope with life among the 
fragments.  By stressing flexibility, fallibility and responsiveness to lived experience, it provides a much-
needed antidote to the cognitive rigidity, which as we’ve seen, characterizes thought in the digital age. 
 Intimately tied to the flexibility James promotes is his refusal to either seek, or propound, enteral 
truths.  More than perhaps anything else, pragmatism, in its Jamesian guise, is defined by resistance to the 
top-down imposition of form.  As Sarin Marchetti writes, James “fiercely opposed” any intellectual 
approach that sought to impose “a certain configuration of values and principles… on reality” (68).  To be 
of maximum ethical and intellectual worth, the principles by which we live, James believes, must be the 
result of active thought, alive to the singular affordances of context.  With this in mind, the mode of 
philosophy James practices seeks to provoke, rather than reveal.  As Marchetti puts it, James always 
“aims at making us do something” (26).  He seeks to spark transformation, not by demanding allegiance 
to that which lies beyond the individual (God, culture, a utopian future), but instead, by giving each 
person the “instruments to better deal with [his or her life] from within its practice and exercise” 
(Marchetti 18).  Dr. James, in short, doesn’t dispense meanings.  Instead, he attempts to give his readers 
the tools to create their own.  He does this by providing a model of reflection, intellectual rigor and 
inclusivity, a bit of encouragement and a lot of provocation.  As such, I believe he provides an apt model 
for the writing teacher. 
 Of course, James, being a complex thinker with a large catalog of work, can be read in multiple 
ways.  My reading, as will become clear, emphasizes the material element of James.  I do this for a 
number of reasons.  First, I believe his earlier, natural science-based psychological studies (among which 
Talks to Teachers can be numbered), are more relevant to writing instruction than, say, his discussions of 
human immortality or mystical states.  Second, when read as a materialist, James speaks directly to the 
concerns of recent composition theory.  Integrally though, his thought represents a challenge to much of 
this theory.10  James is certainly not a cognitive internalist of the Cartesian stripe: he recognizes that we 
always think with and within a matrix of objects and others.  He diverges from current theoretical trends 
though in that he demands that the thinking-feeling human body—what he calls the “storm centre” of 
existence—be understood as the ultimate source of all knowledge, all value.  This emphasis on the 
individuated, embodied human, in turn, becomes a key component of my project. 
10 Richard Gale, for example, writes of James’s wish to be a “Promethean agent,” the “active cause” of his own self-
realization (3).  This respect for individual freedom, and even power, is certainly not in vogue. 
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 To explain what for some may appear to be a retreat to a passé, “humanist” perspective, I will 
note that James was trained as a medical doctor.  Heavily influenced by Darwin’s theory of evolution, he 
describes his thought as a form of “naturalism,” rooted in the belief that “the environment kills as well as 
sustains” (RE 42).  According to this view, all cognition—from the recognition of a snake in the grass, to 
our highest ideals—arises out of the Darwinian drive to survive in the face of a hostile world.  This means 
that to be of any worth, concepts must lead back into sensible experience, they must help our body (and 
soul) survive and thrive.  Contemporary composition theory is not so grounded.  A theoretical discussion 
of the ways in which texts circulate among computer networks, for example, without noting the ways in 
which this circulation impact human bodies, or furthers human values, would be of little interest to James. 
 My project asserts that the unbreakable link James draws between thought, body and world is 
integral to combating the hegemony of the fragments.  When held at a remove from human experience, 
whether as Platonic ideals or ideological buzzwords, ideas take on solid form.  They become monuments, 
monoliths.  Conversely, when understood as human constructions, intimately related to and growing out 
of the world of bodies and things, the opposite is true.  Now ideas are flexible, fluid.  In short, when tied 
to the material world, concepts are held to account.  Human experience is the site of this alchemy.  It 
follows that to disrupt ossified ways of thinking and being, it is to lived human experience—perception, 
cognition, life—that we must direct our attention.  On the theoretical level this means interrogating our 
disciplinary concepts, trying to trace what actually they do.  As Welch and Scott put it, we need to 
consider actual bodily impacts, not just texts and tools.  On a pedagogical level, a return to the body 
means increased awareness of the role we, as embodied humans, play in the construction of reality.  How 
does my physical being, for example, affect the way I understand this image or idea?  As will be detailed 
in later chapters, it also means using the power of sensation to reveal, and ultimately challenge, the 
abstract and insufficient.  There is always more “there” than we perceive.  This excess is capable of 
disrupting even the most rigid fragment.  A Jamesian writing pedagogy, by centering on the thinking-
feeling human body, seeks to tap this excess.   
*** 
Richard Gale perceptively notes that the metaphor of open doors and windows appears again and 
again in the writings of William James.  Dickinson Miller, James’s friend and colleague notes this too, 
writing that James’s thought demands “open doors and windows,” to any “idea, mood, attitude [or] 
propensity,” which might aid in the “richness and satisfaction of human life” (qtd. in Gale 5).  In the 
above, I’ve argued that the forces of neoliberalism and technological innovation have slammed certain 
doors shut.  As a result, thought has grown increasingly rigid, unyielding, dogmatic.  I’ve termed this 
state of affairs the hegemony of the fragments.  And I’ve suggested that resistance to it can revitalize both 
the teaching of writing on the classroom level, and rhetoric and composition as a discipline.  The figure of 
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William James—a new character in our disciplinary drama—indicates one form this resistance might 
take.  As we’ve seen, James refuses to offer assurances.  Instead, he uses our shared precarity to spur 
individuals towards more expansive acts of meaning making.  This entails close attention to both 
ourselves and our world.  To open the door to the former—to sensation, perception, and the role we play 
in the construction of reality—equals an inevitable alteration of the latter.  This is an alteration 
composition should seek to affect. 
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2.   TOWARDS A JAMESIAN THEORY OF DISCOURSE 
 
 
 
 
2.1   THE WATERS OF THE METAPHYSICAL 
 
 
 In the epilogue to the abridged version of his epic Principles of Psychology, William James 
makes a curious move.  The Principles, published in 1890, sought to distill the combined learning of the 
then-emergent field of psychology.  By all accounts it was wildly successful, sparking talk of a “New 
Psychology,” based on the methodology of the natural sciences and capable of unlocking the secrets of 
the human mind.  Only two years later, James is quick to dispel this notion.  Though his project treats the 
description and explanation of states of consciousness as a “natural science,” he writes, this should be 
understood as “a phrase of diffidence, and not of arrogance” (BC 468).  To practice a science means to 
limit one’s scope of study, “to stick to… arbitrarily-selected problems,” accede to certain assumptions, 
and in the whole, deal with experience in a “partial and provisional way” (BC 1).  The idea is that by 
establishing clear boundaries, variables can be standardized, laws formulated, and cause and effect 
mapped.  If his epilogue is any indication though, by 1892 James had serious doubts about the feasibility 
of such an approach when dealing with the human mind.  “Psychology as a natural science,” he writes, 
“means a psychology particularly fragile, and into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at 
every joint” (BC 468).  The leaky state of his discipline means that if understanding is to be achieved, the 
field’s “elementary assumptions and data must be reconsidered in wider connections” (BC 468).  For 
James, this means a turn to philosophy—“the Science of all things”—and to metaphysics (BC 2).  It is to 
these pursuits that he would devote the rest of his career. 
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 I begin this chapter with reference to James’s “philosophical turn,” because I believe an analogy 
can be drawn between composition as an intellectual pursuit and academic psychology, circa-1890.  In the 
preceding chapter I argued that of late, our field’s theory has been misdirected, focusing too much on 
tools and texts, and not enough on the real-life consequences of discursive practices.  In this chapter I 
argue that to better understand (and mitigate) those consequences, we must reconsider our “elementary 
assumptions and data”—our thoughts about texts and textual production—in light of  “wider 
connections.”  For composition theory, of late, “to connect” means to project outward, to move from the 
concrete into the abstract realm of networks and circulation (or the supposed real of ecological systems).  
The following inquiry does not take this route.  Instead, it seeks to trace the actual lived relationship 
between word and world, text, thinker and thing.  This requires stepping outside disciplinary boundaries, 
engaging unexamined assumptions.  By doing so, I hope to lay the groundwork for a better (e.g. more 
beautiful, more useful) mode of composition theory.1  
As James indicates, when we move beyond the partial and provisional—when we recontextualize 
what disciplinary approaches have decontextualized—we engage the metaphysical.  Now, don’t let this 
term frighten you.  “Metaphysics,” James writes, “means only an unusually obstinate attempt to think 
clearly and consistently” (BC 461).  It addresses questions which our practices “suggest but do not solve,” 
questions relating “to the whole of things, or to the ultimate elements thereof” (BC 462).  Metaphysics, in 
short, involves the study of the integral, but unspoken.  It’s important to note though, that as I understand 
the term, metaphysical inquiry doesn’t seek foundations.  Instead, as James’s friend and ally F.C.S. 
Schiller writes, it’s a form of “intellectual mountaineering,” a subjective, creative activity, always 
informed by the metaphysician’s interests and investments (197).  In my case, those interests and 
investments are first-year composition and its use as a site from which to disrupt the hegemony of the 
fragments.  My claim is that a theory of discourse informed by James’s metaphysical thought is a 
necessary step towards this end. 
 In light of the above, any theory articulated in the following pages is perhaps best read with an 
eye towards its performative function.  Drawing on J.L. Austin’s notion of speech acts, Joseph Harris 
makes a distinction between the constative and performative functions of theory.  A focus on the 
constative, Harris writes, asks whether an articulation accurately describes the object to which it purports 
to correspond.  A performative take, on the other hand, looks to the possible effects of holding (and 
convincing others to hold) a certain view.  This way of reading is concerned with consequences, with 
1 I understand composition theory as the activity of talking or writing about the teaching of writing.  Discourse 
theory, as used here, is a subset of composition theory.  It provides hints as to what writing is and what it does.  A 
similar parsing of terms, and a template for the type of project in which I’m engaged, can be found in Louise 
Wetherbee Phelps’s Composition As a Human Science (1988). 
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outcomes, and theory-as-rhetorical-posture.  In composition, Harris argues, the performative function of 
theory should be our primary concern.2   
Certainly, what theory does will be a theme throughout this project.  As James discovered in his 
explorations of consciousness, human thought and action (writing, teaching) is too complex to be trapped 
by the conceptual.  Therefore, we can’t expect our theory to provide us with a set-in-stone description of 
the writing act or an outline of the perfect lesson plan (see Kent).  Instead, as Harris suggests, it’s best to 
understand composition theory as “a form of discourse whose subject is the beliefs that guide our work as 
teachers and intellectuals—and whose aim is to change those beliefs and practices” (144).  This is theory 
as an activity, an on-going process of evaluation and adjustment.  It’s innately rhetorical, a way we exert 
pressure on our practice to help us do our job better.  “The final test of a theory,” Harris writes, “is what 
we can do with it, what kinds of talk and writing it makes possible for ourselves and our students” (144).  
This hints at the goal of this chapter.  As will become clear, to combat the hegemony of the fragments we 
need, in addition to a plan of action, a story about how and why that plan of action will work.  Such a 
story is exactly what William James provides. 
 
 
 
 
2.2   COMPOSITION’S (TACIT) JAMESIAN TRADITION 
 
 
 Before we try to think the metaphysical, it’s necessary to situate ourselves.  How is 
“composition” understood in these pages?  From whence does it come and what does it seek?  As is likely 
apparent, for me, composition is (and should remain) intimately linked to university writing instruction.  
In chapter one, I claimed that James has appeared little in the scholarly literature referencing this activity.  
This is not to say, though, that Jamesian thought is alien to the writing classroom.  Quite the opposite.  I 
believe that a certain pose, a certain attitude towards thought and language, sustains both James and some 
of composition’s most influential theory.  By tracing this line of thought—and its limitations—we can 
define composition and start to see how such a project can challenge the hegemony of the fragments. 
 Francophiles and philhellene rhetoricians might deny it, but composition, is, at heart, an 
American enterprise.  And William James is perhaps the most American of philosophers, an “authentic 
2 Of course, a theory’s persuasiveness will always be based, at least in part, on its perceived correspondence with 
reality, making this distinction, like Austin’s original constative/performative distinction, a bit of a thought exercise. 
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American intellectual frontiersman,” to quote Cornel West (55).  In light of this, it’s perhaps not 
surprising that James has influenced comp theory.  What’s the nature of this influence?  Literacy critic 
Richard Poirier hints at it when he writes that pragmatist thinkers share “a liberating and creative 
suspicion as to the dependability of words and syntax” (5).  The slipperiness of language, its innately 
metaphorical nature: yes, this is an important component of the tradition in which I work.   
Another important component is the recognition of both the generative and restrictive power of 
tradition, convention and commonplace.  Poirier argues that American pragmatism—and its complicated 
relationship with the past—has its roots in Emerson.  For Emerson, discursive formations or “circles” of 
thought and speech “actively create truths and knowledge,” therefore shaping our experience of both self 
and world (22).  At the same time, though, the Emersonian individual constantly seeks to move beyond 
what came before.  Circles, Poirier writes, “solidify and hem in life,” therefore, any idea “to which one 
conforms... becomes constrictive, a provocation to escape” (23).  One escapes through attention to the 
complexity and mutability of lived reality—what Poirier calls the “vague” and “superfluous”— along 
with an embrace of her own world-making potential.  “Nothing is secure,” Emerson writes, “but life, 
transition, the energizing spirit” (qtd. in Poirier 28).  The Emersonian writer, in turn, seeks to use this vital 
force to personalize shared cultural forms, thus taking ownership—however provisionally—of thought 
and language. 
James is sustained by a similar impulse.  In locating truth in the flux of human experience rather 
than the static realm of ideas, he exalts the potential of the vibrant and singular.  “I am against bigness and 
greatness in all their forms,” he writes in a famous letter to the founder of Radcliffe College, “and with 
the invisible molecular moral forces that work from individual to individual, stealing in through the 
crannies of the world” (qtd. in West 59).  James believes that given time, these “molecular moral forces” 
will reshape the social order, “rending the hardest monuments of man’s pride,” and restructuring our 
shared experience (Id).  The result is a lifelong interest in the small, the local, the individual. 
So where can we find the pragmatist legacy in contemporary composition?  Numerous 
connections could be made, but for our purposes, the work of David Bartholomae is perhaps the most 
relevant.  The author of one of the field’s most-widely cited essays and co-author of a popular textbook 
series, Bartholomae is undoubtedly a mainstream figure.  As with many in composition, the impact of 
American pragmatism on his work is extensive, though largely unspoken.  It can be found in his 
insistence on the duplicity of language, its tendency to hide as much as it reveals, as well as his demand 
that students consider the consequences of certain words and certain ways of speaking.  Bartholomae is 
also personally connected to the pragmatist tradition, having studied with Richard Poirier.  Poirier, 
Bartholomae writes, taught him to see writing as an action, “an activity, an agitated, often dislocating 
effort to appropriate and change the reality it confronts” (2017 29).  He was taught to see even the humble 
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sentence as “a gesture… a way of being alive in the world” (Id).  In these lines, I’d argue, we see the 
Emersonian impulse on display.  We see the individual world-maker fueled by Emerson’s “energizing 
spirit,” struggling with the limitations of his (shared) tools.  Similar themes of appropriation, power and 
struggle run throughout Bartholomae’s work.  In this regard, he resembles William James. 
So how does Bartholomae—as a sort of closet Jamesian—understand composition?  His essay 
“What is Composition and (If You Know What That Is) Why Do We Teach It?” provides a convenient 
point of reference.  Here, Bartholomae presents our shared enterprise not as a professional grouping or 
body of knowledge, but as “a set of problems produced by a wider, more diffuse set of practices and 
desires, usually brought into play by instances of language change or variety” (327).  So language can be 
and is used in different ways, for different ends.  This fact has systematic consequence, calls forth certain 
questions, creates certain problems.  Composition is tasked with engaging these problems. 
 Bartholomae provides an example of composition’s mode of engagement via an analysis of a 
prize-winning student essay.  Though appreciative of the essay’s formal properties, he critiques it as “too 
good, too finished, too seamless” (329).  There’s a sense of closure in the essay which he resists.  Poirier 
writes that pragmatism demands “disciplined resistance to the blandishments both of conclusiveness and 
of common sense” (42).  Here we see such an attitude in practice.  In true pragmatist style, Bartholomae 
wants a text which is more messy, less finished, in order to “imagine other possible narratives,” to open a 
space in which lines of thought silenced by the dominant narrative can emerge (329).  In this act of space-
making, and the anti-hegemonic impulse behind it, we catch sight of composition’s first defining feature.  
In short, when dealing with problems of language change and variety, composition in the pragmatist 
mode seeks not just understanding (in the sense that the biologist understands the frog), but active 
intervention.  More specifically, comp seeks to challenge, and thus invigorate, our cultural inheritance by 
cultivating diversity of thought and story.  Here, Bartholomae seeks to achieve this through formal 
disruption of the supposedly “excellent” student essay. 
 As detailed in chapter one, throughout Western society, the contraction and ossification of 
thought (the tightening of “circles,” you might say) is currently the order of the day.  In light of this, the 
need to foster new and better stories is as pressing as ever.  Other social groupings may share this goal 
though: how is composition different?  According to Bartholomae, composition differs from say, 
community activism, because of the highly localized nature of our project.  Composition, he writes, “is 
concerned with the how and why one might work with the space on the page” (336).  This “binds it to the 
ordinary” and “assumes the direct intervention in specific projects where… the gains are small” (336).  
Taken together, these lines indicate the extent to which composition is defined by the attention it pays to 
real writers, writing for specific purposes in specific (institutional, cultural, political) settings.  As an 
intellectual endeavor, composition brings the most sophisticated theoretical tools available to bear on 
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these seemingly “ordinary” writers and writing situations.  This focus on the local, once again echoing 
Emerson and James, is composition’s second defining feature.  
Of course, the local—whether the student in the classroom or the text on a page—never exists in 
a vacuum.  As Poirier puts it, “any particular thing or text is itself superfluous, part of a nearly 
overwhelming excess which is the essence of the universe” (57).  Pragmatists believe that it is through 
engagement with this extra-textual excess that circles are disrupted, that language and thought are 
(re)vitalized.  Composition, as Bartholomae understands it, recognizes this fact.  To an extent.  He 
encourages engagement with the vague and superfluous, but—and this is important—only at a textual 
level.  In “What is Composition” and elsewhere, he has little to say about what lies beyond the text, or 
how we can harness its power in the writing classroom.  In this focus on the discursive, he breaks with his 
pragmatist forbearers.  And it is here, I’d argue, following James, that we spy “the waters of the 
metaphysical criticism” leaking in at the joints.  Like a good disciplinarian, Bartholomae limits his object 
of study.  Of course, he recognizes that the text bears some relationship to body, thought and thing, but 
the nature of this relationship doesn’t interest him.  It can remain unexamined, he figures, and he can still 
do his job.  Is this assumption still tenable?  Given what we now know about the radically externalized 
nature of cognition, I don’t think so. 
In chapter one I argued that of late, composition theory has seriously errored in failing to respect 
the local, as in the individuated, thinking-feeling writer.  Bartholomae makes no such mistake.  By 
emphasizing the text, he keeps “the writer” squarely in his sights.  But, at the same time, an argument can 
be made that by failing to acknowledge the affective, material and sensual excess from which the text and 
writer emerge, he ends up engaging only an abstraction, a ghost.  In ignoring the excess, Bartholomae is 
not alone.  His position, on the whole, is that of mainstream composition pedagogy over the past thirty 
years.  Following Emerson and James (as well as more recent new materialist thought), I’d argue that this 
tight textual focus limits our field’s transformative potential.  To smash circles and create new lines of 
thought, we must find ways to let the outside in, to let the “vague” and “superfluous” elements of lived 
experience saturate and thus energize our thought and language.  A Jamesian theory of discourse which 
tracks, and ultimately dissolves, the boundaries between text and world, writing instruction and lived 
experience, is a step in this direction.  In a composition class informed by such a theory, the whole of our 
experience (affective + material + discursive) is implicated.  It is understood that when we engage “the 
space on the page” we are shaping the machinery by which embodied subjects make sense of the world.  
Yes, we are still against bigness.  And we still pay close attention to the ordinary, the local, the 
individuated writer.  But now that writer is understood in a more holistic manner.   
 
 
 38 
2.3   THE REHABILITATION OF JAMES BERLIN 
  
 
 So composition has been and should be an anti-hegemonic enterprise, intensely focused on the 
local.  But we must also contextualize the local.  Towards this end, the strain of composition theory I want 
to put forward walks a fine line: it positions the thinking-feeling writer at the center of the writing act, but 
refuses to discount the array of forces—many of them “vague and inarticulate”—which course through 
the writer.  It focuses on bodily impacts, but recognizes that impact is always a term of relation.  Tracing 
the nature of this relation, I’d like to suggest, should be one of the primary concerns of the composition 
theorist.  Many of the best thinkers in our field have already done such work.  James Berlin, for example. 
With the exception of Bartholomae, perhaps no figure in composition’s recent history has been on the 
“they say” side of more arguments than Berlin.  His work is particularly valuable for our purposes 
because it makes explicit the metaphysical assumptions implicit in Bartholomae’s work.  As noted, the 
latter understands composition as the cultivation of diversity of thought and story.  Berlin, in essence, 
attempts to explain what forces we work through and against when we practice this art.  He contextualizes 
our classrooms and conversations, drawing “wider connections,” as William James says.  He does this 
most explicitly in his discussion of social epistemic rhetoric, a mode of writing instruction in which he 
situates both himself and Bartholomae. 
Make no mistake: Berlin’s discussion of social-epistemic rhetoric is metaphysics.  It posits a 
theory as to both what is and how we know what is.  Per this theory, our reality is interactive, emerging 
from a dialectic between self, community and the material world.  “For social-epistemic rhetoric,” Berlin 
writes in his oft-cited 1988 essay “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class,” “the real is located in a 
relationship that involves the dialectical interaction of the observer, the discourse community…and the 
material conditions of existence” (488).  Integrally, language structures this reality.  As Berlin sees it, the 
dialectical interaction among contextual elements is “grounded in language,” with self, group and world 
all being “verbal constructs” (488).  A materialist in the Marxian sense, Berlin doesn’t deny the existence 
of the non-linguistic.  He does hold though, quite forcefully, that we cannot know the world apart from 
language.  And language is always interested, “always already serving certain ideological claims” (477).   
Ideology is a key term for Berlin.  It is transmitted through language, and works at the very 
deepest levels of being, determining “what is real and what is illusory… what is experienced and what 
remains outside the field of phenomenological experience” (479).  Ideology is always plural; competing 
(and conflicting) discourses, carrying different ideological inflections, circulate within each society and 
individual.  These discourses work to benefit certain groups, further certain ends.  We can’t step out of 
ideology, but Berlin does seem to believe that we can grasp its nature, and ultimately, bend the 
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interpretive process towards our own ideals.  Social epistemic rhetoric, Berlin argues, does this by 
recognizing its own investments.  It is “self-consciously aware” of the interested nature of rhetoric, thus 
providing its practitioners a means of “self-criticism and self-correction” (478). 
In Berlin’s preferred mode of instruction, writing teachers make ideology—and its political and 
economic consequences—the center of classroom discussion.  They seek to reveal what the dominate 
discourse has obscured, the goal being to make students realize how, through language, “control over 
their own lives has been denied them” (490).   
Earlier, I accused Bartholomae’s project of being too focused on the page.  Berlin escapes the 
page.  Writing instruction, as he sees it, involves nothing less than the restructuring of subjectivity.  The 
idea is thrilling.  Also controversial.  Some object to Berlin’s aggressive politicization of the classroom.  
Others have theoretical objections.  Byron Hawk, for example, argues that Berlin is too rationalistic; he 
argues that Berlin’s focus on the consciously knowable forecloses “a more complete understanding of 
learning” (85), one which recognizes the importance of “bodily knowledge” and “tacit knowing” (116).  
Thomas Rickert lodges a similar complaint, noting that awareness of the power of discourse and actual 
resistance are not necessarily related.3  His students know they don’t need expensive blue jeans, he writes, 
but buy them anyway. 
I agree with these thinkers that the study and teaching of writing must partake in “what it means 
to be human and have a life” (Rickert 2007, 35).  Berlin’s articulation of social-epistemic rhetoric, which 
at its core positions writer-thinkers as textual nodes, largely fails in this regard.  That said, I view Berlin’s 
work as composition theory of the highest order.  His effort to chart the (metaphysical) forces which 
animate our conversations and classrooms is exactly the sort of deep contextualization we need.  Berlin 
must also be praised for the avowedly moral thrust of his theorizing and pedagogy.  As I will detail in 
chapter three, writing and teaching always take place in service of an ideal.  Berlin, unlike many writing 
teachers, foregrounds this fact.  Finally, Berlin’s articulation of the social-epistemic paradigm is good 
theory from a performative perspective.  It can help drive compositionists, make possible acts of writing 
and teaching of which we otherwise wouldn’t be capable. 
To illustrate this point, a vignette. 
 December.  Chicago, Illinois.  At thirty-two, after having taught English abroad for a few years, 
I’ve taken my first tentative steps into academia, taking a course on education and democracy with Todd 
DeStigter at the University of Illinois-Chicago.  As part of my final project, I came across Berlin’s 
Rhetorics, Poetics, and Culture.  I remember the exact moment.  The weather was very cold and plumes 
3 Gerald Graff, commenting on Berlin’s mid-career turn to strident Marxism, notes that it was like he suddenly 
“found religion.”  Certainly, Berlin’s unabashed Marxism and associated air of self-righteousness is one reason he is 
so often cited (and challenged) in the composition literature. 
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of steam were rising from the foundry beyond my apartment.  I held that little, silver book in my hands 
and felt that it was an object of great power.4  Berlin’s central thesis—that language structures reality and 
as such we have a choice in our reality—had never occurred to me before.  To teach writing is to change 
the way students think and feel: to influence them on the most primal level.  This was heady stuff.  And 
it’s not an exaggeration to say that it made me decide to become a writing teacher. 
 Now, perhaps language doesn’t quite have the epistemic force that Berlin suggests.  A more 
sophisticated understanding of the nexus between word and world, such as James provides, shows that 
experience is not entirely “grounded in language” (1987 16).  Berlin’s clunky, prescriptive Marxism is 
also outmoded.5  That said, as we’ll see, Berlin’s belief that “there is never a division between experience 
and language” is fundamentally correct (1987 16).  Language does intertwine with, and therefore impact, 
all elements of experience.  This means that when we teach reading and writing, we are, in essence, 
teaching new ways of seeing, hearing, being.  As Ann Berthoff, another compositionist working in the 
social-epistemic mode puts it, perception “is not something that comes first then we get ideas; perception 
is itself a construing, an interpretation, a making of meaning” (37).  Perception itself is an interpretation.  
Yes.  And in the writing classroom we teach different, more sophisticated, more moral, modes of 
interpretation.  Taken seriously, this idea, which lies at the heart of Berlin’s project, is of great 
consequence.  On one hand, it makes composition important, gives writing teachers (like me) a reason to 
devote themselves wholeheartedly to our shared enterprise.  On the other, it pushes our work off the page, 
out of the classroom even.  It makes the whole of the student’s lived experience our object of concern.   
 
 
 
 
2.4   NEW MATERIALISM / POSTCOMPOSITION 
 
 
 So far we’ve taken a deep dive into some important work from composition’s social turn.   From 
this inquiry, we’ve drawn a definition of our shared enterprise, along with an understanding of the 
relationship between word and world which underlies that definition.  The social epistemic paradigm 
presents the real as arising from the interaction, via language, of self, community and world.  Language 
4 Stephen North’s editor’s note, which informs the reader that Berlin died prior to the text’s publication undoubtedly 
added to the book’s gravitas. 
5 In fact, I’d argue that anyone who believes social ills can be captured in terms such as “reification” and “false 
consciousness” is himself “mystified.”   
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has pride of place in this scheme.  It is also rather blocky, circulating in well-defined, seemingly mutually 
exclusive discourses.  These discourses structure reality.  By realizing this, we can control our lived 
experience, at least to a point.  In essence, by changing the way we talk, we change the world. 
Recent theoretical trends have challenged the social epistemic paradigm.  As Laura Micciche puts 
it in an issue of College English devoted to “new materialism,” the primary tools of the social turn—
“textual and linguistic analysis as well as ideology critique—have proven important but limited” (488).  
She goes on to criticize thinkers such as Berlin for “narrow[ing] what counts as the social” by putting too 
much emphasis on culture, language and other human constructs, at the expense of “matter” (488).6  
Micciche defines new materialist thought broadly.  It includes ecological, affect, actor-network and 
posthuman orientations.  The defining feature, she writes, is that such thought foregrounds a “relational 
ontology,” highlighting the ways in which being is shaped by intersecting forms of matter (488).  The 
non-human is active, power and agency distributed.  Writing, in such a world, Micciche claims, in a 
phrase which I believe captures the tenor of the times, is a “practice of coexistence” (498). 
 Of course, I’m all for coexistence.  And, as we’ve seen, I agree that writing instruction must 
engage the material and affective, as well as the discursive elements of experience.  That said, I have 
doubts about the efficacy of (most) materially inflected composition theory.  It’s not for a lack of the 
metaphysical in such work; in fact, metaphysical claims are often key to new materialist thought.  “With 
the rise of new materialism,” political theorist William Connolly writes, “the idea that you should try to 
be postmetaphysical is scrapped….  What replaces it is a contestable metaphysic and cosmology that 
emphasizes the dynamic, temporal and process character of systems and things” (400).  In composition, 
this emphasis on the dynamic, temporal and processual is reflected in the “relational ontology” noted by 
Micciche.  Put simply, the idea is that for most composition theorists today, what is—being—exists in a 
state of ever-changing, interconnected relation.  This view is not necessarily incorrect; as we’ll see, 
similar ideas are at the heart of William James’s metaphysical scheme.  The problem, as I see it, is that 
within composition studies, Connolly’s “contestable metaphysic” is too often not contested.  Instead, of 
critical exploration of the actual character of text, thought and thing, we get blanket assumptions about 
“connection” and “fluidity.”  These assumptions are then used to shape our understandings of teaching 
and writing.  My claim, simply put, is that many of these assumptions are naive, ill-thought out and 
contradictory.  As a result, our practice is compromised.7 
*** 
6 As should be apparent, Micciche is describing, in slightly different terms, the same trend described in chapter one 
by Kristopher Lotier. 
7 Most tellingly, as argued in chapter one, a presumption of connection has left us unable to think the radical 
disconnection which characterizes the hegemony of the fragments. 
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The work of Sidney Dobrin provides a convenient synecdoche for our field’s state of the art.  
Though, as we’ll see, Dobrin doesn’t care much about matter in the conventional sense, he does embrace 
Micciche’s “relational ontology.”  In fact, in his efforts to distribute power and agency, he could be said 
to take this view to the extreme.  
Dobrin’s principle contention, laid out in two monographs and a series of edited collections, is 
that composition should focus less on the individuated writing subject (particularly student subjects) and 
instead seek to theorize writing itself.  This desire to “theorize writing beyond the disciplinary limit-
situation” means that Dobrin’s work, like my own project, implicates the metaphysical (3).  We are also 
both willing to question the seemingly sacrosanct bond between rhetoric, and rhetoric and composition.8  
That said, our aims are widely divergent.  Unlike Bartholomae, Berlin and myself, Dobrin rejects the idea 
that university writing instruction can have positive social impact.  He believes that the field is hopelessly 
compromised by its institutional position and that emancipation can be found only in the ethereal realm of 
theory.  As such, he encourages writing studies to move beyond the “neurosis of pedagogy,” and instead, 
devote itself to descriptions of what writing is and does (28).  These descriptions, though, shouldn’t 
implicate concrete objects, or as we’ll see, context in any practical sense of the word.  Instead, they 
should try to capture “the agency of writing itself” through the use of metaphor (78).  The end game, the 
reason for such reasoning, seems to be a belief that discourse, when pushed to the limit, has the power to 
disrupt itself, thereby making space for new meanings.  As detailed below, I don’t believe this is possible.  
Dobrin’s efforts to theorize writing are useful though, because they reveal the metaphysical underpinnings 
of much current composition theory.  He is a prophet of fluidity and connection.  As such, he is one with 
his time. 
In his influential book, Postcomposition, Dobrin engages both posthuman and ecological thought, 
perhaps the two most important new materialist theoretical strains.  In both cases, he celebrates their 
decentering of the individuated subject.  The posthuman, he writes, demands “a realignment of focus not 
upon the individual as producer/originator of writing but upon the complex systems in which the 
posthuman is located, endlessly bound in the fluidity and shiftiness of writing” (72).  Similarly, he praises 
ecological thought for presenting a “hyper-circulatory concept of system in which agents become 
indistinguishable from the system itself” (133).  Composition theory, as Dobrin understands it, should be 
utterly holistic, privileging relations above all else.  And writing is the fluid, ever-shifting medium 
through which relations relate.  Writing, Dobrin argues, is a “dynamic, encompassing system inseparable 
8 Dobrin rejects the term rhetoric, and the methodology of rhetorical inquiry, because he believes it too often 
“defaults to a process of rendering parts of the whole identifiable,” thus betraying a “will to simplicity and stability” 
(173).  For my part, I simply prefer to draw on, and thereby celebrate, composition’s own tradition (one informed by 
rhetoric but not one with rhetoric). 
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from…everything” (136).  Like some sort of primordial ooze, it “saturates” and “penetrates,” and 
ultimately, through its fluctuations, defines reality.  
Though Dobrin engages new materialist thought, I would not label him a materialist.  Instead, he 
seems mainly interested in using posthuman and ecological thought as a source of metaphor to describe 
how language functions.  Likewise, apart from vague claims like writing “saturates,” he makes no attempt 
to explain the nature of word and world or how these elements might interact.  In fact, I’d argue he 
fundamentally cannot perform such analysis.  This is because any interaction between word and world 
must take place within the realm of (embodied, individuated) human experience.  Dobrin, being a priori 
anti-subject, can’t descend into this realm. 
As we’ll see, William James, unlike Dobrin, strives to theorize life as it is lived.  This requires 
strict contextualization.  Overall, I believe such an approach can energize writing, making space for the 
new meanings Dobrin so values.  When word is abstracted from world though, the opposite happens: 
thought and language tend towards stasis.  To see how and why this might be, it’s useful to compare 
Dobrin’s radically acontextual approach to that of another influential composition theorist: Thomas 
Rickert.   
Dobrin turns to Rickert in a discussion of complexity theory, another new materialist staple.  He 
is generally supportive of the “networked logic” of complexity theory, but views its conception of 
networks and nodes as too linear to describe writing.  Per his anti-subject bent, he wants to draw attention 
to the “not-node,” the spaces in-between points of connection, “as well as what occupies and what occurs 
in those spaces” (182).  What occupies and occurs in the not-node is, of course, writing.  From outside 
and beyond, it saturates networks.  “Without the saturation of writing,” he argues, “nodes, knots, and 
networks are not” (183).  Dobrin uses Rickert’s idea of “ambience” to support this claim.   
Dobrin’s vision of writing as an uncontainable constructive force is appealing; though not a 
pragmatist, he’s hit upon something akin to Poirier’s “vague and superfluous.”  I’d like to suggest, 
however, that in his exultation of the discursive, Dobrin distorts what should be a key takeaway from 
Rickert (and Poirier).  Simply put, Rickert understands the world as many.  Dobrin does not.  He replaces 
Rickert’s pluralistic metaphysics (a metaphysical vision not unlike that of William James) with a monistic 
flux.  This is a step backwards.  Our senses, yours and mine, make very clear that writing is real (as in 
capable of making an impact), and that other things (rocks, cats, Donald Trump) are also real.  In 
addition, we know that these things are different, both from writing and from each other.  Sometimes they 
collide or connect; sometimes they do not.  Rickert acknowledges this reality.  Dobrin, with his abstract 
claims of saturation and textual fluidity does not. 
Rickert sees ambience as working in conjunction with the idea of networks, but emphasizing “the 
constitutive role of the overall, blended environment” (2004, 904).  So, from an ambient perspective, each 
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situation is fluid, in a sense, but also “blended.”  Ambience, we can therefore say, pays respect to both 
parts (bodies, objects) and wholes (spaces, discourse).  The overall goal is to “put place, language, and 
body into co-adaptive, robust interaction” (903).  Language is an element in this interaction, of course, but 
not a God term.  In fact, unlike “writing” in Dobrin’s world, there is no God term here.  Instead, from an 
ambient perspective, “language and environment presuppose each other” (903).  Language, in other 
words, both arises from, and returns to, the physical world.  It penetrates being, sure, but cannot be said to 
constitute a field or flux which is somehow “beyond” or “behind” being and from which being emerges. 
Not coincidentally, Rickert, like pragmatist thinkers, places great emphasis on context.  One of 
the keys “to understanding ambience,” he writes, “is the particularity of a situation” (911).  A “situation,” 
for Rickert, is always singular, a unique arrangement of matter in space.  This becomes clear via his 
frequent discussions of ambient music.  When a Brian Eno track is heard through Bose headphones on the 
Acela Express from Boston to Philadelphia by a slightly stoned account executive on a Thursday 
afternoon, the hum of the wheels, the rush of the wind and the boasts of the Patriots fan in the next seat all 
become constitutive parts of the experience.  As does the dryness in the man’s throat and the circuitry of 
his iPhone.  This respect for singularity is essential.  It allows each setting, and thus writer-as-writer, to 
take on unique productive capacities.  “The writer is not merely in a situation,” he argues, “from the 
ambient perspective, the writer is written by the environment, considered as the most singular, concrete 
moment” (920).  As Dobrin suggests, in such a scheme conventional notions of agency and subjectivity 
are disrupted.  But, the focus on the singular and concrete means that while the writer may be written by 
the environment, he or she is in no way overwritten.  The presence of innumerable elements within the 
writing situation means that new and completely unpredictable levels of order are always possible.  In 
short, Rickert, like James, recognizes the richness and complexity of experience as it is lived.  His 
thought, therefore, allows—in fact, demands—new and novel acts of meaning-making.  It doesn’t shut 
down conversation with God-terms. 
Laura Micciche writes that theorists such as Dobrin, by substituting talk of matter with “the 
materiality of text,” betray a “longing for theory unfettered by the distraction of pesky subjects and their 
unruly bodies” (491).  My claim is very similar.  Reality, as Dobrin presents it, though “fluid” and 
“hyperconnected,” is rather boring.  He posits an abstract monistic flux, and in doing so, fails to make 
room for the concrete and particular, for trains or Brian Eno songs or Micciche’s “unruly bodies.”  This 
vision contradicts reality as it is lived.  It also, as I hope I’ve shown through my discussion of Rickert’s  
more situated vision, limits the writer’s ability to a make new connections, to tell new stories.  Word 
separated from world tends towards stasis. The opposite is also true.  To create space for new meanings, 
to take the “first step towards counter hegemony,” as Dobrin puts it, we need theory capable of thinking 
both (45). 
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2.5   WRITING AS A WAY OF BEING 
 
 
Robert Yagelski’s Writing as a Way of Being provides another example of new materialist 
thought in action.  Unlike Dobrin and Rickert, Yagelski doesn’t speak of networks or ambience.  He does 
seek to engage matter though, and definitely displays a “relational ontology,” forcefully arguing against 
various dualisms (and for coexistence).  In this regard, his work fits within the new materialist fold.  I turn 
to Yagelski in particular because, unlike Dobrin, he foregrounds the relationship between language and 
human experience.  In doing so, he articulates an understanding of the real, and our relation to it, which I 
find is widely shared by writing teachers. 
Yagelski’s general premise is that Western society is undergoing a “crisis of sustainability.”  This 
is characterized by environmental destruction: global warming, deforestation, etc.  In a provocative move, 
he traces this global catastrophe directly to Western education practices, particularly our way of teaching 
writing.  When we teach writing, he argues, we teach fundamental lessons about the relation of the 
individual to community and to world.  And the “basic lesson of mainstream writing instruction,” 
Yagelski argues, “is disconnection” (4).  Like seemingly all writers in the new materialist vein, Yagelski 
blames Descartes for the current state of affairs.  A “Cartesian view of writing”—one which presents the 
writer as a self-contained mind confronting an external other—informs writing instruction at all levels (3).  
This teaches separateness, rather than interconnectedness, duality, rather than unity, and ultimately, 
makes real Margaret Thatcher’s claim that “there is no society,” only discrete, autonomous individuals.  
Disconnected as we are, we exploit the earth, drive SUVs, eat McDonalds, etc.9 
Yagelski’s proposed solution, on both a theoretical and pedagogical level, is to shift our gaze 
from writing as text (product) or writing as the production of text (process), to the actual experience of 
writing.  He proposes an “ontology of writing” in which the object of inquiry is not what the “writing self 
does through or with writing but rather… the experience of the self in the act of writing” (107).  Such a 
project, he argues, is capable of revealing “the writer’s inherent connection to [the] reader and… all other 
writers and readers” (107).  As this claim indicates, Yagelski views the writing act as capable of 
producing an expanded or heightened state of consciousness.  Sustained dwelling in this space, over the 
long-term, he believes, can produce radical changes in subjectivity.  It can transform us from Cartesian 
dualists to uber-connected Zen Buddhists.10  
9 I find Yagelski’s belief in impending ecological cataclysm (and the uncritical acceptance of the such discourse) to 
be further hallmarks of new materialist thought (See Paul Lynch’s discussion of the field’s “apocalyptic turn”). 
10 Transcendence can be achieved by both expert and novice writer.  When we struggle to “find the words,” 
Yagelski argues, we become aware of those parts of our experience not captured by language, thereby revealing the 
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Overall, Writing as a Way of Being is a cogent and provocative book.  I agree with Yagelski that 
how writing is taught conveys certain assumptions about self and world, about what “is” and how we can 
know it.  Likewise, these assumptions operate largely below the level of consciousness, outside the realm 
of intent.  Therefore, pedagogies which claim to be emancipatory, but fail to restructure our felt sense of 
being in the world, “miss the point” (55).  Writing, as Yagelski sees it, is not primarily about the 
production of  text or the achievement of certain rhetorical goals.  Instead, it’s a means to live better.  It’s 
a technology (my word) that when used properly, can help us “be in the world in a more reflective, self-
aware, and… altruistic way” (159).  I agree.  We disagree, however, about how to achieve this end.  
Whereas Bartholomae and Berlin can be accused of privileging the discursive at the expense of the 
experiential, Yagelski makes the opposite mistake.   
Like many new materialist thinkers, Yagelski positions himself against the text-centric social 
epistemic paradigm.  Though he views writing instruction as key to shaping our understanding of reality, 
he challenges the view that truth and meaning are functions of language.  Instead, he forewords the idea 
that reality—or the most important part of it anyway—is non-conceptual.  This idea underlies his entire 
approach.  The Cartesian view of writing, remember, posits an external reality more or less capable of 
being captured by language.  Yagelski (rightly) rejects this view.  Unlike social epistemic thinkers though, 
who, when deprived of extra-linguistic foundations, present language (or rhetoric) as the scene of truth-
making, Yagelski turns to lived experience.  Truth and meaning, as he understands it, lie in the living, not 
the telling.  The telling, as in conceptualization, comes later.  Although, as we’ll see, this idea that thought 
and experience are functionally separate is philosophical suspect, it is fundamental to Yagelski’s notion of 
an “ontology of writing.”  Writing, as in marks on paper, can’t contain or convey truth.  The activity of 
writing, though, that’s a different story.  There is meaning outside language, remember, therefore the 
experience of writing, like any experience, can become a “ground for truth-seeking” (75).  The actual 
production of text acts as “a vehicle for truth-seeking” (75).  It helps us make sense of, and share, what 
we might discover within the vast world of the non-discursive. 
I appreciate Yagelski’s efforts to articulate the metaphysical foundations of his claims.  
Ultimately though, those foundations are shaky.  This failure appears most tellingly in his discussion of 
“nonduality.”  As noted, as Yagelski sees it, the world’s biggest problem is a failure of certain (Western) 
subjects to recognize their inherent oneness.  Our Cartesian view of language makes us assume 
separation, disconnection and duality; this forecloses the possibility of experiencing nonduality.  The 
solution is to embrace nonduality in theory and engage in practices which make that state of being real.  
possibility of a richer, more fully realized self.  We can unlock this extra-linguistic “more,” and the sense of radical 
connection it promises, through careful attention to the writing act.   
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Yagelski himself claims to have experienced such a state while climbing in the Grand Teton mountains.  
High on a mountain ledge, his “sense of self seemed to dissolve into the moment,” leaving him with an 
intense feeling of connection and joy (73).  
To justify nonduality on a theoretical level, Yagelski turns to the work of Eihei Dogen (1200-
1253), described as a “great Zen Buddhist teacher” and philosopher (81).  His discussion of Dogen is 
complex, but it comes down to the idea that this thinker, through meditation and self-reflection, is able to 
step beyond human delusion, learn and ultimately speak “what-is.”  The Zen master, Yagelski writes, 
quoting Thomas Kasulis, “brings no personal, egotistic delusions into… expression,” therefore, through 
his words, “the occasion speaks for itself” (85).  In short, he is able to live nondualistically, and use this 
state as a site from which to understand, and ultimately speak, non-linguistic truth.  Reading Yagelski 
generously, we can say that he wishes to present Dogen as a model, proof that non-dualistic modes of 
thought and being are possible.  Read less generously, however, it seems as if he is suggesting that 
Dogen, and his supposed forays into the real, support the fact of precognitive unity.  Kasulis’s actual 
description of Buddhist practices bolsters this latter reading.  He writes, for example, that it is just our 
“excess conceptual baggage with its affective components” that keep us “deluded,” i.e. separated from 
each other and the natural world (Kasulis qtd. at 85).   
Now Yagelski is a sophisticated thinker and realizes that his discussion of nonduality may seem 
to be “smacking of foundationalism” (86).11  Likewise, as noted, there’s more than a little “if you build it, 
they will come” aspect to his use of Dogen.  It is the assumption of duality, or disconnection, after all, that 
prevents nonduality from being achieved.  That said, when subjected to sustained metaphysical inquiry—
the type in which composition theory must traffic—his arguments crumble.   
I agree with Yagelski’s claim that truth lies in lived experience.  And we certainly cannot dismiss 
Yagelski’s experience on that mountain ledge.  That experience is clearly rich with truth and meaning.  
But—and here is the key difference—I would suggest, following William James, that those qualities arise 
not because at that moment on the mountain Yagelski tapped into some pre-discursive real.12  Instead, 
Yagelski made the experience meaningful.  This occurred via his pursuit and embrace of the moment 
(processes threaded through with discourse) and later when he projected that moment into the world, 
when he used is as an impetus for his book project, for example.  As I understand it, meaning is always a 
relation, an interaction between word, world and purposeful agent.  It entails connection, yes, but 
connection is created, not found. 
11 This sense of foundationalism is not dispelled, when on the next page, he insists that “modern physics” suggests 
that nonduality is a “legitimate description of the physical world” (87). 
12 This statement requires some explanation.  James, being of a mystical bent, would likely believe that Yagelski and 
Zen master Dogen, in their moments of ecstasy, tap into some higher order of being—a pre-conscious, supernatural 
“world soul,” perhaps.  Yagelski does not suggest this.  He seems to believe in a material connection. 
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Similarly, I feel we need to reject the discursive / nondiscursive binary that underlies Yagelski’s 
entire discussion of nonduality.  It’s not that truth resides solely in language, as James Berlin might say.  
It’s also not that truth is primarily non-linguistic, as Yagelski believes.  Instead, it’s more accurate, and 
useful, to conceive of lived experience as a mix: every moment, as James suggests, is “shot through” with 
adjectives and nouns, as well as the “vague and inarticulate” rumblings of our body and/in the world.  
Experience is always discursive and non-discursive.  So is truth.  My argument is that composition theory 
should seek to better understand how text, things and bodies interact, how they inform, and can be made 
to inform, each other.  This knowledge will help us use the nondiscursive as a means to disrupt, and 
expand, discursive structures.  Yagelski believes something very similar.  Ultimately though, his inability 
to sufficiently theorize the relationship between word and world, text and self, compromises his project. 
*** 
Earlier, I said that Writing as a Way of Being displays certain assumptions that are commonly 
shared by composition theory of the new materialist sort.  Micciche hits upon this when she mentions new 
materialism’s relational ontology.  As noted, this is the belief that things exist not as discrete entities, but 
in relation.  This is a fine idea, but I’d like to suggest that when not properly examined, it can end up 
twisting our theory in unproductive ways.  Dobrin succumbs.  As does Yagelski.  His entire project is 
based on the inevitability of connection.  He seems certain that once we get beyond the delusions wrought 
by human cognition our primordial interconnectedness will be revealed.  In this way, he is very typical of 
new materialists thinkers.  Whether in discussions of digital networks or natural systems, connection is 
too often taken for granted.  This assumption needs to be challenged. 
It is not that I am opposed to practices which try to make real the ways in which individual are 
entwined with other people, texts and things.  In fact, as we’ll see, William James’s thought is radically 
holistic, with one of its primary aims being to challenge conventional dualisms such as subject/object and 
self/world.  My claim is rather that when connection is assumed, when it is as seen as something to be 
revealed rather than constructed, growth is impeded.  
As noted, the goal of composition should be to disrupt hegemonic thought regimes.  This entails 
promoting more expansive acts of meaning-making, the active tracing of more connections, more 
relations.  Sparking the sort of felt sense of universal connection Yagelski promotes may help achieve this 
goal.  I don’t see exactly how, though.  Also, we should keep in mind that all of our experiences, even 
(especially) those which seem to reveal fundamental truth, must be subjected to critical, conscious 
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examination.13   Their limits must be acknowledge and traced.  Otherwise, we risk solipsism.  As I argued 
in chapter one, in the digital age it is particularly easy to mistake our segment of reality for reality itself.  
By offering assurance that we are preternaturally attuned, blanket assumptions of connection further this 
tendency.  This is true of composition theory which seeks only to reveal ever-new ways writers are 
overwritten by texts and things, and it is true of Yagelski’s assurance of a unified real.  Simply put, in 
rhetoric and composition, we must recognize that we never know (or feel) the whole story.  There must 
always be a “more” out there, a piece of the world which is alien, to which no line has yet been drawn.  
This is what spurs us to create new, more inclusive meanings.  Composition needs a metaphysics—a 
sketch of the ground on which we work—that allows for, and in fact demands, this constant 
(re)construction of thought and belief.  Yagelski, and new materialism as a whole, fail to provide such a 
blueprint. 
 
 
 
 
2.6   RADICAL EMPIRICISM 
 
 
 In the preceding pages I’ve argued that composition is undermined.  Over the past three decades, 
our theory has moved steadily outward, tracing more and more lines of connection, naming more and 
more forces which impact the writer and shape the writer’s text.  All the while, what should be the core of 
our thought—the lived relationship between text and world—has been neglected.  A Jamesian theory of 
discourse aims to correct this oversight.  In doing so, it starts at the very bottom, so to speak, asking us to 
consider the very nature of the world in which we write and think.  William James’s metaphysical 
scheme, termed “radical empiricism,” can guide our inquiry. 
 James had a long and varied career.  A prolific author and speaker, he is perhaps America’s 
greatest public intellectual.  That said, his metaphysics has received little scholarly attention.  Though 
James considered radical empiricism the culmination of his life’s work, because of its provocative nature, 
it has often been assigned to the “spooky” side of his oeuvre (see Livingston).  A review of the literature 
indicates that lately this has begun to change; more and more thinkers, it seems, are beginning to realize 
the doctrine’s transformative potential.  As we’ll see, James presents, in essence, a new way of being: one 
13 This is one reason a metaphysics for rhetoric and composition must reject the idea of “pure” or unconceptualized 
experience.  When we acknowledge that experience always contains a discursive component, there’s a shared social 
element there which we can engage. 
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that rejects conventional dualisms, but at the same time respects the individual agent.  “Between holism 
and a world of sundered parts,” Alexander Livingston writes, “radical empiricism envisions networks of 
‘little worlds’ or ‘partial systems,’” always open to new and novel, more inclusive and more productive, 
connection (5).  It is humane thought.  And, as I hope to show, well-suited for rhetoric and composition. 
 So what is radical empiricism?  David Lamberth writes that it “is a thoroughgoing metaphysical 
view of the broadest scope, integrating all the aspects of our lives and our world” (59).  It is perhaps best 
understood as a melding of classic British empiricism with Darwinian naturalism.  Like classic 
empiricism (that of John Locke and David Hume, for example), radical empiricism “remands us to 
sensation” (RE 3).  It holds that “reality is created temporally day by day,” and that the “deeper features 
of reality are found only in perceptual experience” (RE 3).  Empiricists, in other words, believe the world 
is the case.  They start with what is, not abstract principles, take parts and try to construct wholes.  James 
respects this, but believes that ordinary empiricism falters by displaying “a tendency to do away with the 
connections of things” (RE 21).  The empiricist’s understanding of reality leaves too many gaps: between 
subject and object, mind and world, word and thing.  His radical empiricism seeks to corrects this by 
doing “full justice to…conjunctive relations” (RE 21).   
 Rationalist philosophies, such as absolute idealism, the dominant metaphysics of James’s day, 
also posit unity.  Integrally though, radical empiricism locates the unifying “conjunctive relations” within 
sensory perception, as opposed to some transcendental realm such as perfect reason, the mind of God or 
“The Absolute.”  At the most basic level, it holds that both relations (time, space, likeness, difference) and 
objects (cat, book, language) are real and directly accessible to humans.  Each object or relation is neither 
inherently part of a single whole (rationalism) nor a monad grouped with other monads only by human 
thought (empiricism).  Instead, each is potentially part of many wholes.  These wholes come together and 
break apart through the activity of interested, world-making agents (often human, but not necessarily).  In 
allowing for immanent connection, radical empiricism, like much of James’s thought, represents a sort of 
middle ground.  At the same time though, it is radical, in that it takes what was once the providence of 
God (or “Reason”) and places it within felt human experience. 
 As noted in chapter one, James was heavily influenced by Darwin’s theory of evolution.  
Following Darwin, he believes that the higher comes from the lower.  This means that all thought and 
value—our greatest theories and most cherished ideals—all arise (or arose) from the Darwinian drive to 
survive in the face of a hostile world.  The human, James writes, “whatever else he may be, is primarily a 
practical being, whose mind is given him to aid in adapting him to this world’s life” (P 25).  There is no 
thought apart from matter; the transcendent always arises from the corporal.  This baseline understanding 
leads to the view that knowledge is good only for what it does, famously formulated in the pragmatist 
maxim that “truth is what works in the way of belief.”  Knowledge in such a system is always provisional, 
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always fallible (because what works today, may not work tomorrow).  It must constantly be put to use, 
tested and reimagined.  In other words, knowledge must be allowed to evolve.14 
Radical empiricism describes the reality which necessitates pragmatism’s view of knowledge-in-
action.  It situates the thinker within a constant, overwhelming flux of sensory inputs.  This world of 
experience, James writes, “is multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed” 
(P 14).  It’s always rushing forward, swamping our cognitive capacities: in every regard, there’s more.  
This excess means that the lived present is a space of unlimited potential.  But’s it’s also unworkable.  As 
such, “pure experience” must be immediately “taken,” abstracted and manipulated so that it flows “as if 
shot through with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions” (RE 39).  Integrally, James 
understands this process of abstraction and conceptualization as additive.  Reality, in short, consists of 
both “existential particulars”—sensory inputs or percepts—and the abstract concepts by which we 
navigate these sensory inputs.  “Percepts and concepts interpenetrate and melt together, impregnate and 
fertilize each other,” he writes. “Neither taken alone, knows reality in its completeness” (SP 53). 
As noted in chapter one, some have marked James as a romantic, only interested in the parts of 
experience which lie beyond language.  The above should dispel this notion.  Simply put, for James, 
concepts—the communally created abstractions by which individuals and groups navigate experience—
are important.  They allow us to map the perceptual flux and assign value to what we find there.  In doing 
so, they shape our reality.  Concepts are never all there is though.  “Every reality has an infinity of aspects 
or properties,” James reminds us, of which the conceptual only captures a tiny sliver (BC 356).   Though 
the act of perception, we abstract certain aspects from the flux, thereby radically delimiting what we see, 
hear and feel.  Our selection of this real is “always unjust, always partial, always exclusive” (BC 356).  It 
is based on our specific interests as embodied beings.  We must be constantly aware of this fact.  
Otherwise, our conceptual schemes can work to “deny the very properties with which things sensibly 
present themselves” (PU 89).  Thought, in other words, can limit understanding.15 
Another key aspect of radical empiricism is the idea that thought, with its ability to abstract and 
divide, only works backwards.  Experience, as it comes to us, has no “inner duplicity” (RE 8).  In other 
words, according to James, divisions between subject and object, thing and thought, self and world, are 
only retrospective mental constructions.  “There is no original spirituality or materiality of being,” he 
14 Though pragmatism and radical empiricism are separate doctrines (the former is a theory of truth, the latter a 
metaphysics), they are mutually sustaining.  A pragmatist thinker, James writes, “turns his back resolutely and once 
and for all upon… abstraction and insufficiency… verbal solutions… fixed principles, closed systems, and 
pretended absolutes and origins” (P 24).  For the pragmatist, ideas are “instruments” used to reshape experience, not 
“answers to enigmas” (P 25).   
15 This idea is very similar to what Yagelski suggests through Dogen.  The difference is that James doesn’t seek to 
escape the conceptual.  Instead, the goal is to use the nondiscursive to expand the bounds of the conceptual.  
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writes, “only a translocation of experiences from one world to another; a grouping of them with one set or 
another of associates for definite practical or intellectual ends” (RE 60).  So within the realm of practice, 
of life, there is no functional division.  Everything that is—language, matter, God, the body—is virtually 
there, and is capable of affecting other elements of experience.16  The idea suggests a great intimacy of 
being, and at the same times, hints at the constructive power of  thought.  Many of the relations between 
these elements, after all, are only virtual.  In a world of both connection and disconnection, they do not 
impact each other.  A meaning-maker can change this though.  By grouping elements of experience with 
“one set or another of associates,” thought can actualize connections which within pure experience are 
only potentialities. “Little worlds” or “partial systems,” as Livingston writes, can be bound together (5). 
*** 
Earlier, I suggested that composition needs theory which respects both the individuated, thinker-feeling 
writer and the array of forces which inform that writer’s text.  In radical empiricism, I believe we find a 
metaphysical base on which to build such theory.  Per radical empiricism, there does exist a human 
subject, “an objective nucleus,” as James calls the thinking-feeling body (RE 35).  This subject, each 
subject, has desires, intentions and the ability to project novelty into the world.  At the same time, within 
practice—during the writing act, for example—this subject is, in essence, one with the material, 
discursive and affective systems in which she moves.  These systems shape her thought and her text in 
ways which, upon reflection, are both traceable and untraceable.  Experience as lived is whole.  
Experience as conceptualized is partial.  Thought abstracts and divides, but can also actualizes latent 
connections, thus (re)structuring both individual perception and shared reality.  Yes.  
 
 
 
 
2.7   TOWARDS A JAMESIAN THEORY OF DISCOURSE 
 
 
 So what can we do with our new metaphysics?  How can radical empiricism change how we 
understand writing?  In performing such an analysis we must keep in mind the purpose of our shared 
enterprise.  As discussed above, composition, as I understand it, entails the cultivation of diversity of 
16 It may seem paradoxical, but as James understands it, lived experience is both one and many.  Experience, David 
Lamberth explains, is “formally monistic,” in that it “posits a fundamental similarity among everything that can be 
philosophically categorized.”  At the same time, it is a “pluralistic thesis” in terms of content, “allowing a radical 
variation of content or natures among or within pure experience(s)” (25). 
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thought and story.  It entails breaking down barriers, and allowing the vague and superfluous—life’s 
excessive elements—to energize language.  We need to think about discourse in ways which provide for 
this sort of transformation.  And here is where radical empiricism is valuable.  Radical empiricism is, first 
and foremost, a pluralist metaphysics.  By holding that reality is infinitely rich, infinitely varied, it 
demands that we keep looking, listening, grasping.  “The world is full of partial stories,” James writes (P 
58).  They “mutually interlace and interfere,” but can never be unified completely (P 58).  This 
commitment to pluralism, founded on the belief that every articulation leaves something out, that there’s 
too much difference in the world to be contained or captured, can serve as a beacon.  It reminds us that no 
articulation is final, every sentence can (and must be) revised.  In short, radical empiricism forces us to 
keep writing. 
The anti-hegemonic nature of James’s thought is nicely captured in the “story of the squirrel,” an 
anecdote contained in the series of lectures published as Pragmatism.  The story involves a man, and a 
squirrel on a tree trunk.  The man tries to catch sight of the squirrel, but the squirrel keeps moving, 
keeping the tree trunk between itself and the man.  In such a case, does man go round squirrel?  This 
question, James writes, sparked a “ferocious metaphysical dispute” among his friends, who appealed to 
him for a solution (P 21).  The answer, he determined, depends on how one groups sensory elements.  If 
one understands “going round” as invoking relations of geography, the man does indeed “go round” the 
squirrel.  If instead, one invokes relations of anatomy— squirrel back, belly, etc.—then, clearly, man does 
not go round beast.  In other words, depending on how and for what purpose potentialities are actualized, 
there are multiple, equally valid ways to understand the event. 
The story of the squirrel shows pluralism in action.  It also illustrates how radical empiricism can 
spark the proliferation of meaning.  Meaning-making, as I understand it, involves building connections, 
“the ability to see one thing as a sign for another,” as John Dewey says.  Connection typically involves 
abstraction.  To abstract is to identify the same quality in two disparate entities, and using that quality as 
a point of reference, create a new, higher-level order.  For example, I am confronted with cat and pillow.  
I identify the quality of “soft” in both objects and group them under the new heading: “things that are 
soft.”  Now, I have three linked items, hence a very basic meaning system.   
Writing is, of course, a powerful meaning-making tool.  By allowing us to visually represent 
elements of experience and their various qualities, it greatly expands our ability to draw connections.  
Radical empiricism expands this ability even further.  Per this doctrine, remember, there is no gap 
between subject and object, thing and thought, squirrel and man.  “The instant field of the present,” he 
writes, “is always experienced in its 'pure' state, plain unqualified actuality, a simple that” (RE 31).  
Paradoxically though, within this “simple that” there are infinite elements, each possessed of infinite 
aspects.  It is a flux of the pluralistic sort—a one and a many—and therefore pulsing with possible points 
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of connection.  These connections are actualized, as noted above, by the grouping together of certain 
elements.  For example, James groups man and tree to make one story (“man goes round squirrel”) and 
man, squirrel belly and squirrel back to make another (“man does not go round squirrel”).  In both cases, 
he takes the undifferentiated flux of experience and goes to work on it, actualizing latent connections.  In 
both cases, he makes meaning.  The key is that by multiplying possible points of connection, radical 
empiricism multiples the possible meanings that can be made.  It presents the everyday as a source of 
unlimited thought and story. 
How might the above ideas inform writing instruction?  Well, it seems to me, that a teacher under 
the sway of William James would view her students’ objects of inquiry—texts, life events, cultural 
artifacts—as infinitely rich.  She would encourage student writers to capture as much of this richness as 
possible: through the use of detailed description, for example.  She would then move them to draw 
connections, to abstract away from the parts to make wholes.  She would recognize, though, that these 
wholes are always partial, always liable to disruption from the revelation of addition qualities, additional 
facts or details.  In short, a Jamesian writing teacher recognizes that student texts are built from the 
bottom up.  And that any text is only a temporary stopping point.  Moved by this idea, she constantly 
pushes her students to create more and more expansive meanings.   
Radical empiricism, as I’ve described, allows meaning to proliferate.  It promises nothing though.  
A pluralist worldview, James writes, “is neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but melioristic, rather. The 
world, it thinks, may be saved, on condition that its parts shall do their best” (SP 142).  This is an attitude 
I believe composition would do well to adopt.  It allows for intellectual and ethical growth, but demands 
effort, responsibility.  The world, remember, pulses with potential lines of connection.  But it is up to the 
thinker-writer to make these connections real.  To do this—to relate one bit of experience to another, and 
ultimately create a whole bigger than the parts—takes work.  It requires self-awareness and the constant 
interrogation of our practice in light of our ideals.  In this regard, a Jamesian view demands both a 
constructive and critical attitude towards language.  It holds that both reading and writing are thoroughly 
hermeneutic activities.  To write without awareness of what you’re writing towards is simply not 
sufficient. 
Related to the above, is the importance of deep contextualization when considering symbols and 
symbolic action.  James, remember, views all “verbal formulas” as pallid in comparison to the vivid 
“thatness” of experience.  Signs and symbols are essential—they make experience workable—but are 
also, by their very nature, radically reductive.  As such, to understand what language is and does, we 
must, as Louise Wetherbee Phelps writes, shift our gaze from “symbols and symbolic structures in 
themselves to acts of symbolizing in social context” (134).  This means viewing discourse as active, as 
language-in-use, as contextualized discursive event.  Seen in this way, writing is dynamic and 
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performative.  It always points beyond itself, and beyond any codifiable definition, into a world of selves, 
bodies, affects and objects.  And it is known there by its fruits.  This move from writing-as-structure to 
writing-as-event represents a move from the transcendent (ahistorical, static) to the immanent (temporal, 
vital).  As indicated in chapter one, this sort of contextualization keeps us honest.  It prevents us from 
reifying concepts.  The recognition that each concept arises from and must return to the teeming, 
overflowing flux of experience, in turn, destabilizes meaning.  It allows entry of the vague and 
superfluous. 
*** 
My goal in these pages has been to use the thought of William James to suggest a new and 
hopefully more productive way to conceive of the relationship between writer, word and world.  So far 
my discussion has trafficked in abstraction.  To follow William James, though, we must descend from the 
ethereal realm into the messy particulars of experience.  As such, I’d like to use the above ideas to 
analyze a specific writing act.  In doing so, it’s important to remember that a Jamesian theory of discourse 
is intended to allow for maximum creativity.  Given any object, an infinite number of stories can be told.  
What story emerges will depend on the storyteller. 
I’d like to center my story on Mark Corrigan, a character from BBC 4’s long-running comedy 
series Peep Show.17  Circa season eight, Corrigan is an aspiring author living in Croydon, south London.  
After losing his job as a credit analyst, he sets out to write a book of business advice modeled on the 
teachings of the ancient Egyptians.  One night, high of caffeine, he sets down at his computer and types 
the following chapter heading: “Make UK Business Law Your Anubis.”  So how should we understand 
this act of textual production?  What’s the relationship between writer, word and world?  David 
Bartholomae, for one, would tell us to engage in an act of “practical criticism.”  This entails interrogating 
the text “in relationship to the problems of writing and the problems of disciplinary knowledge” (332).  In 
doing so, we’d likely foreground issues of power and authority.  What textual moves, for example, grant 
Corrigan, a business-writing novice, authority to speak in that field?  James Berlin would want us to 
foreword ideology.  He’d ask use to consider how the dominate discourse shapes what Corrigan can think 
and imagine, and how competing discourses may be leveraged to disrupt his (capitalist) inclinations.  
Robert Yagelski, with his “ontology of writing,” would draw our attention to Corrigan’s actual experience 
that night.  What does he feel in the moment, sitting at his computer, typing away?   
 
17 Corrigan’s experience makes for an apt example because he is very clearly not a skilled practitioner.  Instead, like 
a first-year writing student, he is struggling to write and think in a new discourse.  I’ve found that depictions of 
amateur writers in this vein are rare in popular culture. 
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I can see the value in all these modes of analysis.  Each makes the writing act more intelligible, 
thus allowing for more effective intervention.  How does a Jamesian analysis change the conversation?  
Well, first, we must remember that a Jamesian theory of discourse “starts from the very bottom,” so the 
speak.  Rooted in James’s radical empiricism, it holds that Corrigan is a mind-body, an individuated 
thinking-feeling subject immersed in a flux of sensory experience.  Through acts of perception and 
cognition he makes cuts in the flux, composing his world.  His actions are purposeful and potentially 
novel.  This does not mean that Corrigan is in anyway monadic or self-contained, though.  Instead, he and 
his text exist at the intersection of multiple discursive, affective and material processes.   
A Jamesian analysis seeks to convey the interpenetration of energies inherent in the writing act.  
This requires close attention to and thick description of the various and varied forces with which 
Corrigan, as a mind-body, resonates.  These forces are discursive (an article he read in the Times that 
morning, the rules of English syntax), affective (love of history, fear of death), and material (the caffeine 
in his bloodstream).  They all collide in, but do not determine, Mark Corrigan.  And they work all at once, 
shaping his text.  Some are cognizable; many are not.  Integrally though, those which are cognizable are 
revealed only in retrospect, and only through future interested acts of meaning-making.18   
Turning to Corrigan’s text, “Make UK Business Law Your Anubis” is understood as the symbolic 
remnant of a purposeful act of meaning-making.  Earlier, I claimed that meaning exists when a thinker is 
able to draw connections between various bits of experience, to see one thing as sign of another.  As 
noted, this typically involves abstraction, the identification and merger of shared qualities.  Indeed, this is 
what Corrigan does when he ties the Egyptian god of the afterlife to UK business law.  He locates the 
same in two different things and thus becomes able to see one for the other.  When he joins them, the 
result is a third thing: new and more complex.  Though a simple example, the movement displayed here is 
the essence of human thought.  Disparate bits of experience are linked via concepts; concepts are linked to 
create webs of meaning.  These systems, in turn, make order out of chaos. 
It’s important to once again emphasize that from a Jamesian perspective, when Corrigan links 
disparate parts of experience to create meaning he is doing more than just describing some pre-existing 
state of connectivity.  Instead, he is actively creating connection.  In a pluralistic universe, remember, the 
experiential flux pulses with possible links.  These links are only virtual, though.  UK Business Law and 
ancient Egyptian gods are, for all intents and purposes, absolutely separate until a meaning-maker—like 
18 What story will be told depends on what relations the future writer-thinker chooses to invoke.  For example, using 
affective relations as a guide, she could examine the ways in which Corrigan’s emotional connection to the ancient 
Egyptians, popular history texts and the demands of capitalism, shape his discursive production.  Alternatively, 
thinking in terms of physical relations, she could examine the impact of his computer’s word processing program, 
the caffeine flowing in his veins and the UK’s publishing regime.  In the abstract, each of these articulations is 
equally valid.  In practice, of course, different contexts demand different lines be drawn. 
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Mark Corrigan—unites them.  When this occurs, our shared reality is altered.  Perhaps law + god will 
allow Corrigan to understand credit analysis in a new way.  Perhaps its circulation will alter the actions or 
beliefs of others.  Either way, this concept is now something in the world with which we must contend.  It 
is now part of our reality. 
So concepts are important.  Integrally, though for James, they are also understood as partial and 
utterly mutable.  Law + god is a human creation.  It was created by Corrigan at a specific time, at a 
specific place, to meet the needs of that time and place.  Confronted with the same bits of experience (the 
sensual inputs we label UK business law and ancient Egypt), other thinkers will abstract other elements 
and create different concepts.  Depending on the context of creation and deployment, these concepts—
though potentially opposed to Corrigan’s—may be equally valid, equally real.  It is within the realm of 
embodied human experience that this determination must be made.  And human experience is always 
singular.   
As noted above, a Jamesian mode of analysis demands deep contextualization.  Now we see why.  
To evaluate Corrigan’s statement we must know the consequences of law + god as it moves among the 
world of objects and relations.  We must also recognize our own positionality.  Is this effective rhetoric?  
As a truth claim, is it true or good?  We simply cannot say in the abstract.  The answers depend on the 
consequences of the statement in a particular, delimited time and place.  And they also depend on who we 
are and why we are asking.  A Jamesian theory of discourse demands that we constantly perform this sort 
of bifocaled analysis.  It suggests that there are truths to be had, but that they are always local, always 
limited, and always changing.  The task of the analyst is to know herself, know her world, and let 
circumstances lead. 
*** 
 In the above, I’ve argued that composition needs a new story about the relationship between 
thinker and thing, word and world.  Towards this end I’ve sketched a theory of discourse based on the 
metaphysical thought of William James.  By situating the writer within the multitudinous flux of lived 
experience, this vision of what is renders boundaries provisional, new forms of connection possible.  If 
we see the world in this way, I believe, we will start to think about writing instruction in new, more 
creative ways. We will become more adept at tapping the vague and superfluous, and thus sparking the 
generous, expansive meanings necessary to disrupt the hegemony of the fragments.  “Our fields of 
experience,” James writes, “have no more definite boundaries than have our fields of view.  Both are 
fringed forever by a more that continuously develops, and that continuously supersedes them as life 
proceeds” (RE 30).  More expansive, more inclusive thought and story, I believe, can only be found by 
exploring this more.  A Jamesian theory of discourse provides a framework for such exploration.
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3.   COMPOSITION AS ETHICAL ENTERPRISE 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1   COMPOSITIONIST AS CLERIC 
 
 
This chapter is about the good—what we value, what we want and work towards.  I will present a 
way of thinking and being, which, simply put, I believe is better than any alternative.  This is perhaps a 
bold statement.  Even in the interpretive humanistic fields, academics often feel compelled to avoid direct 
assertions of value.  There are, perhaps, good reasons why this might be.  In society at large it seems that 
claims of “right” or “good” are more often used to shut down conversation than to spur it.  We associate 
talk of values with dour authority figures, the priest or principal trying to legislate skirt length or sexual 
mores.  Well, I’ve never been to church and have no interest in telling you how to dress.  I do think, 
though, that it’s important for writing teachers to make clear where we stand.  And whether we 
acknowledge it or not, we always stand somewhere. 
Patricia Bizzell, one of composition’s most self-aware theorists, writes that when we teach 
writing in the university we are inviting students to share “a certain set of intellectual habits and ethical 
predilections… asking them to accept a certain kind of relation to their culture” (161).  As such, it is 
“hypocritical to pretend that academic activity is value-neutral” (162).  I agree.  Unfortunately, it seems 
that hypocrisy is the name of the game.  It’s of a complex sort, though.  Bizzell, for example, writes of the 
“moral fervor” with which many writing teachers approach their work (162).  To me, this seems right, as 
in both an apt description and how things ought to be.  In my experience, teachers, the good ones anyway, 
typically do believe that they are working towards a greater good.  Any teacher who doesn’t should 
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probably find another job.  This is especially true for writing teachers.  Writing, as discussed in chapter 
two, is not just a skill, like operating a chainsaw.  Instead, it has the ability to alter meaning systems and 
thus perception.  This means that writing instruction, changes people.  I think most compositionists 
recognize this fact.  At the same time, though, our field tends to avoid responsibility for the changes we 
seek.  We are often unable or unwilling to identify the larger goods that our practice serves.  Our ideals, in 
other words, remained cloaked behind unexamined norms or faux-objectivity.  This, I believe, 
compromises our practice. 
An illustrative example:  
Not long ago I encountered a friend in the lobby of the neo-gothic university building where we 
both work.  We stopped to chat.  Apparently, in class that day, one of my friend’s first-year composition 
students had used the word “retarded” to describe a classmate.  She chastised him.  He was contrite, but 
my friend wasn’t satisfied; she felt like she’d just silenced the student, rather than using the event as “a 
teaching moment,” as we say.  Trying to be supportive, I asked her to take me through the encounter.  
“What was your explanation as to why he shouldn’t use that term?”  “It’s offensive.”  “Why?”  Here she 
paused.  After a bit more Socratic pestering on my part, it became clear to both of us that despite the 
(moral) repugnance she felt at the student’s statement, and her certainty that it had no place in the 
classroom, she had yet to think though the justification for her belief.  Now, I don’t want to imply that my 
friend is not a competent scholar or teacher.  I’m sure if given time, she could write a great essay on the 
rhetoric of disability.  At that moment though, when she confronted this student and attempted to enforce 
the norms of our community, she was uncertain as to the larger good those norms serve.  This uncertainty 
compromised her practice. 
The above example, illustrates, I think, the problem with not acknowledging our investments.  
We don’t just teach writing or thinking.  Instead, we teach certain types of writing and thinking, and we 
do so because we believe that these ways of being are better than the status quo.  There’s a moral 
imperative here, a good, or array of goods, which our actions serve.  My claim is that we need to do a 
better job of articulating these goods.  We need to be willing and able to say what we believe, what we 
want, and most importantly, who we want our students to be.  There’s an element of persuasion in this 
sort of discussion, of course, but consensus is not necessarily the goal.  Instead, the process of identifying 
and defending our values is of intrinsic worth.  Through our shared engagement we can start to see 
ourselves, and our ideals, in new ways.  We can note contradictions, make connections.  In this sense, 
ethics talk involves ongoing inquiry as to what we are doing, why we are doing it, and how we can do it 
better.  And in my opinion, within composition studies, such inquiry is never optional. 
*** 
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 Among those willing to talk greater goods, what are the dominant trends at the moment?  Critical 
pedagogy, celebrating empowerment and emancipation, seems to be on the wane.  In its place we find 
new materialists promoting connection without telos, on the one hand, and activist academics, advocating 
for the rights of disadvantaged groups on the other.  William James does not fit easily into either of these 
categories.  He knows the practical value of ideals, of teloi, even if unattainable, and he refuses to view 
ethical action as a team sport.  Where does he stand then?  Cornel West writes that James is “first and 
foremost a moralist” (54).  Whether eulogizing civil war veterans or exploring mystical states, here is a 
man clearly striving to become better and to help others do the same.  Towards this end, he writes with 
great force about gods, faith, the “energies of man,” and the ways in which these forces can and should be 
brought to bear upon life as it is lived.  “The distinctive appeal of American pragmatism,” the tradition 
James inaugurated, West writes, “is its unashamedly moral emphasis and its unequivocally ameliorative 
impulse” (4).  Yet James never comes off as preachy or didactic.  Perhaps pragmatism is best defined as 
therapeutic thought.  It seeks to inspire, not to indoctrinate.  Openness to lived experience, flexibility, 
sureness of purpose, generosity of spirit: these qualities define both James and the change he seeks. 
 James, I’ll argue, embodies an ethics of attunement.  This is a critical, constructive habit of mind 
which attends closely to context in order to name, and rename, the world.  In making the case for such an 
ethics, I’ll first discuss the good as presented in James’s “Talks to Teachers” lecture series.  I’ll then 
discuss how ethics has typically been conceived in rhetoric and composition, paying particular attention 
to composition’s postmodern moment, which in many ways parallels James’s own thought.  Next, after 
examining some more recent new materialist thought, I’ll return to James’s writing, illustrating, through a 
discussion of his essay “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” what an ethics of attunement might 
look like.  Finally, I’ll move to the classroom, showing how such an ethics can invigorate writing 
instruction.  Overall, I hope to show that a strain of composition theory inspired by William James is 
capable of forging both better writers and better people.   
As is perhaps apparent, this chapter builds on those that came before.  In chapter one, I argued 
that Western society is undergoing a crisis of meaning.  With the rise of digital technology, and the 
radical fragmentation of our lifeworld, thought and story have ossified.  In chapter two, I argued that 
composition can assert a much-needed counterforce.  To do so though, we need a new metaphysics, a 
theory which explains the relationship between word and world, thinker and thought.  James’s radical 
empiricism, which presents the writer as an embodied, thinking-feeling being, fills this gap.  So, in short, 
so far we have the hegemony of the fragments.  And we have the writer as thinking-feeling being.  I 
believe that we can use the latter to challenge the former.  This chapter makes clear the moral impulse 
behind such a move.  It argues, in short, that compositionists are clerics and that growth is the go(o)d we 
serve. 
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3.2.  FINDING THE RIGHT NAME FOR THE CASE 
 
 
 What or whom does William James serve?  Perhaps it’s best to start with what ethics in the 
Jamesian sense is not.  Unlike much moral theory, Jamesian ethics refuses to issue prescriptions.  As 
Sarin Marchetti writes, James fiercely opposes any moral code “that would rule our moral lives from 
above their contingencies” (22).1  For James, in other words, the good is local; it can’t be transferred from 
philosopher to citizen, or teacher to student.  This means that ethics, as practiced by James and as 
presented in the following pages, must be “hortatory rather than prescriptive” (Marchetti 23).  Instead of 
propounding a set of rules—a better to replace a previous better—the goal of the moral philosopher (or 
composition theorist) is to provoke and stimulate, to challenge others to identify and reevaluate their 
moral assumptions.  The goal of such inquiry is to open up new vistas, make possible previously 
foreclosed options, both for the individual and society.  These vistas always emerge first at the individual 
level, though.  “Ethics practiced in a Jamesian way,” Marchetti writes, “is about giving us instruments to 
better deal with the moral life from within its practice and exercise” (18).  My better can never be your 
better, in other words.  Instead, all we can do is continuously challenge each other to keep defining, and 
redefining, what better might mean. 
 But what does better mean to William James?  A useful formulation can be found in James’s 
educational writings.  As noted in the last chapter, after publication of his groundbreaking Principles of 
Psychology, James emerged as something of an intellectual celebrity.  His next move, notably, was to 
embark on a series of public lectures designed for school teachers.  As Paul Stob has detailed, during the 
1890s James delivered his “Talks to Teachers” lecture series dozens of times all over North America.  
The advertised purpose of these talks was to put academic psychology to classroom use.  According to 
Stob, though, James’s goal was nothing less than the redefinition of education and the role of the teacher 
for the new century.  “Amid the upheavals of the modern world,” Stob writes, James encouraged 
educators to “push the nation towards a better version of itself” (107).  This “better version” was to 
emerge through shaping the intellectual habits of the nation’s youth.  As such, much of Talks to Teachers, 
is devoted to discussions of virtue and how it can be cultivated.2  The result is a complex conception of 
the good. 
1 Marchetti is a young Italian pragmatist associated with the Università degli Studi di Milano.  Interestingly, James 
has always been popular among Italian thinkers, starting with his mentorship of Giovanni Papini (see Simons). 
2 The series of lectures, with some additions, was published in 1899 as Talks to Teachers About Psychology: and to 
Students About Some of Life’s Ideals. 
 62 
                                                 
   As Talks to Teachers comes to a close, James describes the “ideal sort of mind,” the kind “that 
we should seek to cultivate in our pupils” (180).  This ideal disposition is a mix of both tendencies to 
action and inhibitions.  It’s both responsive to others and environment, and oddly stubborn.  The ideal 
thinker, he writes, “with the reasons for [an] action, sees the reasons against it, and yet, instead of being 
palsied, acts in the way that takes the whole field into consideration” (180).  As this indicates, James 
values the ability to trace consequences, to survey a complex scene and make judgements in the face of 
competing choices.  This involves awareness of self and world, both in regard to what is and what could 
and should be.   
Interestingly, for James, judgements take on increased moral weight when opposed by 
psychological forces.  “The highest form of character,” he writes, “will be full of scruples and 
inhibitions,” but somehow “will succeed in energetically keeping on its way” (179).  James rejects both 
the recklessness of the despot and the paralyzing self-consciousness of the melancholic.  His ideal subject, 
we can say, is capable of both thought and action.  But what of the relationship between the two?  And 
how can we know a moral act?  Elsewhere, as we’ll see, James addresses these problems in philosophical 
terms.  Here he focuses on the psychological features of morality.  “Reduced to its simplest and most 
elementary form,” James writes, a moral act “consists in the effort of attention by which we hold fast to 
an idea which but for that effort of attention would be driven out of the mind” (187).3  This description of 
the good is notable in two respects.  First, it openly privileges conscious mental activity, what James calls 
“voluntary attention,” but what could be called “willpower.”  Second, it demands that we “hold fast” to 
our ideas, which, at first blush, seems like a thoroughly unpragmatic notion.  Pragmatism, remember, 
celebrates mediation, compromise, cognitive flexibility.  In these lines James seems to suggest that 
morality equals the opposite. 
 The above tension is resolved if we recall that for James, ideas are conceived as thoroughly 
entwined with lived experience.  He rejects any attempt to rule our lives “from above their 
contingencies,” as Marchetti writes.  Instead, the ideas to which we must “hold fast” are those which 
emerge from interaction with our environment.  They are human creations, the result of active inquiry.  In 
any deliberative situation, James argues, the initial problem “is to find the right idea or conception for the 
case,” with rightness determined by consequence, evaluated per the thinker’s singular meaning-system 
(185).  Once the right name is found, he suggests, it will play out its hand, leading to positive action.  His 
principle intervention in Talks is to suggest that certain tendencies—both psychological and 
environmental—will inevitably drive us away from what we know (and feel) to be the best possible name, 
3 James here is drawing on his own assertion of free will, discussed in chapter four.  Given the option to conceive of 
himself as either free or not free, he chose freedom as to reap the benefits such a conception would bring. 
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thus preventing the best possible action.  Morality, as James presents it here, is a matter of recognizing 
this drift, and rejecting it.  We must think broadly, think creatively, draft the best conceptions possible, 
and stick with them, come what may.  If we do can this, the good will inevitably follow. 
   James illustrates this insight into the nature of morality with the example of a drunkard.  When 
confronted with a whiskey bottle, this subject’s “moral triumph or failure,” James writes, “literally 
consists in his finding the right name for the case” (187).  If he conceives of the situation as one in which 
he must “be social” or “not waste good liquor” he is physically and spiritually doomed (per his particular 
meaning-system).  On the other hand, if he is able to label the situation one of “being a drunkard”—and 
stick with that label despite all forces to the contrary—“his feet are planted on the road to salvation” 
(188).  While a “hackneyed” tale, as James admits, this example aptly illustrates the pragmatist 
conception of the relation between language and life.  We name the world in order to achieve certain 
ends.  And in a pluralistic universe—the universe described by James’s radical empiricism—multiple 
descriptions are always possible.  Morality, James suggests here, involves choosing wisely among our 
descriptive options.  Language will then play out its hand. 
 So we must find the right name for the case.  How can we do this though?  How can we create 
better names and teach our students to do the same?  My claim in the following pages is that if we move 
away from Talks to Teachers and into James larger oeuvre we can find something approaching an answer.  
For James, as we’ll see, to draft the best descriptions we must be open to questioning and reworking.  We 
must refuse to abide by any limit or form, and instead strive to feel the unfelt, to think the unthought.  
Cornel West writes that for James, the goal of philosophy “is to be more fully alive, more attuned to the 
possibilities of mystery, morality and melioration” (56).  We think, in other words, to live fuller, to grow.  
I’d like to argue that this emphasis on growth—individual, social; intellectual, ethical, sensual—should 
guide composition.  We can actualize such a vision, I’ll suggest, by encouraging attention to both self and 
world, our thoughts and the things about which we think.  By engaging what’s “out there,” we can make 
room for more of the world “in here,” ultimately allowing us to think, write and act more creatively, more 
inclusively. 
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3.3   DIFFERENCE & ITS DISCONTENTS 
 
 
 I’m not alone in wishing to foreground ethics in rhetoric and composition.  I’d like to examine 
some of this work, but first, a brief digression is in order.  In chapter two, we saw how talk of “what is” in 
composition theory is currently dominated by thought positioned against the text-centric scholarship of 
the social turn.  This text-centric scholarship can be understood as “postmodern” in that it is generally 
influenced by anti-foundational high theory (Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish and Jacques 
Derrida, for example).  Now, the ontology of such theory is under attack.   
A similar backlash is underway in regard to ethics.  The current trend in ethical theorizing, as we 
will see, is to write against core postmodern themes such as contingency, difference, self-conscious 
reflection and critique.  As with my earlier discussion, the following pages will reveal that I am more 
sympathetic to postmodernism than most.  Simply put, I believe that the ethical theory of that era gets a 
lot of things right.  Chief among these is the postmodern demand for critical, self-aware inquiry.  Gary 
Olson writes that in a world without agreed upon foundations (which like it or not, is the world we 
inhabit), “no longer can we conveniently rationalize our behavior by appealing to rules, rule books, 
priests, or philosophers” (45).  Yes.  This statement is both true and of great consequence.  Simply put, 
we now have to judge our own actions, set our own rules.  This means that self-conscious thought, real 
thinking, is more important than ever.  Such a project, in such a space, as I see it, requires a good deal of 
humility.  It requires the recognition of radical, incommensurate difference, as well as our own myopia in 
regard to that difference.  The best postmodern thought acknowledges this.  In that regard, as we will see, 
such thought resonates with the work of William James.4 
*** 
The most prominent contemporary voice on ethics and the teaching of writing is certainly John 
Duffy.  In a series of influential journal articles, he has argued for renewed attention to composition as a 
positive social force.  To clarify our mission in this regard, he suggests that the field look to Aristotelian 
virtue ethics.  By drawing on the language of the virtues, he writes, both teachers and students can find 
“rationales for making ethical decisions in the writing class” (2017, 231).  
 
 
4 I am, of course, not the first to make the connection between pragmatism and postmodernism.  As early as the 
1970s, for example, Richard Rorty quipped that James (along with Dewey) could be found “waiting at the end of the 
road… Foucault and Deleuze are currently traveling” (qtd. in Poirier 101). 
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 Integrally, Duffy doesn’t claim to be inventing anything new.  As he sees it, both our classroom practice 
and the history of the discipline suggest that to teach writing is “always and already” to teach ethics.  The 
cultivation of “ethical dispositions” in our students, he argues, is, in fact, our field’s “prevailing 
disciplinary narrative and our teleological reason for being” (2014, 226).  This is a bold claim.  Indeed, 
some may reject the idea that composition, which rightfully prides itself on implicating a diverse array of 
theoretical traditions and institutional sites, can even have a “prevailing disciplinary narrative.”  Duffy 
argues that we can, we do, and that this narrative needs to be made clear.  Specifically, he believes that 
composition, no matter where or how it is taught, necessarily promotes “communicative practices of 
honesty, accountability, compassion [and] intellectual courage” (2014, 213).  He sees this as a much-
needed social mission and one, which if better articulated, could raise the field’s public profile. 
Key to Duffy’s claim is the idea that all writing instruction, no matter the pedagogical method or 
institutional venue, involves the teaching of certain traditional moral values.  How can this be?  Duffy ties 
it to the nature of the rhetorical act.  Writing, like rhetoric in general, is a social activity, one which entails 
relations with other people and therefore, requires judgment as to the terms on which those relations will 
be conducted.  As writing teachers, we teach students how to judge, how to decide what is appropriate 
given certain variables.  This inevitably involves, according to Duffy, instruction in principles of honesty, 
accountability, etc.  Together, these principles constitute the “rhetorical virtues… the traits, attitudes, and 
dispositions we associate with a good person, speaking or writing well” (2017, 235).  The goal of Duffy’s 
project is to help the field recognize the existence and social importance of these virtues. 
Duffy makes a strong case.  It is hard to argue with his claim that in our neoliberal age, 
“conceptions of civic good have been undermined by a corrosive, market-driven public discourse” (2014, 
217).  Likewise, I agree that composition should devote itself to combating this corrosion.  Duffy, as 
we’ve seen, wants us to do this by emphasizing a traditional, community-derived form of morality.  He 
sees unity among composition teachers (whatever pedagogy we profess we teach the rhetorical virtues, 
after all), and wants us to transmit a similar vision of common cause to our students.  In this regard, he 
falls into that camp which resists postmodern values of contingency and difference.  A sophisticated 
thinker, he recognizes that a return to “Platonic ideals of foundational truths” is neither possible nor 
desirable (2014, 218).  Instead, by foregrounding the virtues, he hopes to expand composition’s “ethical 
vocabulary,” bringing forth the common good through talk of “connection, reciprocities, and 
interdependencies among peoples” (2014, 217).  The goal of such talk is to turn students into models of 
“the good writer,” a creature capable of sustaining “rhetorical friendships” (2017, 242). 
It’s flippant, but also accurate, to say that, basically, Duffy wants us to teach students to be nice.  
This is a noble goal.  Unfortunately, I think it’s also fatally short-sighted.  The corrosive, market-driven 
public discourse we’re up against has deep affective and material roots.  It shapes the way people think, 
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feel and perceive the world.  To combat it, we therefore need to reshape perception itself.  Duffy’s project 
doesn’t provide for this. 
At heart, my claim is that Duffy, while well-intentioned, remains too focused on the superficial 
features of discourse.  He takes the way individuals talk as cause, rather than effect of larger cultural, 
political and material forces.  To demonstrate what I mean, let’s look at Duffy’s example of the kind of 
discourse we want students to avoid.  It’s a Facebook comment from a congressional staffer.  In a 
response to a constituent’s claim regarding equal pay legislation, the staffer refers to the constituent, 
mockingly, as having “a little bee in his bonnet.”  He then goes on to suggest that his readers “hurl some 
acid” at certain female senators (qtd. in Duffy 2014, 209).  Now, admittedly, that’s not a very nice thing 
to say.  As Duffy suggests, it provides an apt example of the rancor which characterizes contemporary 
civic discourse.  We must consider, though, why this staffer would speak in such a manner.  In chapter 
one, if you recall, I discussed the effects of group polarization, and the ways in which, within online filter 
bubbles, beliefs become both more homogenous and more extreme.  In such environments, it’s not 
surprising that language would also become more extreme.  Immersed in his filter bubble, we can 
imagine, the staffer’s beliefs have ossified; the desires of his interlocutors (immersed in their own 
bubbles) seem bizarre and perverse.  In addition, within such spaces, there’s a strong social incentives to 
attack opponents in the most cutting manner possible.  Given this expanded notion of context, the 
staffer’s language takes on new resonance.  Rather than simply not being empathetic or kind, we see that 
he is, in fact, responding as the situation demands.  Within the world the staffer inhabits, the constituent, 
with his perverse view on equal pay legislation, is the enemy.  It would be illogical to try and sustain a 
“rhetorical friendship” with such a figure.  
Duffy sees the above situation and believes that we need to put more effort into teaching codes of 
conduct.  I believe that given the material reality writers and thinkers face, such a vision simply does not 
go far enough.  It is unreasonable to expect a writer to act against his own best interests in the name of 
kindness.  Instead, we need to change his perception of what his interests really are.  The goal of an 
ethical writing pedagogy, in other words, should be to restructure that staffer’s lifeworld, so that when he 
encounters the other in a Facebook forum, he is fascinated instead of repulsed.  We need to make it so he 
longs to engage and be changed.  A Jamesian ethical vision, centered on the notion of growth, allows us 
to cultivate this sort of subjectivity.  It can lead to Duffy’s much-desired rhetorical friendship, for sure.  It 
doesn’t frame such a relationship as a gift to the other, though.  Instead, the opportunity for growth it 
provides is a gift to oneself. 
*** 
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Laurie Grobman, in a pair of essays on multiculturalism and moral relativism, also examines 
ethics in the writing classroom.5  Like Duffy, who praises her work, Grobman wants to foreground 
commonality rather than difference.  She is particularly critical of what she sees as the postmodern 
relativism at the heart of many multicultural pedagogies.  A widespread belief in “epistemological 
subjectivity,” she writes, has made students and teachers too hesitant to judge other people and cultures 
(2003, 206).  There is a universally agreed upon set of human values, she argues, and actions and beliefs 
which contradict these values should be challenged.  In turn, she promotes a vision of “just 
multiculturalism,” which privileges the ideal of “justice” over “tolerance or difference” (2002, 815).  Just 
multiculturalism, she writes, “does not make the assumption that all differences are valuable and useful, 
but puts differences into view and subjects them to critical and ethical judgment” (2002, 837).   This 
framework, she argues, gives writing teachers grounds to criticize, and teach their students to criticize, 
unjust cultural practices. 
While, as we will see, I don’t agree with Grobman’s conclusions, I think her discussion of the 
relationship between knowledge and ethics is useful.  Grobman clearly possesses the moral fervor which 
marks a good writing teacher.  This is a teacher who clearly wants to do good, however that may be 
defined.  Likewise, she should be praised for not being afraid to clearly state what she values.  
Unfortunately, her work is more concerned with justifying those values than understanding them.  Her 
essay “Just Multiculturalism” is a particularly fascinating document in this regard.  Here, we see a subject 
valiantly resisting the idea that her ideals are, at bottom, her ideals.  Towards this end, she presents, and 
rejects, arguments by Charles Paine that values are ultimately personal, and by Patricia Bizzell that they 
are community-based.  There’s actually quite a lot of pathos in the contradictions that plague Professor 
Grobman.  She believes an instructor should be able to act on her personal beliefs, but not if they’re 
“reprehensible” (819).  She believes students’ desires should be respected, but not if they’re “hateful” 
(819).  To resolve this cognitive dissonance, Grobman takes what could be called the scientific route.  
Applying what she terms a “realist (moral) epistemology” (2003, 210), she argues that due to our species’ 
“common humanity” (827), something like an empirical definition of justice can be established.  Ethical 
action is that which conforms to this standard.  In her classroom, in turn, students work together to 
articulate such a standard, then think through specific cases, determining if acts are right or wrong based 
on the application of rules to situation (see Grobman “Postpositive Realism”). 
 
5 These essays are “‘Just Multiculturalism:’ Teaching Writing as Critical and Ethical Practice” (2002) and a more 
philosophically oriented companion piece, “Postpositivist Realism in the Multicultural Writing Classroom” (2003).   
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Right away, we can see why Grobman’s approach would be amenable to Duffy.  Duffy, 
remember, claims that writing instruction is united by a shared commitment to the “rhetorical virtues.”  
Grobman goes a step further—claiming that all humans (or all decent humans anyway) are united by 
similar ideas about justice and that these ideas can be known, at least vaguely, and used as a guide for 
action.  Now, Grobman doesn’t claim that ethics is simply a matter of memorizing rules: she admits that 
“most moral standards remain both situational and contextual” (2003, 218).  She is quite insistent though 
that certain hard and fast rules do exist.6  Her whole project, in short, involves convincing students that 
through careful analysis, they can arrive in a position to make moral claims that are more than just 
opinion—if they look hard enough, they will be able to find objective, albeit socially derived truth and 
thus act accordingly.  She sees this belief in moral certainty as necessary to overcome a “paralyzing 
relativism” that limits “cross-cultural understanding and ethical decision-making” (2003, 206). 
For sure, Grobman’s essay is of a certain moment, one in which combating limp, kumbaya 
multiculturalism was a major concern (see Olson, Pratt).  That said, I think her analysis draws our 
attention to a topic of timeless import: in short, how should we approach objects of inquiry?  Grobman is 
clear on this point.  She believes that we should work out a set of rules and judge objects by their 
correspondence with those rules.  Now, this position is not unreasonable; making sense of parts via 
wholes, small via large, has much philosophical precedent.  As stated in previous chapters, though, 
empiricism—the tradition in which William James works—takes the opposite approach.  It moves from 
parts to wholes, up from particulars, not down from rules.  This analytical method demands attention to 
differences as well as commonalities, along with a certain mental flexibility.  We have to recognize that 
concepts (the rules by which we understand) are only general guidelines and are always subject to 
revision. 
Now, like me, Grobman wants her students to pay attention to detail.  They must learn “the 
appropriate rules and general [moral] principles,” she writes, and also the “sensibility it takes to ground 
such principles in real social and historical contexts” (2003, 217).  I believe though that her top-down 
approach stands in the way of such sensibility.  It radically reduces her students’ ability to cultivate new 
lines of thought and story, and hence to see, feel and understand.   
Grobman writes of an assignment in which students research then pass judgment upon the case of 
Elian Gonzalez (a Cuban boy held in the United States against the wishes of his father).  One student, 
Sharon, uses the “moral principle of parental rights,” a supposed “transcultural value,” to decide the case 
6 I will not challenge Grobman’s claim that pretty-much universal standards of conduct could be articulated (“don’t 
kill without a good reason,” seems to be one).  My claim is simply that such rules are so abstract as to be worthless.  
It should also be noted how conservative Grobman’s vision of morality is—if our only concern is enforcing norms, 
rather than thinking new, better ways of being, how could society ever progress? 
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(2003, 212).  Her essay, in turn, betrays the single-mindedness of a provincial magistrate.  “The child has 
a right to be with his father… It is universally unethical to withhold custody of Elian,” she concludes, 
thus the “United States is the wrong one in this situation” (2003, 213).  Although, like Grobman, I am 
pleased to see a student take a stand on an issue of national importance, Sharon’s claim presupposes a 
myopia which her teacher fails to complicate (or perhaps even realize).  Who is speaking here?  Why?  
What information does she have to overlook in order to make her ruling?  Yes, the application of a rule 
simplifies the situation and allows for a solution.  But it also demands a radical contraction of potential 
meanings.  Following William James, I would prefer that Sharon open up new lines of meaning, that she 
complicate her object of study—and her own relation to it—even if that limits her ability to act as 
magistrate.  This sort of complication, I believe, is how we come to understand (more).  It’s how we 
grow. 
 
 
 
 
3.4   ETHICS AS A MODE OF QUESTIONING 
 
 
So far I’ve reviewed the work of two thinkers who challenge postmodern ideas about what is and 
what is good.  Both Duffy and Grobman stress commonality.  In doing so, they elide engagement with 
that which is radically, uncognizably other.  From my perspective, this is a mistake.  Rather than being a 
dismissible inconvenience, I’d argue that otherness defines our lifeworld.  The depth of this otherness can 
be glimpsed if we take a moment to consider the nature of cognition.  Like James, I believe that cognition 
arises from the material construction of the cognizing being.  As James writes (albeit in a slightly 
different context), “spirit” is always “at the mercy of bodily happenings” (BC 5).  All bodies, of course, 
are singular, with each tracing a different path through time and space.  The result, given any stimuli, is a 
innumerable array of interpretations, myriad manifestations of spirit.  The composition of distant galaxies, 
the machinations of capital: these things are unknowable (or more precisely, infinitely knowable).  The 
same can be said of the thoughts and feelings of our friends and lovers.  In all areas of life, in other words, 
if one takes a hard materialist line, what we know can only be said to mask the vast, roiling expanse of 
what we don’t (and can’t). 
Of course, visions of preternatural unity provide emotional support.  Ultimately, though, I think 
they’re self-defeating.  To achieve the good in any meaningful sense we must work together, which 
requires, at least to some degree, thinking together.  But how do we do this?  James’s project suggests that 
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close attention to the other and the object is key, as is the recognition of the limits of our ability to know 
(and feel) that to which we attend.  Commonality, in short, is made, not given, and most often made 
through surrender.  Postmodern discussions of ethics in rhetoric and composition are useful because they 
allow for surrender.  By emphasizing self-awareness and the contextual nature of all knowledge, they hint 
at a blueprint for moral action in a pluralistic universe.   
Perhaps the definitive statement of postmodern ethics in the writing classroom is James Porter’s 
1993 essay, “Developing a Postmodern Ethics of Rhetoric and Composition.”  Here, Porter acknowledges 
the unavailability of universal ethical principles (the “common humanity” sought by Duffy and 
Grobman), but unlike some, doesn’t see this as freeing us from ethical responsibility.  The key, according 
to Porter, is to understand ethics not as “a set of answers, but a mode of questioning” (219).  The good is 
always a process.  It implicates ideals (Grobman’s “justice,” for example), but those ideals are always 
understood as arising out of, and returning to, local circumstances.  Porter characterizes this ongoing 
merger of thought and thing, theory and practice, as “praxis” and claims that it “represents a new kind of 
critical positioning.  It is practice, conscious of itself” (220). 
Sheryl Fontaine and Susan Hunter, in 1998’s Foregrounding Ethical Awareness in Composition, 
expand on Porter’s vision of ethics as a “mode of questioning.”  Though concerned with consequences, 
they note that ethics-as-process doesn’t seek predetermined outcomes.  Instead it encourages 
consideration and reflection, the goal being for the thinker, every thinker, “to see what may not have been 
seen before, to resist complacency and reconsider what had, heretofore, seemed acceptable” (4).  This 
(re)vision requires a degree of self-consciousness and even self-doubt—we must engage in “continuous, 
on-going scrutiny of our motives and methods” (4).  Even then, nothing is guaranteed.  Postmodern ethics 
does not offer guarantees.  Instead, it merely helps the thinker better understand and work upon her own 
singular situation.  As Fontaine and Hunter phrase it, ethical inquiry in the postmodern mode acts to 
“clarify, diagnose, and structure situations” (7).  What the thinker does next is up to her. 
Taken together, we can say that postmodern thought presents ethics as a way of being, as a 
critical, self-aware habit of mind.  Instead of giving subjects a pre-made concept such as “kindness” or 
“justice” to guide their actions, it asks that they consider, and reconsider, each action in light of its 
singular circumstances.  Context is the key term here.  Postmodern ethics doesn’t assume commonality, 
other than the fact that every actor must act within a specific, delimited space and time (a specific 
context).  As such, every thought or action demands negotiation.  When John Duffy writes an essay, for 
example, there’s no escaping his background, his body, his highest ideals and most perverse vices.  The 
key to a context-dependent ethical scheme is the recognition that it is from the convergence of these 
variables, rather than any a priori obligation, that duty arises.  In the rhetorical act, indeed every act, the 
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“drive to obligation and action,” Porter writes, “derives from community… from a ‘local we’” (217).  
Attention to this we, and attunement to its demands, is thus the basis of morality.  
The connection between the above thinkers and William James now comes into view.  James, 
remember, asks that we survey the whole field in order to find the right name for the case.  Attention to 
context is key in this formulation.  The “right name” is always singular: it arises out of the specific 
dynamics of the field to which it is to work upon.7  Attunement, we can say, is the process by which name 
and field come into alignment.  In the case of the drunkard, for example, the concept of “being a 
drunkard” only derives meaning from the specifics of his lived experience.  And it is through attunement 
to that lived experience—the drunkard’s body, background, highest ideals and most perverse vices—that 
the idea of “being a drunken” can be formulated.  With James, as with the postmodern compositionists, 
attunement thus emerges as an ethical imperative. 
Louise Wetherbee Phelps, in her under-appreciated book, Composition As a Human Science, 
provides additional insight into the relationship between context and ethics.  Writing at the height of the 
postmodern moment, Phelps draws on two pragmatists—John Dewey and Stephen Pepper—to present 
human subjectivity as an “open system, constantly evolving through the exchange of energies with the 
world” (34).  As this line indicates, there’s an ecological element to Phelps’s analysis: actors draw from 
the tissue of context, but also redraw that tissue.  They name the world, but in doing so, act upon the 
world in ways that change the names which must be assigned.  Attunement, in other words, is always 
ongoing. 
In a line of thinking with which James, a Darwinian natural scientist, would agree, Phelps argues 
that an ecological perspective radically redefines the relationship between thinker and thought.  From 
such a perspective, the tools of understanding—reason, rationality, the senses—are seen as provided by 
the world as opposed to existing apart from it.  Reason is communal, rationality dialogical; they arise in 
time and space, from specific, delimited interactions.  This focus on the relational and situated, Phelps 
argues, lays the groundwork for a non-foundational ethical agenda.  An invigorated notion of context, she 
writes, echoing James Porter, “represents the precise counterpart (as God-term) to the discredited ideals of 
an autonomous, context-free authority” (30).  Shared attention to the local, in other words, provides for 
the possibility of shared meaning.  It allows for negotiation between what were once autonomous 
perspectives. 
As perhaps is apparent, the good as described by Porter, Fontaine and Hunter, and Phelps is quite 
amendable to composition as I have defined it.  The goal of composition in the face of the hegemony of 
7 Different situations will often be given what is technically the same name, of course.  Many singular situations 
have been named “being a drunkard,” for example. 
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the fragments, remember, should be to allow for more expansive, more inclusive acts of meaning-making.  
My claim is that ethics as a mode of questioning can spur such activity.  By refusing to treat thought as 
determined in advance, it demands respect for and attunement to the absolute singularity of ever situation.  
Moral imperialism, we can say, is countered with strict intellectual and sensual responsibly.  The ethical 
subject, according to this view, must check and recheck, feel and refeel, constantly searching for what 
they might have missed.  They must name the world, but can never rest assured in any particular name.  
Such a demand encourages writers not just to find the right name for the case, but to keep coming up with 
new and better names.  This is meaning-making.  And it’s how we counter the hegemony of the 
fragments. 
 
 
 
 
3.5   A POST-CRITICAL COMPOSITION? 
 
 
In the previous section I identified what could be termed a postmodern ethics for rhetoric and 
composition.  This vision of the ethical, as enacted by scholars associated with composition’s discourse-
centric social turn, presents the good as a critical, self-aware habit of mind.  Not surprisingly, with the 
more recent material turn this view has been challenged.  Though, as noted, I am an adamant materialist, I 
believe that the insights of the social turn must be respected.  To follow William James is to acknowledge 
the importance of matter, affect and the “vague and inarticulate.”  At the same time, though, James is 
clear that the purpose of recognizing and engaging such forces is self-definition, not self-effacement.8  
We think, write and act in order to grow, to expand self and sensibility.  To do this, we must learn to trace 
our boundaries, as to challenge, and ultimately exceed them.  This process inevitably involves active 
thought—as in conscious, critical, often traumatic thought.  Many new materialists feel differently.  They 
view thought as a barrier to connection, rather than its precondition.   
Stephen Rowe makes visible the tension between the dominant new materialist position and my 
own Jamesian-inspired view.  In exploring the vitalism at the heart of James’s work, he notes what 
appears to be two conflicting demands.  On one hand, to live life to its fullest, James indicates that we 
must utterly submit to lived experience.  We must “renounce entirely our efforts at control,” Rowe writes 
(18).  True submission, though, quickly reveals that as embodied humans we must choose, we must act.  
8 We must define ourselves as to affect that realm in which the impact can be the most felt (our lived experience). 
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So, as Rowe sees it, to “let go,” paradoxically, forces us to more fully embrace our constructive, creative 
powers.  My claim, in short, is that most new materialists only ride this train halfway.  In their efforts to 
put humans, birds and bricks on the same level, they renounce human control.  This is fine.  They fail to 
take the next step, though, and embrace their role as active agents.  In exalting the agency of a brick, say, 
new connections between the world’s varied elements are forged.  These connections weren’t there 
beforehand, though.  Instead, they were created by interested, willful human actors.  The more aware 
these actors are of their creative function, I believe, the better. 
As noted, many new materialists would take issue with James’s privileging of the constructive 
power of human thought.  Casey Boyle provides a good example.  In line with the dominant rhet-comp 
ethos, he privileges, above all else, notions of the “codependence” among human and nonhumans.  
Towards this end, he forwards a vision of “rhetoric as posthuman practice.”  Such a rhetoric, he writes, 
uses “repetitions to become attuned to and help foster the… rhythms, and relays that emerge across 
different media ecologies” (543).  Language in such a scheme becomes a means of “generating and 
sustaining dispositions,” rather than gaining active awareness of self, object or other (549).  There’s no 
need to know what you are doing or why.  There’s no need to identify the ideals your practice serves 
(other than the ideal of oneness).  In such a scheme, in fact, metacognition and reflection—hallmarks of 
postmodern ethics—“have the potential to become bad habits,” as they may encourage a writer “to 
separate herself from all those things with which she is codependent” (533).  Thinking too much, in other 
words, might make one forget that he is not a tree or mobile phone.  Boyle sees this as placing the writer 
on dubious ethical grounds. 
Critique, a term privileged by social-epistemic scholars like Berlin, Bizzell and Bartholomae, has 
also been challenged.  Boyle’s new materialist allies, Paul Lynch and Nathanial Rivers, for example, 
writing in response to the “critical materialism” discussed in chapter one, claim that pedagogies based on 
critique—on tracing the often unseen impacts of texts and other social creations—risk training students to 
“mistrust the very tools” of social improvement (585).  Instead of studying the way thought or language 
can misled, Lynch and Rivers want inquiry into things.  Every situation, they argue, is made up of equally 
real, equally important, and more or less accessible forces.  They argue for a writing pedagogy which 
traces these forces through quasi-scientific inquiry.  The ethical imperative at play, as with Boyle, is to 
promote a greater sense of connection between writer and world. 
I don’t want to completely dismiss the above arguments.  Overall, our positions have much in 
common.  I am in complete agreement with Boyle, for example, as to the importance of the unknown (and 
unknowable) in the composition and reception of texts.  Likewise, his description of “current critical 
rhetoric,” which uses reflection solely as a means to identify exploitable power relations, seems both alien 
and undesirable (536).  As for Lynch and Rivers, influenced by Bruno Latour—a self-proclaimed admirer 
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of William James—they are fellow empiricists.  They are certainly right to urge attention to the parts, to 
the details.  That said, I think that these scholars’ attacks on self-reflective, critical inquiry are largely 
unfounded.  First, like Bizzell or Bartholomae (or James, for that matter), I think a bit of mistrust for our 
tools is not only healthy, but desperately needed.  As discussed in chapter one, currently, those tools 
(particularly digital technologies) are radically restricting our ability to comprehend and communicate.  It 
is only through critique—through the self-conscious, creative identification of hows and whys—that we 
can begin to come to terms with this phenomenon.  Now, to be clear, I don’t promote any theoretical 
method which purports to reveal one true reality, hidden or otherwise.  Similarly, as my discussion of 
Grobman demonstrates, I reject top-down critical approaches.  That said, we must question.  And this 
often involves abstracting up and away from the specific to create higher orders of explanation.  The 
suggestion that there is more than meets the eye—that thought and language and perception may not be 
honest brokers—is valuable, I believe, because it sustains this sort of movement. 
Phelps, for one, agrees with me.  As she sees it, critical analysis, and the attunement to context it 
engenders, can help overcome the isolation occasioned by radical plurality.  Questioning what appears to 
be, Phelps writes, “helps us to identify . . . limits to reason, meaning, and community insofar as they 
constantly impose themselves” on our constructive efforts (34).  Critique, in other words, works to disrupt 
and detotalize truth claims.  We can thus generate new, more widely shared truths.9 
As Phelps’s analysis implies, critique has important moral implications.  James hints at this when 
he writes that the ideal thinker must be able to “take the whole field into consideration.”  To highlight 
exactly what’s at stake, though, I’d like to turn to another source: Hannah Arendt.  This may seem like an 
odd choice.  I think, though, that Arendt, perhaps better than any other philosopher, successfully 
elucidates the nexus between morality and critical thought.  As such, she sheds light on the belief system 
under which both William James and many postmoderns labor.  She also shows that the critical impulse is 
part of a long tradition that cannot be easily dismissed. 
Arendt hits upon the moral implications of critical thought in her influential lecture, “Thinking 
and Moral Considerations.”  Here, following Kant, she draws a distinction between knowing and 
thinking.  The former, she writes, involves the mapping of our world.  It is cumulative, leaving behind a 
“growing treasure of knowledge” (421).  Thinking, on the other hand, just is.  It is “the habit of examining 
and reflecting upon whatever happens to come to pass, regardless of specific content and quite 
independent of results” (416).  It has no purpose (other than the act of thinking itself) and is driven by a 
9 In describing the community building function of critical thought, Hannah Arendt, discussed below, writes that 
such thought “has roused you from your sleep and made you fully awake and alive,” but, at the same time, revealed 
that “you have nothing in your hand but perplexities, and the most we can do with them is share them with each 
other” (434).  Translation:  to lose our old names means we must band together to draft new ones. 
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desire that knows no limit or satiation point.  “The need to think,” Arendt writes, “can be satisfied only 
through thinking, and the thoughts which I had yesterday will [satisfy] this need today only to the extent 
that I can think them anew” (422). 
As we’ve seen, Boyle values discursive production—the fostering of “repetitions, rhythms and 
relays”—over any sort of cognitive activity.  Lynch and Rivers also value production.  What cognitive 
activity they do encourage, it seems to me, is more akin to knowing than thinking.  They cite Bruno 
Latour’s book Aramis as an example of their method.  Here, Latour “works to add to reality by counting 
up all the actants” involved with the failed construction of a new train system (584).  This is an interesting 
project; it increases one’s “treasure of knowledge.”  But does it make students more inclined to think?   
This question in essential, because, as Arendt see it, thinking is directly tied to morality.  
Specifically, she traces a connection between consciousness and the conscience, seeing in the former the 
distanciation from self which allows for the latter.  Observing Adolf Eichmann on trial in Jerusalem, she 
finds him utterly unable to think.  Eichmann, she writes, had little trouble transitioning from Nazi 
functionary to prominent war criminal: he passively accepted this new value system “as though it were 
nothing but another language rule” (417).  The invocation of linguistic habits is key here.  According to 
Arendt, Eichmann lived by clichés, stock phrases and standardized codes of expression.  Educated and 
articulate, he could no doubt use these to foster rhythms and repetitions among his fellow Nazis.  
Likewise, he could know his world in positive terms—perhaps he could trace all the actants that made up 
the German train system.  Being unable to think, though, he had no ability to challenge or change the 
discourse in which he moved.  Thinking, Arendt writes, “brings out the implications of unexamined 
opinions and thereby destroys them,” allowing us to conceptualize our world in new and better ways  
(445).  Eichmann’s opinions remained unexamined.  He was thus a useful cog in the Nazi machine.   
Arendt’s discussion of the relationship between critical thought and morality directly relates to 
composition as an ethical enterprise.  As we’ve seen, ethics in the postmodern sense is relentlessly 
reflective.  It calls into question not just what we think about (trains, Trump), but the very tools with 
which we think (words, concepts, our senses).  In this way it is “thinking” in its purest form.  To think, 
Arendt writes, is to unfreeze “what language, the medium of thinking, has frozen into thought” (417).  
Throughout the best composition pedagogies, I’d argue, we see attempts at this sort of cognitive 
defrosting.  It often begins when we question language, what it does and what it hides.  Bartholomae, for 
example, demands that we ask “questions of the discourse as a discourse” (2005 341).  Who benefits, for 
example, when missionary work on St. Croix is characterized as “charity”?  What are the consequences of 
the ways in which we write and think?  This is critique.  Eichmann was unable to perform such analysis.  
I’m afraid that some new materialist pedagogies, by failing to challenge thought and language, may be 
putting students in a similar position.   
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3.6   EMBRACING THE EXCESS: COMPOSITION’S ETHICS OF ATTUNEMENT 
 
 
The previous section argued that there can be no post-critical composition.  In the face of the 
hegemony of the fragments our field must encourage more expansive acts of meaning-making.  And 
meaning, as we’ve seen, can only arise from attunement to context.  Now, many new materialist thinkers 
would concur.  They fail to realize, though, that attunement has both constructive and destructive aspects.  
In its constructive guise, attunement allows for the creation of new names.  In its destructive form, 
attunement does away with old names.  When attunement does this latter work, when it disrupts ossified 
thought structures, it is intimately tied to thinking—the unfreezing of thought—and to critique. 
As noted, I believe that composition in the postmodern, social-epistemic vein should be praised 
for encouraging critical thought.  All told, though, I agree with Boyle, and Lynch and Rivers that a break 
with the social-epistemic is needed.  As argued in previous chapters, by remaining fixated on the text, 
such thought is unable to theorize the affective, material and uncognizable—essential elements of the 
human experience.  Context is key.  And context is always more than just text. 
Likewise, ethics is always more than just mind.  My use of term attunement to describe the 
process by which we name the world gestures towards this fact.  Within rhetoric and composition, this 
term is most often used by those who study sound.  Attunement, the process of “attending to tonality,” 
Matthew Heard writes “describes a complex process of moving, flexing, reading, and responding” (49).  
So attunement implies holism.  For me, it carries resonances of interpretation and creation, of the 
cognitive, along with the physical and the affective.  Consider the act of singing.  To match the tone of the 
other members of a choir, say, we must listen, then act, listen, then act, in a series of incremental 
adjustments.  This process of adaptation involves both conceptual knowledge (am I sharp or flat?) and 
tacit or bodily knowledge (does this note feel right?).  It involves simultaneous reception and production.  
And by necessity it involves sociality, embeddedness, the existence of an other with which to attune.  In 
deploying this term, I’m suggesting that a similar mix of variables holds whenever we attempt to find the 
right name for the case.   
 Though I respect attunement’s prior usage, I admit I am somewhat expanding the concept.  It 
seems to me that as used in sound studies, attunement implies a certain passivity.  As I use the term, 
attunement is anything but passive.  Naming the world is by definition a conscious, willful, always-
interested human activity.  The attuned writer-thinker never acts alone, however, and is never stable or in 
stasis.  “An ethos of attunement,” Heard writes, “subjects us to the stretching and breaking of our most 
familiar and comfortable habits of listening” (54).  Yes.  And this stretching and breaking, James would 
say, always involves interaction, relation but also a certain striving, even an acquisitiveness.  We name 
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and rename because we want to know more, to feel more, to expand the self.  In this sense, attunement, as 
I use the term, involves “prolonged dwelling within,” as Heard writes, but also active motion (46). 
But what exactly are we moving towards?  To what are we supposed to attend when we try to 
find the right name for the case?  In answering these questions we approach the ethical imperative at the 
heart of an ethics of attunement.  As noted, for James, words, names, concepts—though valuable—are 
always partial; they are clean and neat, and inevitably elide more than they mark.  Within the world of 
lived experience, though, the opposite situation pertains.  This world is defined by more.  Simply by 
virtue of being alive, the thinking-feeling body, and whatever names it may draft, are constantly 
overwhelmed by the excess which is the object and the other.  “Nature,” James writes, “is but a name for 
excess; every point of her opens and runs into the more” (PU 116).  As a result of this excess, lived 
experience, as James conceives it, is a space of radical potential.  In any given moment, we have the 
ability to expand our discourse and our selves, to come to know and care for more of the world.  The 
ultimate moral act, for James, is to exercise this ability.   
“Every bit of us at every moment,” James writes, “is part and parcel of a wider self, it quivers 
along various radii like the wind-rose on a compass, and the actual in it is continuously one with possible 
not yet in our present sight” (PU 117).  In these lines, we once again see the great intimacy James posits 
between self and world.  Within lived experience, the actual sits side-by-side with the possible.  Our goal 
should be to engage in thought and action which unlocks the latter, makes real some tiny part of that 
“wider self” inherent in every moment.  To do this, we must find ways of opening our selves to that 
which surrounds and threatens to engulf us.  Of course, what sort of action this might entail depends on 
our individual circumstances.  Here again though, I’d suggest, we find hints of the paradox noted earlier: 
to grow, to unlock wider selves, we must submit.  
James’s ethics of submission resonates with the vision of morality presented by various 
continental philosophers (see Bauman; Levinas).  Within rhetoric and composition, this stain of thinking 
is best represented by Diane Davis.  In Breaking Up (at) Totality, Davis argues for the embrace of the 
unknowable.  Echoing James, she writes that “the universe will forever overflow our superimposed 
categories and distinctions,” and as such, we must learn to cherish “the unstructurable excess” (57).  
Davis views this excess as generative.  There is no inscription without exscription; the “is” is always 
defined by the “is not.”  From this idea, she derives a moral imperative.  Ethics “in a world that has lost 
its criteria for responsible action,” she writes, “begins with straining to hear the excess” (19).   
So Davis argues for the encounter.  To encounter does not necessarily mean to understand, 
though.  Instead, the goal, in a world of uncognizable difference, must be “a constant straining toward and 
attending to the other,” in order to “bear constant witness to understanding’s withdrawal” (Davis 243).  
Here again, we see attunement in its negative guise.  To acknowledge the presence of the uncognizable is 
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to recognize that our names are insufficient.  No matter how well-spoken, the reality of overflow, of 
excess, reminds us that we can’t rest.  Excess disrupts all conceptualization—identities, ideologies, 
names—and, in turn, demands the construction of more expansive worlds. 
More than any composition project I know of, Breaking Up captures the impulse behind William 
James’s ethical vision.  Simply put, both Davis and James demand growth though encounter.  We must 
find ways to engage the object and the other, they suggest, not to change it, but to be changed.  The 
critical-ethical impulse elucidated in the previous two sections is key here: while in the world we must 
constantly push against the thought and language we use to define it.  Questioning and self-awareness 
alone are not sufficient, though.  We also need excess, the other, that which we can’t conceptualize.  
When we question, and encounter, we grow.  Like kudzu vines on a fence. 
 The outline of the ethical vision I propose now comes into view.  An ethics of attunement, is an 
ethics of excess, an ethics of approach.  It combines the postmodern tradition of self-examination, the 
continental tradition of the encounter, and a strong material element.  The material world, as William 
James makes clear, is rich and wild, unknowable and endlessly knowable.  Through attunement to its 
vagaries our conceptual schemes can (and will) be disrupted, allowing (in fact, demanding) the 
construction of new, more expansive meanings. 
As I see it, an ethics of attunement holds that the good—in life or the writing act—involves a dual 
motion: outward towards the object and the other, and inward towards the self.  It demands submission, 
but recognizes that submission is an act of will.  Behavior-wise, such an ethics presents as a readiness to 
question, compare, reflect and consider.  Rather than law, it privileges openness and cognitive flexibility, 
with the goal being to fully inhabit, in both body and mind, the (ever-changing) context in which one 
thinks, writes and acts.  William James provides a model of this way of being.  He makes real the ethics, 
which up only this point, we have engaged only in the abstract.  
 
 
 
 
3.7   ON A CERTAIN BLINDNESS IN HUMAN BEINGS 
 
 
Over his long career, William James often discussed the nature of ethics and the ethical life.  
Earlier, we saw how in Talks to Teachers, he urges us to “find the right name for the case,” and to “hold 
fast” to that idea, despite internal and external resistance.  As noted, this can be understood as James’s 
“psychological” articulation of morality.  I’d now like to examine his literary and philosophical 
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articulations.  The former finds its fullest manifestation in his essay, “On a Certain Blindness in Human 
Beings,” published as a supplement to the 1899 book version of Talks to Teachers.  Composed of long 
passages from literary works, interspersed with personal vignettes, “On a Certain Blindness” is an odd 
little essay.  It’s important, though.  In the introduction to Talks to Teachers James notes that while, to 
some readers, the essay may seem a “mere piece of sentimentalism,” it in fact, “connects itself with a 
definite view of the world and of our moral relations to the same” (v).  The view of the world he refers to 
is pluralism, sustained by radical empiricism.  According to James, this philosophy holds that “the truth is 
too great for any one actual mind…. The facts and worths of life need many cognizers to take them in” 
(v).  “On a Certain Blindness” seeks to illustrate this state of affairs, and show how, within a world of 
radical difference and limited knowledge, ethical action remains possible. 
James begins by acknowledging the difficulties humans face in thinking, or feeling, outside 
ourselves.  We are “practical beings,” he writes, captivated by our own interests (4).  This leads to 
“stupidity” and “injustice,” so far as our opinions “deal with the significance of alien lives” (4).  For 
James, these “alien lives” are lead not just by humans.  He laments, for example, his insensibility to “the 
rapture of bones under hedges,” that his fox terrier must experience (5).  This sense of rapture is of the 
greatest possible significance, because for James, passion—the inchoate flow of energy between disparate 
entities—is the source of all value.  Wherever it is found, he writes, “there is the zest, the tingle, the 
excitement of reality; and there is ‘importance’ in the only real and positive sense in which importance 
ever anywhere can be” (10).  In these lines we see, rather than the nihilism typically associated with a 
“relativism,” a radical multiplication of meaning(s).  The world, for James, is wildly varied, and utterly 
disparate, but also capable of an infinite number of meaningful connections.  Dog for bone, Jack for Jill, 
settler for muddy homestead: if vital, each merger is of value, and demanding of respect.   
So given a world of infinite meanings, most of which we can’t access, what should we do?  James 
offers two solutions: one in the form of the “verbal formulas” in which philosophers traffic and one more 
obscure, the half-seen truth of the artist or mystic.10  The first is found in “The Moral Philosopher and the 
Moral Life,” a lecture to the Yale Philosophy Club from 1891.  Here, James, like the postmoderns, 
acknowledges that no ethics can be established in advance.  Meaning, remember, is always singular, 
always defined by context.  Given this state of affairs, he determines that “the essence of the good is 
simply to satisfy demand” (201).  As I read it, this claim is both utilitarian (implicating the greatest good 
for the greatest number) and radically selfless.  James’s ideal moral subject, it could be said, is a 
philosopher rather than a partisan.  Instead of demanding her own ideals be realized, she attempts to 
create a world in which all ideals, even those opposed to her own, can be realized.   
10 These are what I have labeled his philosophical and literary articulations of morality, respectively. 
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“The various ideals,” James further explains, “have no common character apart from the fact that 
they are ideals” (201).  Each represents a claim on the object and the other, which, in a world of infinite 
potential meanings, gives rise to an obligation.  Ethical action, therefore, at its most basic, is simply that 
which works to satisfy as many claims as possible.  The “best name” is that which allows for such action.  
Again, this naming requires active human inquiry.  We must survey the field, listen carefully.  Against 
external and internal forces (our own tendency towards moral imperialism, for example) we must not 
“rule out any ideal from being heard” (203).  The ultimate goal, James writes, is to strive for a “more 
inclusive order,” driven by the recognition that the highest ethical life, “consists at all times in the 
breaking of rules which have grown too narrow for the actual case” (209).   
The ethics James presents in a “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” is admirably 
egalitarian.  Ultimately though, it remains a verbal formula.  Within the chaotic world of lived experience, 
how can we overcome our blindness and moral imperialism?  What force works to shatter “rules… grown 
too narrow for the actual case?”   
In Poetry and Pragmatism, Richard Poirier provides a useful lens through which to read James.  
As discussed in chapter two, Poirier sees the pragmatist tradition, starting with Ralph Waldo Emerson, as 
marked by both a deep “linguistic skepticism,” as well as a perpetual desire to overcome this skepticism 
(11).  Emerson, Poirier finds, does this by moving beyond language-as-representation.  Instead of merely 
describing his experience, or the way in which language fails to capture that experience, he lets his 
sentences reveal how words themselves resist his attempts at original thought.  Emerson’s deployment of 
the “vague” and “superfluous,” Poirier claims, “enacts the struggles by which he tries to keep his own 
language from becoming ‘faked,’” as in clichéd or mere remnants of “previous human thinking” (27). 
Though Poirier doesn’t make the connection, “On a Certain Blindness” enacts a similar sort of 
dramatic performance.  As noted, this essay is very odd structurally, consisting of long quotations from 
other authors (Robert Louis Stevenson, Wordsworth, Whitman), interspersed with small bits of 
commentary.  In this regard, the text performs the very decentering of self James’s ethical vision 
demands.  Remember, according to his radically pluralistic vision, “the facts and worths of life need many 
cognizers to take them in” (TT v).  This essay puts such a belief into practice.  Rather than trying to 
capture truth in a single narrative, James juxtaposes multiple narratives in a sort of textual collage.  In this 
indirect, impressionistic method we see the same “vagueness” Poirier identifies in Emerson.  In both 
cases, I would argue, the goal is to overcome the limitations of the available discourse, to convey 
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something beyond what is available via the tools of “previous human thinking.”  Whether James 
successfully does this is up for debate.11  But what lessons should we draw from his performance?  
First off, we must respect the encounter.  James demonstrates as much.  Journeying in the North 
Carolina woods, he comes across a dilapidated farmstead, an “ulcer” in the natural landscape, as he 
describes it.  Disgusted at first, after speaking with a mountaineer, he realizes he “had been losing the 
whole inward significance of the situation” (8).  That which to him was a mere “ugly picture on the 
retina,” to the settlers who cultivated the land, “sang a very paean of duty, struggle, and success” (9).  In 
this realization, he comes to acknowledge and respect the claim which the settlers’ ideals make upon him.  
Though exposure to alterity, through an encounter, his previously narrow conceptual scheme expands, 
along with his ethical horizon.  In short, he finds a better name for the case.   
Later in the essay, James describes the same base process, multiplied in intensity.  He writes of 
those moments in which one is able to transcend “deadness towards all but one particular kind of joy” 
(17).  Such moments are rare, he notes, but open to those who assume the pose of dreamer, philosopher, 
poet or lover.  They occur when one captures the “mystic sense of hidden meaning” in the other or the 
object (20).  He references, as an example of the latter, a passage from the novel Obermann in which a 
man falls in love with a jonquil.  No matter the object of the loving gaze, he writes, these moments are of 
the greatest (moral) import.  It is then, James writes, that 
the hard externality give way, and a gleam of insight into the ejective world… the vast 
world of inner life beyond us, so different from that of outer seeming, illuminate our 
mind.  Then the whole scheme of our customary values gets confounded, then our self is 
riven and its narrow interests fly to pieces, then a new centre and a new perspective must 
be found (16). 
In these lines we see the wonderfully disruptive power of excess.  We see an intense form of relation in 
which the elements in the equation (self and world) are redefined.  Poirier, echoing Marchetti, writes that 
James’s displays a fierce opposition to the “calculated superimpositions of form” (43).  Here, this 
iconoclastic tendency is on full display.  James celebrates the destruction of all conceptual schemes, all 
clichés and dead letters, even those which define the self.  He celebrates, in short, the destructive aspect of 
attunement.  Behind this, I see, as Poirier sees in Emerson, a deep optimism, an abiding faith in human 
potential.  For the self to be riven is a great accomplishment, because the new self, “the new centre and 
new perspective” which such a break necessitates, is bound to be better adapted to the world in which it 
11 As noted, in the introduction to Talks to Teachers James questions the effectiveness of this piece, writing “I wish I 
were able to make [the essay] more impressive” (v).   
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dwells, its interests less narrow, its perspective more inclusive.  When our meanings are shattered, we are 
forced to draft better names, create forms more responsive to life. 
Though, as noted, James refuses to issue any recipe for liberation (such a recipe would, of course, 
be the sort of formal mandate he opposes), he does indicate from what source such liberation must arise.  
In short, sensation disrupts form.  As we’ve seen, to be life-affirming, our language and thought must 
remain flexible, responsive to lived experience.  As James sees it though, industrial society impedes such 
responsiveness.  In a world of culture and edification, we are “stuffed full with abstract conceptions, and 
[made] glib with verbalities and verbosities” (38).  The result is alienation, both from our bodies and each 
other, for it is, of course, the most elementary of joys, “seeing, smelling, tasting, sleeping, and daring and 
doing with one’s body,” in which we could share (38).   
How can we remedy such alienation?  Referencing nature and the “pure savage… nearly on the 
level, mentally, with the wild animals,” James argues that we must “descend to a more primitive and 
profound level” (44,38).  We must somehow touch that which lies beyond thought.  Of course, as 
discussed in chapter two, we can never escape the conceptual realm altogether.  For the conscious, adult 
human, experience is always shot through with language.  In even our most private moments, we must 
rely on public forms, on the remnants of previous human thinking, as Poirier says.  James makes it clear 
though that we are in no way doomed or trapped by these forms.  Though careful attention to that which 
lies beyond our narrow interests, we can catch “a gleam of insight into the ejective world,” and thus 
reshape and (re)vitalize our thought and language.  We can turn the actual into the potential, come to 
know and feel more.  This disruptive expansion of self and world constitutes the core of an ethics of 
attunement. 
 
 
 
 
3.8   ACTUALIZING THE EXCESS 
 
 
In the above section we saw an ethics of attunement in action.  In “On a Certain Blindness,” 
James connects various bits of experience— texts, ideas and life events—to create a synthesis which 
exceeds the sum of its parts.  He leverages the world’s innate excess, in other words, to invigorate his 
thought and story.  Diane Davis claims that to harness the excess, writing must resist mastery and closure.  
It must “hold the door open” on one’s ideas, refusing to shut out the unknown and thus end the 
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conversation (2001 141).12  Through his essay’s unique patchwork-style, James accomplishes this feat.  In 
doing so, he challenges his reader to rethink their place in the world.  With this sort of provocation in 
mind, I’d like to close by examining how James’s ethical thought—especially as displayed in “On a 
Certain Blindness”—can inform classroom practice. 
As noted in chapter one, I teach freshman writing at a large, fairly exclusive public university.  In 
the fall of 2016, I designed and taught a course—titled “Sense and Sensation”—based on Jamesian 
principles.  The goal of this course was simple: to help students improve their writing.  From a Jamesian 
perspective though, as I hope I’ve made clear, word cannot be separated from world.  This means that 
though our putative subject was writing, the course also implicated perception and that which we 
perceive.  A Jamesian mode of writing instruction, we can say, like certain British surnames, must be 
double-barreled—it must engage students both on and off the page.  In chapter five, I will go into detail 
regarding my students’ essay writing.  Here, I’d like to discuss how we work with the space beyond the 
page. 
In the previous chapter I argued that for James, meaning-making involves connecting bits of raw 
experience to create more complex and expansive webs.  The bottom up nature of this process is essential.  
An empiricist like James, remember, rather than imposing a certain form on experience, takes parts and 
makes wholes.  He or she starts with the local—what we see and hear and feel—and works from there.  
On a number of levels, my course is structured to encourage this sort of movement.  The sequence of 
essay prompts, for example, starts with personal narrative and then moves through more and more 
expansive research assignments—all while focused on the same topic.  This sequence encourages students 
to ground their later, broader claims, within lived experience.  Equally important though, we don’t 
immediately leap into the conceptual clouds.  Instead, before my students begin to make meaning through 
essay writing, they attend to the tools of meaning-making: specifically, their own minds and bodies, and 
how these entities make sense of the world. 
 As we’ve seen, the material world for William James is infinitely rich, infinitely varied.  
Embodied individuals abstract from this flux, thus bringing order to chaos; but the order created is always 
interested, always limited.  In the abstract, these ideas may sound academic, esoteric.  I believe though, 
that when internalized, the implications can be profound.  To recognize that all knowledge is made is to 
deny any claim to pure truth or unmediated reality.  It is to acknowledge, at least implicitly, that ideas are 
just tools, to be picked up and discarded at will.  In short, as I see it, acceptance of these basic 
12 Here we find the mirror image of the magisterial brand of student writing for which Laurie Grobman advocates  
Davis wants students listening and learning, not issuing rulings. 
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metaphysical premises pave the way for radically expanded acts of meaning-making.  They allow for 
growth of self and world. 
 So the first step in a Jamesian writing pedagogy is to reorientate students towards their own 
perception.  How can we do this?  One way is through course readings.  My students, for example, read 
James’s “On a Certain Blindness,” as well as Martin Heidegger’s “Memorial Address” and Audre Lorde 
“Uses of the Erotic.”  All of these texts, in one way or another, draw attention to our role as thinking-
feeling, world-making beings.  I could imagine other teachers drawing on more recent psychological 
research to make similar points.  As I hope is clear though, it is not sufficient (or even necessary) to 
discuss metaphysics in the abstract.  Instead, to truly follow William James writing teachers must create 
occasions which make real the world’s infinite richness.  We must help students hear the excess, to 
paraphrase Diane Davis.  This involves leaving the page. 
 There are of course myriad ways to make students aware of the ongoing, embodied process of 
world-making.  My particular route, in the fall of 2016, started when I read an article online about Charles 
Foster, a research associate at the University of Oxford, who extolls the virtue of “living like a badger.”13  
A Jamesian writing pedagogy is, above all else, responsive to its environment; my students and I will 
engage whatever (current events, internet memes, TV shows) interests us at the moment.  Foster’s article 
interested me, so I took it to class and we discussed.  His basic claim is that humans, due to evolutionary 
concerns, are overly reliant on our sense of sight.  We therefore miss out on much of our world.  Foster 
suggests we try living like animals—crawling through the underbrush like a badger, for example—to 
engage latent sensory resources.  By physically experiencing more of the world, he believes, we can come 
to live in it in more productive and enjoyable ways.  
 The connection between Foster and James should be readily apparent.  James, remember, argues 
that industrial society has encased us in ossified abstraction, thus alienating us from our senses.  To 
invigorate our thought and language we must find ways to break these bonds.  Foster’s idea of “becoming 
an animal” provides a model for how we might go about this.  If we can assume the perspective of an 
otter or badger, his thinking goes, the radically limited nature of our (human) world can be made real.  
This sounds plausible to me.  As such, after reading Foster’s article and discussing the merits of his 
position, I asked my students to emulate his example.  Before our next class, they were to choose an 
animal, go a private location, and “become” that animal.  This entails assuming its physical posture and 
engaging the world through its particular sensory resources.  One must make herself small like a mouse or 
stealthy like a cat, and sniff and scratch and skulk.   
13 “Ig Nobel prize winner: why I lived like a badger, an otter, a deer and a swift,” from theconversation.com. 
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In addition to becoming an animal, my students were instructed to reflect on the experience (as a 
human, obviously) and write a blog post about it.  Think about what your animal would smell, taste, feel.  
How does the space change when understood from this new perspective?  What do you notice that you 
missed before? my writing prompt asked.  In their reflection, I encouraged them to describe the 
experience in as much detail as possible—to be creative—but also to engage both the experience and 
Foster’s ideas critically.  Reflect on what happened.  Was this a valuable activity?  Did you learn 
anything or come to any new understandings?  If not, why not?  Aware of the student tendency to say 
what they think their teacher wants to hear, I added a further caveat: Don’t be afraid to say you didn’t 
learn anything.  But, make sure you sufficiently justify your claim. 
Before discussing my students’ responses to this admittedly unusual task, I must stress that this 
was meant to be more than a creative writing prompt. The students were not asked to sit at their writing 
desk and simply imagine what it would be like to be a cat or bird.  Instead, like Foster, they were expected 
to get down on the ground and physically engage with their environment.  As James makes clear, it is 
sensation that disrupts form.  Foster’s (very Jamesian) claim is that through conscious will and altered 
physical posture we can “take in” more and different sensory stimuli.  We can “stretch and break our 
familiar habits of listening,” as Matthew Heard says.  To know more, to feel more—this is the movement 
that lies at the heart of an ethics of attunement.  And the entire process is premised on interaction between 
thinking-feeling body and material world.  It cannot be accomplished solely in the mind.   
The blog posts produced in response to this prompt fell into a number of categories.  As to be 
expected, there were certain students who refused to play the game; instead of engaging sensation, they 
engaged only imagination.  As one student put it, he treated the assignment as a “thought exercise.”  In 
turn, he wrote a creative piece about what he thought it would be like to be a squirrel in the park near our 
campus.  The writing this student produced is telling.  In his blog post, he writes about climbing a tree and 
suddenly beginning to notice new things.  I could hear the individual cars driving past, the gentle rustling 
of the leaves overhead… I could smell the earthy scent coming up from the ground mixed with the general 
city smell.  In turn, his world is transformed.  The activity proved a valuable experience, he concludes, 
because it showed me the amount of information I was missing out on by allowing my sight to take over 
my senses.  Now, this student is a skilled writer.  His post is intricately structured, engaging parallelism 
and other formal tricks.  Note the nature of the descriptions, though: they are so vague, so expected.  Note 
how he moves steadily towards a teacher-approved conclusion.  He climbs the tree, claims to be 
enlightened and includes some sensory detail to support his claim.  But there is nothing surprising here, or 
unusual or queer.  Nothing disrupts his narrative.  In short, I would suggest that this is a classic case of a 
writer not engaging the excess.  Instead of working from the bottom up—encountering the world’s 
plurality and struggling to make sense of what he finds—this writer works from the top down.  He has a 
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premade pattern and projects it on to experience, ignoring (or in this case, not even attempting to 
discover) what lies beyond his habitual consciousness.  The result, as we can see, is technically perfect, 
but utterly bland writing. 
Unlike the student discussed above, most students did make an attempt to mimic the embodiment 
of their chosen animal.  Interestingly, those who seemed to get the most out of the exercise were those 
that never left their dorm rooms.  They pretended to be housecats or birds, and used the opportunity to 
defamiliarize this most familiar of spaces.  A non-native English writer, Huaijin, was perhaps the most 
successful in harnessing the excess to (re)vitalize thought and story.  Unlike the writer discussed above, 
Huaijin is not particularly comfortable with the written word.  A math major, I also don’t think he would 
describe himself as particularly creative.  This background makes his blog post all the more remarkable. 
Huaijin’s post starts off with a rather standard introductory move.  Never once in my life have I lay on the 
floor of my dorm before I finally tried to do it today. Though I’m one those neat freaks, I can’t complain 
how dirty the carpet in my room is. Because today I’m a bug…. It then quickly descends (or ascends) into 
what can only be described as the Kafka-esque.  The second paragraph: 
I tried to disconnect my mind with my body. I stopped moving my legs not my arms; I 
felt like I was only a size of football – that’s the size of my head and it’s still too big for a 
bug. I turned my head around. I saw the white roof; I saw my roommate’s lost sock 
hiding behind one of his suitcases; I saw little pieces of tortilla chips which I’m not sure 
how long have they been there. I started imaging myself dealing with those food pieces, 
as a bug. I dragged one with one pair of my legs with other two pairs holding my body. It 
must be heavy – even a tiny piece of corn chip probably weights the same as me….  
The first thing I notice about this passage is its richness, its density.  To make meaning is to connect bits 
of experience and here is a writer weaving an intricate web.  He moves from body to room to imaginings, 
with each step composed of myriad concrete details.  And note the nature of the details: the lost sock, the 
little pieces of tortilla chips.  Unlike “rustling leaves” or “city smells,” these belong to no pre-packaged 
narrative.  They also don’t come from “inside” Huaijin.  Baring a certain type of genius, I’d contend that a 
writer cannot just make this stuff up.  It is original thought and story and arises, in this case, from the 
writer’s mindful immersion in the singularity of experience.  Here, I’d argue, is a writer who for a 
moment became attentive, attuned, both to the material world and the tools he uses to make sense of it 
(his body, his imagination).  This focus on both self and world is, of course, a key component of an ethics 
of attunement.  It is what allows a writer to inject new life into shared forms.   
Huaijin continues: 
While a bunch of boys laughing and yelling curse words getting close, I knew the dude 
lives next door was back along with his friends as usual. But this time, I felt it differently. 
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After music started and they started to hit the wall, I leaned myself on it. I could clearly 
feel the ‘shock waves’ from that side of the wall which were just typical ‘don don don’ 
noise I used to hear when I was still a human….  
 
I heard the door lock clutching. It must be my roommate. I tried to turn my head and look 
at him, but I couldn’t. I had to turn myself upside down to look at him. He looked much 
taller than usual despite he’s only 5’9 or below. It felt kind of the same as when I stand at 
the bottom of the cathedral actually. 
 
‘Step on me’, I said…. My roommate didn’t say anything but just dropped his backpack 
and left.  
At a formal level, these lines display the sort of bottom-up movement a Jamesian writing pedagogy 
encourages.  Rather than allowing an overarching idea to structure his narrative, Huaijin allows the larger 
form to emerge out of the individual events.  He moves from parts to wholes, in other words.  Equally 
important, we also see here the disruption of habitual modes of perception which lies at the heart of an 
ethics of attunement.  Through assuming the pose of a bug, Huaijin is able to experience the noise coming 
from next-door, and his roommate’s physical form, in fundamentally new ways.  Regarding the noise, he 
is able to feel what before he had only heard; through conscious attunement, in other words, new aspects 
of the stimulus are revealed.  Then, through the act of writing, he uses this new sense data to articulate a 
more complex conception of said stimulus.  For James, remember, the ultimate ethical impulse is to move 
beyond what we know, to grasp some of the excess, and thus create more generous and expansive 
concepts.  This is exactly what Huaijin does. 
Earlier I spoke of making real James’s ideas, rather than presenting them in the abstract.  The 
world, for James, is infinitely rich and every perception limited.  By attending to the soundwaves, and 
bearing witness as they change into something new, Huaijin is confronted with this reality  Creating 
situations which allow for this sort of confrontation, I’d argue, is how we go about making radical 
empiricism real. 
Now, I’m not claiming Huaijin, after pretending to be a bug, will suddenly become a Jamesian 
pragmatist.  I am also not claiming that exercises like this should form the core of a first-year writing 
pedagogy.  What I am claiming is that through this simple exercise, early in the semester, certain habits of 
looking and listening were cultivated.  The idea is that students like Huaijin will internalize the lessons 
learned and apply them as we engage in more traditional academic work.  He will see, for example, that 
the complexity and mutability he noticed in the soundwaves also pertains to texts, people, cultures, 
concepts.  In this regard, my course, like the type of student writing I value, works from the bottom-up.  
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*** 
The previous two sections show what an ethics of attunement might look like in practice.  In “On 
a Certain Blindness,” James celebrates attunement in its constructive and destructive, intellectual and 
affective, guises.  He proposes that attention to a jonquil, or a muddy farmstead, can result in the radical 
reorientation of self and world.  Huaijin’s blog post demonstrates the pedagogical force of these ideas.  
By immersing himself in experience, and allowing what he finds there to infuse his thought and story, he 
creates an original and provocative piece of writing.  In doing so he gains practice in renaming the world 
in more sophisticated ways, in finding better names for the case.  He thus displays what James and I 
believe is the highest moral calling—an ethics of attunement. 
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4.  IDENTITY 
 
 
 
 
4.1   “I DON’T GET ANY MONEY OUT OF IT” 
 
 
 This chapter is about identity: the meaning of the I.  How do we conceive of our selves and those 
selves we interact with in the classroom?  This question of definition is essential for composition theory, I 
believe, because at its core, writing instruction is about the interaction of selves.  These entities come into 
contact, engage in certain ritualized behavior, and are changed (hopefully for the better).  My claim is that 
we need a more complete understanding of what is acted upon, what is changed.  As in previous chapters, 
I’ll turn to William James for guidance.  James’s deep phenomenological analysis of selfhood provides a 
provocative lens through which to view social interaction.  The self for James is many; it’s more than 
language, more than flesh, and more than can be known.  But it’s also most definitely a “self”—embodied 
and individuated, capable of autonomy and self-direction.  As we’ll see, this insistence on the importance 
of the individual puts James at odd with much recent composition theory.  This is not to say, though, that 
James views the self as monadic or atomistic.  Instead, he presents the thinking-feeling human being as an 
assemblage of disparate elements, a “bundle of relations,” to quote John McDermott.  This assemblage is 
an open system, constantly reconstituting itself through interplay with others and environment.  Such a 
conception, when applied to teacher and student, reader and writer, opens up new relational possibilities.  
It allows for growth.  It is therefore “good theory” in the most basic sense. 
 Underpinning this chapter is the idea that current conceptualizations of identity in composition 
studies fall short.  From a Jamesian perspective, we can say that talk of identity too often promotes 
foreignness rather than intimacy.  As religion scholar David Lamberth explains, this distinction is key to 
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James’s thought.  Intimacy, Lamberth writes, “is James’s most general criterion for distinguishing a good 
philosophy” (156).  James links intimacy with sociality.  Intimate relations are those which are reciprocal, 
inter-active rather than mono-active.  A world of intimacy, in turn, is ecological in nature; our selves, and 
the real, the good and the true, are seen as evolving together within a “common socius” (156).  A world of 
foreignness, on the other hand, is defined by distance and disconnection; the real, the good and the true 
are external to selves and their desires.  
Like all of James’s claims, his promotion of intimacy is based on the consequences of such 
thought.  “From a pragmatic point of view,” James writes, “the difference between living against a 
background of foreignness and one of intimacy means the difference between a general habit of wariness 
and one of trust” (qtd. Lamberth 157).  An assumption of foreignness, this thinking goes, makes us 
conceive of the object and other as hostile to our interests.  This leads to caution, suspicion and 
eventually, stagnation (as interaction is needed for growth).  An assumption of intimacy, on the other 
hand, allows us to see ourselves in the world around us (and vice versa).  This makes for an atmosphere of 
trust, in which individuals can work together under the belief that they have a stake in the common whole.  
As a result, shared social goals can be articulated and realized.   
I think most writing teachers recognize the importance of promoting trust in the classroom.  If we 
follow James, we see that trust starts with the recognition of our co-affectability.  It starts when we 
conceive our selves as porous entities, shaped by the object and the other, and open to growth and change.  
James, in turn, presents a theory of identity which allows for this sort of conception.  Grounded in the 
natural sciences, his ideas about who and what we are, arise out of and rigorously respect the reality of 
lived experience.  This is key.  Too often in rhetoric and composition our theory seems alien to life as it is 
actually lived.  The result: barriers to interaction.   
Now, I’m no starry-eyed romantic; I recognize that the modern university is defined by barriers 
and boundaries: between art and science, teacher and student, text and world.  William James teaches us 
to push against these obstacles.  But what might such resistance look like?  To find out, James would 
suggest that we descend from the abstract to the concrete.  We must practice a way of thinking (and 
writing) which lies “flat on its belly in the middle of experience, in the very thick of its sand and gravel” 
(RE 112).  Per this imperative, in the following pages I’d like to engage in a particularly intimate mode of 
scholarship.  Alongside theoretical discussions, I will trace—to the best of my ability—my own 
experience wrestling with notions of identity in the classroom.  In doing so, I hope to show both the 
inadequacy of current theory and the possibility inherent in a Jamesian point of view. 
*** 
 It’s midway through the semester, a first-year composition course at a large public university.  I 
enter the room at exactly three o’clock.  Who am I?  Tall, white, stooped, bespectacled, balding.  Old for a 
 91 
grad student.  Before entering academia I worked three years as an attorney—the only white employee of 
a minority-owned firm in Kansas City.  After that I lived in China and Saudi Arabia.  Now, in middle-age, 
I am once again a creature of the American college classroom.  Here, as on the street in Urumqi or Riyadh 
I present as droll, slightly arrogant, utterly harmless.  I recognize that I seem much at home in school, 
books, theory.  Leaning on the podium, I ask my students to do me a favor.  Someday I may want to use 
their writing in a published work; would anyone be up for this?  If so, can you sign a waiver? 
Brianna.1  Brianna is (how should I put this?) very different than me.  A black female, twenty 
years my junior.  She dresses like Madonna in Desperately Seeking Susan: crop-tops, extravagant 
necklaces, gloves without fingers.  She’s an army brat, from South Carolina (pronounced Care-lina).  My 
waiver form has a “yes” box and a “no” box, and under the latter, a line that allows the student to provide 
an explanation.  Brianna checks “no,” and on the line, writes “I don’t get any money out of it.”  Over the 
course of the year, I distributed forty waivers.  Thirty were returned.  Only one was checked “no.” 
So, to put it blandly, Brianna is unique.  And oddly brave.  But who is she?  How should I understand the 
various encounters—the connections and disconnections—we experienced throughout the course of the 
semester?  On the day in question there was a clash of selves, obviously.  What was interacting with what 
though, when, looking me in the eye, Brianna handed me that document? 
Some would argue that for a writing teacher, there’s no legitimate object of inquiry here.  They 
recommend we stay within the margins.  William Coles, Jr., for example, claims that his sole object of 
interest is a student’s “literary self, a self construable from the way words fall on the page. The other self, 
the identity of the student, is something with which [he] as a teacher can have nothing to do" (12).  Under 
this view, Brianna’s accent, fashion sense and body language don’t matter.  Or they only matter when 
they emerge in discourse, when she writes about current fashion trends, for example.  Now, I am 
somewhat sympathetic with Coles’s position.  I agree (of course) that one goal of writing instruction 
should be to help students take on new textual identities.  And I see the practical (political) benefits of 
maintaining a barrier between text and world.  We must admit though, that writing instruction is not 
purely a textual process.  Brianna will become a better writer not solely through writing essays and 
receiving written comments, but through embodied interaction with other selves.  These interactions, 
which occur every day in the writing classroom, implicate how we look and talk and move.  They are also 
powerful, capable of disrupting and thereby (re)vitalizing the forms by which we make sense of the 
world.  They thus directly impact who we are and who we can become. 
 
1 A pseudonym, per convention. 
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Writing instruction, in short, exceeds the discursive.  Composition theory, in turn, must think 
beyond the page.  With this in mind, I ask again: who is Brianna?  I know we are teacher and student, 
man and woman, reader and writer, and also more than any of these designations.  I know what I felt the 
moment I read her waiver form (annoyance, tinged with respect).  I know the appropriate “teacherly” 
reaction (let it pass).  I know of our relative positions within intersecting hierarches of culture, institution, 
race and sex.  I know of clashing discourses, and of a long history of white appropriation of black labor 
and artistic creation.  The question remains though: how should I understand our relationship?  What is 
interacting with what?  And how can I make this interaction as productive as possible, for both teacher 
and student? 
 
 
 
 
4.2   WILLIAM JAMES AND THE ART OF SELF-CREATION 
 
 
 Composition theory presents a myriad of lenses through which to view my encounter with 
Brianna.  In the following pages, I’ll peer through some of these.  First, though, it’s useful to think about 
the impulses which animate James’s understanding of identity.  How might the lens that he provides 
differ from those we typically use?  To answer this question requires that we contextualize James, both in 
terms of history, and in terms of our discipline. 
Now, William James has a large and unusually varied catalog of published work.  He was also 
not afraid to embrace contradiction: a noted natural scientist, for example, he was well known for his 
defense of religion.  Given the complex nature of James’s oeuvre, it’s possible to read him in myriad 
ways.  As we’ve seen, in this project, I foreground the material aspect of James’s thought.2  Materialism, 
as I understand it, is simply the idea that all aspects of thought and being are intimately connected to the 
physical world.  Language, consciousness, ideology, desire—none of these can be theorized without 
taking into account bodies and things.  As we’ve seen, such a reading connects James to the recent 
material turn in rhetoric and composition.  Indeed, throughout this project I have tried to put James in 
conversation with this important strain of scholarship.  There are key differences, though, between the 
2 Materialist readings of James are not unheard of.  In the past decade, Alexander Livingston, Kennan Ferguson and 
Bruce Wilshire have taken similar approaches.    
 93 
                                                 
materialism of William James and that of composition’s “new materialists.”  These differences are 
particularly manifest in conceptions of identity.   
 The fundamental new materialist move, we can say, is that of decentering.  Whether practiced in 
the ecological (Cooper, Syverson), actor-network (Rivers, Lynch) or posthuman (Dobrin, Boyle) mode, 
new materialist thought seeks to distribute agency, desire and cognition across ecologies, networks and 
webs.  To an extent, William James lobbies against this tendency.  But only to an extent.  As we’ll see, 
like new materialists, James complicates the individual/society binary: the Jamesian self is an open 
system, remember.  Integrally, though, James also insists on the constructive power of human thought.  
This is a key point and one which puts him at odds with new materialist tendencies.  New materialism, 
taken as a whole, wishes to foreground the power of things.  James wishes to foreground the power of 
people: to show how individual, self-directed, thinking-feeling beings are capable of world-making.  Later 
in this chapter I’ll put James in direct conversation with some new materialist thinkers.  First, though, I’d 
like to further explore James’s seemingly paradoxical belief that the individual is both porous and 
powerful.  This requires a discussion of William James the man and the time in which he lived. 
As noted in chapter one, the half-century after the American Civil War was an age of great 
uncertainty.  Darwin and modern science had upended the long-standing balance between humans and 
nature.  At the same time, industrial capitalism was having a similar effect on relations among humans.  
Historian Francesca Bordogna charts this upheaval.  Bordogna argues that in this age of “robber barons,” 
artisans, farmers, and workers of all stripes were losing control of their labor, the traditional source of 
personal identity.  The result was widespread anxiety “concerning the erosion of the unitary and masterful 
self” (506).  Some feared this change, while some welcomed it, believing that the decline of isolated 
individuality—and the revelation of our inherent connectedness—would open up new political 
possibilities.  James, as always, was of two minds.  He saw the self as a social entity, but at the same time, 
wished to retain a conception of the individual as potent moral agent.   
 James’s need for moral agency, along with his privileging of the constructive power of human 
thought, must be read in light of his personal experience.  His father, Henry James Sr., aptly described by 
Bordogna as an “unorthodox follower of Swedenborg and of Fourier's utopian socialism,” was a loving, 
but somewhat suffocating presence for young William (528).  Henry Sr. promoted a vision of peace 
through utter submission to God.  For him, “the pursuit of selfhood was the 'source of all evils' and to 
relinquish the illusions of selfhood and substantiality was… the path to individual and social salvation” 
(528).  From a young age, William rebelled against such self-effacement.   
James’s belief in the power of the individual took definite form in April 1870.  Long plagued by 
bouts of depression and psychosomatic illness, that spring he was on the brink of suicide.  Twenty-eight 
years old, unemployed and unmarried, he was paralyzed by his own insignificance.  It was then that he 
 94 
experienced what he would later refer to as his “death and rebirth.”  The experience is recorded in his 
journal from April 30, 1870: 
I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of Renouvier's 
second ‘Essais’ and see no reason why his definition of free will — 'the sustaining of a 
thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts' — need be the definition 
of an illusion.  At any rate, I will assume for the present — until next year — that it is no 
illusion.  My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will… I will posit life (the 
real, the good) in the self-governing resistance of the ego to the world.  Life shall [be 
built in] doing and suffering and creating (Rowe). 
In these striking lines, which Stephen Rowe calls “one of the very central expressions of culture and the 
humanities in the twentieth century,” we see the seed of James’s lifelong project (6).  In short, he seeks to 
subordinate ontology to human will, to establish truth as what works in the way of belief.  In chapter 
three, we saw that for James, morality entails holding fast to an idea that would otherwise be driven from 
the mind.  Here we see the event which lead him to this conclusion.  In a pluralistic universe, both “free” 
and “not free” are possible.  Young James wishes to choose the former because of its positive 
consequences.  But holding fast to this idea is difficult.  His revelation comes when he realizes it is the 
struggle itself which gives his act moral worth.  Because of the difficulty of asserting his freedom, the 
very act of assertion allows him to prove that he is an active force.  For James, this realization reshapes 
his life.  He is able to marry, find work.  In resisting those forces which sought to deny him selfhood, in 
other words, he finds a way to escape the meaninglessness and aporia which had previously haunted him.  
The result was a lifelong belief in the constructive power of the will, of “the self-governing resistance of 
the ego to the world.” 
 So the Jamesian self is capable of free will, of agency, of action.  It is capable of reshaping the 
conditions of its existence.  But this is not to say that the self is in anyway monadic or self-contained.  
Quite the opposite.  As will be discussed in detail below, the Jamesian self is “metaphysically weak… 
menaced by inner division, surrounded by porous boundaries and only precariously whole” (Bordogna 
519).  In the above lines we see an example of these “porous boundaries”: young James comes to his 
revelation, after all, not in solitary contemplation, but in engagement with Renouvier.3  Integrally, James 
turns the self’s riven nature—a seeming weakness—into a strength.  The fragmented self, he believes, 
calls forth an act of construction.  It is through this act, through whole-hearted engagement in the process 
3 As discussed in chapter two, James’s mature metaphysics holds that language and lived experience are always 
intertwined.  Here we see the sort of life events that might have lead him to this conclusion. 
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of self-creation, that one gains strength and agency.  Just like he willed himself to believe, one must will 
themselves into being.  Nothing is guaranteed though (for if it were, it wouldn’t be worth pursuing). 
Overall, we can say that the self, for James, is socially defined, and because of that fact, becomes 
open to self-definition.  This seeming paradox is how he resolves the tension between the socialization of 
life inherent in the industrial age and his profound respect for the individual.  It also hints at the 
complexity of his vision.  James’s presents a world that contains both structures and selves, with each 
exceeding the other.  The self implicates others and objects, most certainly, but that self’s potentiality is 
never determined from without: there’s always an excess, something that escapes determination.  This 
excess is revealed in acts of human thought, in acts of human will.   
*** 
Brianna.  She is not necessarily a poor student: she comes to every class, hands work in on time.  
But her essays are clunky, formulaic.  She also sends text messages in class and often seems bored.  
During mid-term conferences, I ask her if something is wrong.  “It doesn’t seem like you like this class 
very much,” I say.  My dissertation advisor is away and I’m using his office.  I slouch low behind the big 
desk.  On all sides are walls of books, nick-knacks, pictures of people I don’t know.  “It’s boring,” she 
says.  “Why do you think that?  You like philosophy, yeah?”  I recognize the gentle, rather sing-song tone 
of my voice.  I’m speaking to her like I would my younger sister.  “I don’t know…. I have my habits, 
OK?  I like to write in a certain way.”  This statement fascinates me.  She’s hit upon the key element of 
my (Jamesian) pedagogy: my desire to break students out of preset forms, to make them write and think 
in new ways.  I didn’t tell them my goal directly, but Brianna picked it up.  And doesn’t like it. 
 I should also mention that the week before I had my students bring in a piece of “good” writing 
and explain why it was good.  Some brought copies of Harry Potter.  One guy brought a tweet from 
Kanye West.  Brianna brought an excerpt from Isiah Berlin’s ‘Two Concepts of Liberty.”  Her voice 
quivered as she read it to the class. 
 
 
 
 
4.3   POSTCOLONIAL BLUES 
 
 
 So William James lived in a fragmented world.  The same can be said of our world.  Since Mina 
Shaughnessy in the 1970s (at least), compositionists have been grappling with heterogeneity in the 
writing classroom.  Postcolonial theory has been key to this negotiation.  Though not many 
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compositionists quote Homi Bhabha or Edward Said anymore, the legacy of postcolonial comp 
scholarship remains.  Therefore, to understand how identity, and the interaction between identities, has 
been conceived in our field, it’s necessary to examine this work.  If anything, it illustrates some pitfalls to 
avoid when theorizing “the other.” 
 Mary Louise Pratt’s “Arts of the Contact Zone” provides an apt entry point into both postcolonial 
theory, and discussions of identity in general.  First presented as the keynote address at a literacy 
conference in Pittsburgh in September 1990, this piece has been widely influential, with Joseph Harris 
referring to Pratt as the “patron theorist” of composition in the 1990s (2012, 161).  A professor of 
comparative literature, in “Contact Zones” Pratt contends that the classroom, like the speech community 
writ large, has too often been conceived as a “unified and homogenous social world” in which all the 
participants are playing by the same rules, respectful of the same norms (38).  As a result, important acts 
of student resistance often go unnoticed.  To counter this tendency, Pratt presents a model of the 
classroom as “contact zone,” in which the “specific historical relationships” in which students stand to 
texts (and each other) are examined (38).  In such a space, meanings are allowed to proliferate; students 
confront the fact that anything they say will inevitably be received “in radically heterogeneous ways that 
we are neither able nor entitled to prescribe” (38).  This encounter with interpretive difference, Pratt 
argues, works to “put identities and ideas on the line” (38). 
 It is easy to see why Pratt’s notion of contact zones was so well received.  There’s an innate 
pluralism in her pedagogy which must be celebrated.  As I’ve tried to make clear, the sort of growth that I 
value (and that I want you to value) is best achieved in a pluralistic environment in which various 
interpretive schemes are enacted and evaluated.  Pratt’s classroom allows for this critical analysis of how 
we think and why.  So the contact zone model is valuable.  I want to suggest, though, that Pratt’s 
conception of identity—that structure of thought and feeling that each body brings into the classroom—is 
flawed.  This puts an artificial limit on what ideas and individuals can become. 
 Harris hints at the flaws in Pratt’s scheme when he notes that though respectful of difference, she 
fails to explain how differences can be negotiated, how change actually occurs.  “The very metaphor of 
contact,” Harris writes, “suggests a kind of superficiality… of cultures banging or sliding or bouncing off 
each other” (2012, 163).  I agree.  There’s a sense, present throughout “Contact Zones,” that Pratt is 
thinking of “culture” and “identity” as solid entities, as something other than linguistic markers of felt 
different/same.  Pratt’s desire for solidity (and solidarity) is made explicit in her discussion of “safe 
houses.”  These are “social and intellectual spaces where groups can constitute themselves as… 
homogeneous, sovereign communities” (40).  Within these zones of agreement, groups formulate “claims 
on the world” which they then “bring into the contact zones” (40).  As I see it, here Pratt conceptualizes 
the classroom as something like a parliamentary debating chamber: groups with similar interests caucus, 
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develop shared goals and strategies, then, on the debating floor, put these strategies into action.  It’s 
voting bloc versus voting bloc, a zero sum game played among fixed entities, with the goal being to carve 
up a fixed set of discursive resources. 
 Harris argues that Pratt, despite her best efforts, fails to do away with unified, utopian 
communities: she just makes them smaller. Again, I think this is correct.  While Pratt aptly theorizes the 
differences that pertain between teacher and student, or majority and minority, she papers over the 
differences that exist between individuals.  Her conception of identity, in Jamesian terms, fails to capture 
the utter singularity of lived experience.  This causes a variety of problems.  First, as recent intersectional 
work reveals, engaging the world through fixed categories often obscures certain bodies and desires 
(those that don’t present as the right kind of other, for example).  It also works to limit growth.  When we 
think in terms of groups, rather than singular individuals, we restrict the range of possibility open to 
individuals.  We allow certain forms of resistance (against standard academic discourse, for example) 
while foreclosing others (against “home” discourses).  From a Jamesian perspective, composition should 
oppose this sort of a priori restriction on thought and story.  Our goal, remember, should be to promote 
more expansive acts of meaning-making.  This often involves tracing lines of connection which disrupt 
current groupings in the service of more inclusive ones.  My concern is that we can’t do this when we 
conceptualize identities as voting blocs. 
*** 
 Another discussion of identity in the writing classroom can be found in Bronwyn Williams’s, 
“Speak for Yourself? Power and Hybridity in the Cross-Cultural Classroom.”  In this essay, Williams, 
drawing on the work of Homi Bhabha and others, compares his role teaching academic English to 
international students to that of a colonial administer.  Though not a particularly influential work, this 
essay is notable, I believe, because it provides a good example of how a theory of identity can distance us 
from one another. 
 Williams views writing instruction as a form of enculturation.  For him, taking on a new 
language, and the associated genres, necessarily entails indoctrination in “the values privileged by the 
institution,” and thus “the dominant culture” (590).  Notably, Williams presents these values as coherent, 
and inherently opposed to the equally coherent values of his students’ home cultures.  This view of our 
enterprise paints the socially conscious writing teacher into a corner.  No matter what the teacher does, 
“epistemic violence” is perpetrated as the student is forced to conform to Western ways of thinking (595).  
The student’s options are also limited.  Because the culture she seeks to enter will inevitably position her 
as other, she is faced with a stark choice: “mimicry or resistance” (600).  The main thrust of Williams’s 
essay details how these options might reveal themselves on the page. 
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 My response to this piece is aptly summed up by a single notation: “man, this is depressing.”  
Good theory, as I’ve argued throughout this project, is thought and story which opens up new, more 
expansive possibilities for ourselves and students.  It allows for more intense interaction and thus personal 
growth.  In that regard, this essay is not good theory.  So where does it go wrong?  The primary problem, 
as I see it, is that Williams deploys culture as a sort of God-term.  Cultures, in this essay, are monoliths.  
And identities are innately tied to cultures.  There is very little play, very little fluidity.  This in turn, 
limits the thoughts one can think and the positions one can assume. 
 To illustrate my point I’d like to examine a piece of student writing.  It’s an excerpt from an essay 
by Masud, an Egyptian student in Williams’s class.  Regarding Ottoman rule in Egypt, Masud writes: 
In my opinion this dark period of long Turkish rule was a sad and awful time in the 
history of the Arab world. There can be no argument made to say there was a single 
political or economic achievement gained.  The decline of Muslim power was dominant 
from beginning to end and has, because of the harsh and unforgivable ways of the 
Ottomans, has led to a feeling of apathy which made the Arab character reach a point of 
standstill from which came their decline. 
Williams presents this piece as an example of resistance through mimicry.  “The response of the colonial 
subject,” he writes, is always incomplete, and as such “contains within it mockery of the colonizer’s 
authority” (591).  This essay, Williams argues, makes such a move.  In particular, he sees Masud’s 
“emotional, almost vitriolic” tone and refusal to complicate his opinion in proper academic fashion as a 
way to elide the position that the colonizing authority (his teacher) has constructed for him (591). 
 Now, I’m not going to quibble with Williams’s application of postcolonial theory; I will allow 
that his is a correct reading per those terms.  What does this reading do for us, though?  Perhaps it allows 
Williams to read Masud’s paper more generously: Masud is “resisting colonial authority,” rather than just 
“being lazy.”  That’s worth something.  I think we can do better though.  As such, I’d like to propose an 
alternative reading, one which I believe allows for more intense engagement between teacher and student 
(a more intimate relation, William James would say).  I’m well positioned to comment, I think, because, 
as an English teacher in the Middle East, I’ve received this exact same essay.4   
So how do I understand what’s happening here?  Simply put, I see a young man repeating a 
discourse he was taught in high school.  Nothing more, nothing less.  As such, I’d respond the way I’d 
respond to an American student who told me that he “respects the flag, and all it stands for.”  I’d draw 
4 One is also likely to receive a similar essay in Korea or Zimbabwe, or any nation that was once under colonial rule.  
Postcolonial governments are often highly nationalistic: they gain authority by presenting themselves as protecting 
the nation from foreign influence.  Hence, students must be taught about the “bad old days.”  This approved 
discourse thus becomes an easy one on which to rely. 
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Masud’s attention to some facts which complicate his case.  What about Egypt’s cotton industry I’d ask, 
didn’t that prosper under Ottoman rule?  Perhaps I’d send him a link to the Wikipedia page for Qassem 
Amin or Tewfik Al-Hakim—both Egyptians writers of Turkish descent.  Certainly I’d ask him to consider 
how he came to hold his view and what the consequences of it might be.  In short, I’d try to help him 
achieve a more nuanced view of his topic and his thinking about that topic.  I’d try to help him see the 
complex, inscrutable, often contradictory nature of both.  Whether or not he’s engaged in an act of 
postcolonial mockery, simply does not matter.     
 My response to Masud’s essay is obviously different than that of Professor Williams.  I also think 
it’s more productive in that it refuses to construct (or allow) conceptual barriers to interaction.  Williams’s 
reading, because of the ideas about identity on which it is based, throws up just such barriers.  In short, 
rather than seeing Masud as an singular being, capable of self-directed change, Williams views him as an 
emissary of a grave and mysterious god called “Egyptian Culture.”  His teacher, likewise, is an agent of 
“Western Culture.”  Right away, this conceptualization establishes a distance between these two figures.  
In the service of good politics, it robs the encounter of its intimacy.  It thus limits its impact. 
*** 
 Returning to Matt and Brianna.  We now have a new lens through which to view our encounter.  
My classroom is a “contact zone,” it seems, in which differing interpretive schemes clash.  In regard to 
Brianna’s written work, I think this is accurate.  She seems to believe that essays should follow a certain 
tightly structured pattern; I believe that rhetorical flexibility—the ability to adjust form to situation—is 
paramount.  But are Brianna’s commitment to habit and her disruptive classroom behavior properly 
classified as resistance?  Is she engaged in mockery of my colonial authority?  Do we have a clash of 
cultures: the dominant vs. the subaltern?  Viewing the situation in this way does reveal new intricacies, I 
admit.  I see why Brianna might have difficulty adapting to the norms of my classroom and why she 
might not want to adapt.  But does this mean I should let Brianna use her phone it class?  And how does it 
account for her seemingly genuine love of Berlin’s analytical philosophy (and her tendency to write 
essays in a similar mode)?  In short, how does it account for the details?  
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4.4   THE INTERSECTIONAL IMPULSE 
 
 
 A common thread in my discussion so far has been a dissatisfaction with conceptions of identity 
that don’t respect the utter singularity of lived experience.  When we think in terms of big rather than 
small, abstract rather than concrete, we distance ourselves from the site at which change—in thoughts, in 
people—is actually made.  Through rationalization or explanation, we shield ourselves from the 
encounter with difference.  We therefore deprive ourselves of its fruits. 
 Interestingly, across the humanities, recent discussions of identity have expressed a similar 
dissatisfaction with categories and classifications.  This discussion is most often framed in terms of 
intersectionality.  In a useful introduction to the topic, Leslie McCall identifies three general strains of 
intersectional methodology.  For our purposes, I’d like to zero in on two of these.  First, there is what 
McCall terms the “intracategorical approach.”  This methodology, often practiced by feminists of color, 
doesn’t completely reject identity labels (“black” or “woman,” for example).  Instead, it seeks to draw 
finer categorical distinctions, thereby paying heed to the experiences of groups at neglected points of 
intersection.  Practitioners of this method, McCall writes, “avoid the fully deconstructive rejection of all 
categorization, yet they remain deeply skeptical of… homogenizing generalizations” (1781).  They seek 
to reveal the difference within difference, in other words.  Angela Davis or Gloria Anzaldúa might be 
seen as working in this vein.5 
McCall also identifies what she terms an “anticategorical” strain of intersectional thought.  This 
methodology, promoted by poststructuralist thinkers like Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler, holds that 
social life is by definition fluid and heterogeneous: fixed identity categories—man/woman, gay/straight—
are social impositions, fictions which work to maintain the status quo.  The premise of the anticategorical 
approach, McCall writes, is that “nothing fits neatly except as a result of imposing a stable and 
homogenizing order on a more unstable and heterogeneous social reality” (1777).  To deconstruct this 
order, and the binary categories which sustain it, is to deconstruct hegemony.   
 Within rhetoric and composition, some of the most important work to display the intersectional 
impulse has occurred under the auspices of queer theory.  Generally falling under McCall’s 
“anticategorical” heading, queer theorists stress the fluidity of identity, and the inherent excess and 
unknowability of both self and other.  In this regard, queer approaches, like intersectional methodologies 
5 Within composition proper it is surprisingly difficult to find work that expressly identifies as intersectional in the 
intracategorical mode.  Jacqueline Jones Royster’s “When the First Voice You Hear Is Not Your Own,” would be an 
example.  Barbara Tomlinson’s “Colonizing Intersectionality: Replicating Racial Hierarchy in Feminist 
Academic Arguments,” would be another. 
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in general, correspond well with both the thought of William James, and the mission of composition as I 
understand it.  Queer theory, in its relentless “queering” of concepts and selves, demands new ways of 
thinking, new lines of connection.  It can therefore help disrupt hegemonic thought and story. 
 An early application of queer theory to the writing classroom can be found in Karen Kopelson’s 
“Dis/Integrating the Gay/Queer Binary,” from 2002.   Like much queer theory, Kopelson takes as her 
point of departure the idea, from Judith Butler, that identity is fundamentally performative: repeated over 
time, acts of gender (or any other identity category) become facts of gender.  She views this position as a 
direct challenge to much composition scholarship, which she criticizes for positing identity as “singular, 
unified and static” (24).  In short, Kopelson wants to present identity as a moving target.  She wants to 
draw attention to the processes by which identities are made and remade.  This approach, like Butler’s 
work in general, is deeply material, in that it presents belief as arising from practice.  Identities, rather 
than floating about free from actual human bodies (to be bestowed by the god of Culture), are made in 
specific, delimited interactions.  Consider Williams’ Egyptian student, Masud.  His identity as a 
“postcolonial subject,” Butler would say, arises not from his place of birth, or the discourses he was 
taught in high school.  Instead, it arises from his actions, and interactions, in concrete spaces, how he 
“presents” and how he is “taken.”  Integrally, under this view, Masud’s identity is never final; it is 
constantly being (re)negotiated.  (Re)invention is thus possible.6 
 A similar queering can be found in Johnathan Alexander and Jacqueline Rhodes’s essay 
“Flattening Effects: Composition’s Multicultural Imperative and the Problem of Narrative Coherence.”  
Here the authors take aim at a familiar target: multicultural pedagogies which, in the name of “shared 
humanity,” erase or “flatten” difference (see Olson, Grobman, Wallace).  The problem with such 
pedagogies—and the bland narratives of tolerance they encourage—is that they promote a false sense of 
mastery.  The student writer is moved to squeeze the other into preexisting conceptual categories, thereby 
reducing her singularity into an “easy, normative legibility” (428).  For Alexander and Rhodes, this is 
problematic because it works to render invisible systems of oppression, and the unique challenges such 
systems pose to the queer subject.  From a Jamesian perspective, I would lodge a related complaint: 
simply put, if categories are not being redrawn, growth is not occurring.  To know more and be more, 
remember, we must disrupt ossified systems of meaning.  This occurs when the same old thoughts and 
stories are shown to be inadequate.  If the student writer is working only within preexisting conceptual 
6 Of course, our material circumstances are often beyond the limits of our control.  Hence a performative 
understanding of identity doesn’t claim to offer absolute freedom of self.  I do think, though, that with its emphasis 
on real bodies in real spaces—on the “sand and gravel” of experience, as William James would say—it opens up, 
rather than closes down, possibility. 
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categories—which is what Alexander and Rhodes persuasively argue often occurs in the multicultural 
classroom—then disruption, adjustment, and hence intellectual and ethical growth, are not being realized. 
 Alexander and Rhodes provide an interesting example of how what we know can impede 
understanding.  They note that Alexander is gay and married, hence a “married gay man.”  In trying to 
imagine his lifeworld, one might deploy the concept of “married man” as it is understood in a 
heterosexual context.  This will lead her to believe she “knows” Alexander.  The authors argue, though, 
that this understanding is by definition facile.  In line with what I have identified as the intersectional 
impulse, they hold that Alexander, in his queerness, exceeds all attempts at categorization.  The revelation 
of additional details—the “open” nature of his marriage, for example—can make this excess apparent.  A 
more intimate encounter, in other words, can force categories to collapse, revealing an otherness whose 
“difference cannot be accounted for” (440).7  This collapse can be traumatic, yes.  But rather than being a 
barrier to social justice, Alexander and Rhodes view it as a precondition.  Following Butler and 
Emmanuel Levinas, they argue that respect for the other must proceed from an “acknowledged not-
knowing” (449).  A glimpse of the other’s unfathomable queerness makes this not-knowing real. 
 So Alexander and Rhodes present the self as always in excess of any attempt to define it.  The 
recognition of this fact, they believe, is an important ethical resource.  I agree.  The acknowledgement of 
the other’s innate difference, I’d suggest, demands ever increasing levels of intimacy.  We can never 
“grasp” or “master” the other: this forces us to keep trying, to keep tracing new lines of connection.  
Inscrutability, we can say, provides the impetuous for learning and growth. 
*** 
 Moving away from queer theory, we find another example of the intersectional impulse in 
Stephanie Kerschbaum’s “Avoiding the Difference Fixation: Identity Categories, Markers of Differences, 
and the Teaching of Writing.”  Like the above scholars, Kershbaum notes a tendency within composition 
studies to fix difference.  Too often, she writes, quoting Helen Fox, cultural groups are seen as 
unchanging wholes “rather than as systems that blend and shift in response to pressures from the 
environment and their own members' ingenuity” (259).  As a result, teachers and theorists can overlook 
important, but uncategorized identity factors.  Echoing notions of performativity, Kershbaum argues that 
to overcome this blindness we must understand identity not as a thing, but as a situated practice.  Using 
her own experience as a deaf person as an example, she argues that any particular identity category can 
only be properly understood within a particular context.  Deafness, she writes, is not a stable entity 
“whose meaning transcends… particular interactional contexts” (617).  Instead, deafness takes on new 
forms, has different impacts, depending on when and where it is enacted and understood. 
7 The process of making a subject aware of such details is what I have termed attunement.   
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 In light of the above theoretical grounding, Kerschbaum suggests that to better understand 
identity we should “orient to difference as rhetorical negotiated” (619).  This entails attention to what she 
terms “difference markers”—cues by which subjects signal the presence of difference.  Such cues could 
include statements of disagreement, as well as more subtle signals: differences in practice or 
interpretation, for example. 
 Kerschbaum’s intervention is rather simple.  It is also profound.  From a Jamesian perspective, 
difference markers mark the fact that the world may not be as it seems.  They suggest the myriad of ways 
that the “postcolonial subject” or the “gay married man” can see and be seen.  They hint at the world’s 
inherent pluralism, in other words.  Attending to them, therefore, can work to challenge, and hence grow, 
our interpretative systems.8  Kerschbaum makes a similar point when she argues that attention to 
difference markers can help formulate habits of mind such as openness, metacognition and mental 
flexibility.  I agree.  I also see a deep ethical imperative at play.  Levinas, remember, holds that we must 
always approach the other in a spirit of “acknowledged not-knowing.”  Conversely, to “consume” the 
other—to reduce her to a preexisting story or pattern—is an act of violence.  Kershbaum’s approach 
provides a hedge against this sort of violence.  It encourages us to look for details which don’t fit neatly in 
our narrative.  As such, it allows the other to remain other. 
*** 
 Brianna.  What identity does she perform in my classroom?  To what difference markers should I 
attend?  With her crop tops and high heels she is not queer, as the term is popularly used.  Quite the 
opposite: she engages in a very legible performance of femininity.  The love of Isiah Berlin is harder to 
square.  Is this too a performance, of the scholar, or the thinker?  Or of the socially engaged, political 
active, young black woman?  We have intersecting identities, intersecting performances here, no doubt.  
And it’s not hard to imagine, as Levinas would have us believe, that they intersect within (or emerge 
from) a space of excess.  Indeed, however I try to “think” Brianna, she eludes my grasp.  If I look for 
difference markers—her interpretation of my class as “boring,” for example—the gap between us takes 
concrete shape.  “I made you become an animal (a rabbit, if I recall correctly) and write about it,” I want 
to tell her, “how could that possibly be boring?”  But apparently it was boring.  Laying in the grass, 
“marinating in sensation” can be boring.  This simple recognition hints at the distance between me and 
my student, the myriad of ways that the world can be. 
 
 
8 It should be noted that this sort of expansion is what Pratt sought to accomplish with her notion of contact zones.  
The contact zone is a pluralistic space; attention to markers of difference within that space reveal it as such.   
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4.5   THE EXCESSIVE SELF V. THE GENERIC SELF 
 
 
 The previous section unites a somewhat disparate array of composition scholarship.  I argued that 
this scholarship is connected, and connects with William James, in that it foregrounds the utter singularity 
of lived experience.  As a whole, it presents identity as flexible, shifting, and as something that emerges 
through situated, embodied practice.  I am never myself, in a sense.  Instead, “I” names a series of events, 
of affects, of relations, and, of course, something more than any of these things.   
Overall, I think the above vision of identity provides a productive way to understand the entities 
that collide in the classroom.  But how does it change how we understand writing?  Certainly, from the 
above we can get some sense.  If the self is inherently excessive, narratives that erase difference, and thus 
promote an easy tolerance, are to be avoided.  Instead, we should encourage writers to scramble forms 
and categories, incorporate details that skew the story they are supposed to be telling.  The result, it seems 
to me, may be something like writing-as-collage: the text as a collection of sensory details, with the whole 
emerging organically from the parts.  Instead of claiming that the “married gay man is xyz,” for example, 
a writer, recognizing that the married gay man exceeds her grasp, may write simply “x + y + z.”  
Whatever the married gay man “is” emerges out of these details.9  Such an approach is of value, I’d 
argue, because it moves the writer to reject the top-down imposition of form.  It demands that she allow 
her object of inquiry “to speak,” thereby potentially disrupting her existing thought and story.  With this 
in mind, we see how the vision of the self sketched in the preceding section can be of great value.  By 
demanding respect for the excessive, it grants writing disruptive, and hence (re)constructive powers. 
Of course, the excessive, singular self is not the only game in town.  In fact, since at least the 
1980s, composition has shown a marked tendency to devalue the individuated self.  “The individual qua 
individual is a fiction,” Terry Santos writes, paraphrasing Kenneth Bruffee and John Trimbur (4).  All 
language is social, shared, this thinking goes.  The self is a product of language.  Hence, self and other are 
social constructions.  We are defined from without, naked and rather impotent, our powers of creation 
taken second-hand from larger forces (discourse, ideology, etc.).  In short, the thinking-feeling body—
which to each of us is the very center of the universe—is presented as less than some big, nebulous other. 
Now, let’s be clear: language is obviously a shared, social artifact.  When we use language we are 
in essence borrowing cultural forms.  Equally clear though is that there is a very important part of every 
thinker, every writer that exists beyond the social.  The interface between these two spheres, I’d argue, is 
where we must direct our attention.  How can we leverage the excessive nature of lived experience to 
9 For an extended example of this approach, see my discussion of Brianna in the final section of this chapter. 
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(re)vitalize cultural forms?  The theory of identity discussed above starts to provide something like an 
answer.  If the self is an abyss of otherness, constantly reconstructing itself through interactions with 
others and environment, a degree of unpredictability is always present in human affairs.  A self can be 
more than its inputs.  Hence, an act of writing can be more than a web of citation.  In other words, the 
individuated, embodied writer emerges as an independently generative force.  Conceiving the writer in 
this way, I believe, is essential to spurring intellectual and ethical growth, and per the larger mission of 
this project, combating the hegemony of the fragments.  It injects a degree of instability into “filter 
bubbles” and “you loops,” allowing writing instruction to break them apart. 
In short, my claim in the following sections is that in devaluing the individuated, embodied self, 
certain popular strains of composition theory are robbing writing instruction of its potency.  Interestingly, 
this same tendency to devalue the self appears in two seemingly opposing theoretical strains: genre theory 
and new materialism.  This section will discuss the former; the next section will turn to the latter, then to a 
challenge from William James. 
*** 
Genre theory, in short, is the study of social forces through the analysis of standardized written 
forms.  Some might think of genres as stable and rule-bound.  Genre theorists take a different view.  For 
them, genres are complex, dynamic “stabilized-for-now” sites of “social and ideological action” (Kill 
216).  Genres are also essential for thinking about identity.  This is because, from a genre perspective, 
identity is relational and relations are always mediated by genre.  To be visible in a social space, subjects 
must engage in certain standardized forms of behavior.  It is through these specific forms, Charles 
Bazerman argues, that we “take on the mood, attitude, and actional possibilities of that place,” and thus 
become “the kind of person you can become there” (qtd. in Kill 217). 
 It should be noted that genre theory does allow for a certain degree of flexibility in regard to an 
individual’s relationship to a set of genres.  As Elizabeth Wardle writes, identity formation in a 
community is a “negotiation” in which the individual has some degree of control (4).  It’s always possible 
to add personal touches to genres and thus resist some of a community’s demands.  The nature and source 
of this resistance are notable, though.  In regard to the nature of resistance, we can say that identity, as 
understood by genre theorists, is something of a zero-sum game.  To take on a new identity via a new set 
of genres means to give up a previous one.  “Legitimate participation [in a community] entails the loss of 
certain identities even as it enables the construction of others,” Wardle writes, quoting Diane Hodges (9).   
 The source of resistance within genre theory is also notable.  Whenever we encounter a new set of 
genres we must decide whether and to what extent to appropriate it.  As noted, because of the zero-sum 
nature of genres, there will always be some drawback to appropriation: “taking on” new genres will 
alienate us from other identities we value.  This can lead to resistance.  Integrally, though, genre theorists 
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reject any non-discursive spring of resistance.  Wardle is clear on this point.  She writes that rejection or 
alteration of genres doesn’t result from “inherent forces within each human being” (3).  Instead, resistance 
arises from “contradiction individuals experience in their multiple subject positions” (Bawarshi, qtd in 
Wardle 3).  In other words, for genre theorists, desire is totally determined by the discursive fields in 
which one moves.  The individual lacks any independent generative power. 
 After our discussion of the rich, singular intersectional self, the reader can perhaps see the pallid 
nature of the world as described by genre theory.  It presents life and language as a set of blocky, 
interlocking forms.  We can only come into being or affect others through these forms.  A student, for 
example, takes on the genres of the academy, surrenders the genres of West Virginia hillbilly life.  She 
becomes a scholar rather than a mountaineer.  Her language, thought and action are now defined by the 
(predetermined) affordances of the academic genre.  Her previous way of being matters little, if at all.  It 
is gone.  She has surrendered those genres and that identity.   
Now, such a view might provide insight into the nature of texts, but it fails to capture how we 
actually live, learn or write.  By discounting the self—as in the singular self which exists before and 
moves among discursive fields—it artificially limits our ability to connect and create.  Thinking through a 
Jamesian lens, we see why this is the case.  Genres are concepts: tools we use to simplify and thus make 
sense of an unbearably complex reality.  They are clean, whereas reality is messy.  They are solid, 
whereas reality is fluid.  Reality, in short, is excessive.  By working solely in a clean conceptual space, 
genre theorists ignore this excess.  This is a problem, because it is from the excess that new lines of 
connection, and thus discursive invention, inevitably arise.  In real life, our hillbilly academic, having 
traced an absolutely singular life-path, would think and write and act in absolutely singular ways.10  The 
moves by which she perverts cultural forms would likely be small, but they could be identified, and could 
be (and often are) leveraged to great effect.  How can this occur?  What animates her thought and 
language and allows her to transcend that which was previously thought and said, both by hillbillies and 
academics?  The answer is her life experience—an absolutely unique accumulation of affective, material 
and discursive events.  The idea of an individuated “self” captures this reality.  Such a self is centered in 
the thinking-feeling body, but as queer theory (and William James) make clear, transcends that body.  
Genre theory, with their myopic focus on texts and forms, can’t think such ideas.  Hence, I’d argue, they 
overlook the individual writer’s generative power. 
Byron Hawk makes a similar point when he accuses social-epistemic rhetoric, another 
structuralist mode of thought, of ignoring “the entire context of tacit knowing that serves as the contextual 
ground for any heuristic discovery” (116).  Yes.  The tacit, that which we know, but which escapes 
10 This is inevitable because genres are ideal types and no individual case every perfectly conforms to type. 
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codification: this is part of the excess which genre theory denies the writer.  But it also denies her the 
deep well of what we carry with us and don’t know, that which no one has ever known (yet).  Genre 
theory, in short, elides life’s inherent richness.  It deals instead in inhuman abstraction, in frozen slices of 
experience.  It tries to explain identity through these slices.  In doing so, it presents an unrealistic picture 
of life and language, and puts artificial limits on what we can say, think and be. 
 
 
  
 
4.6   A NEW NEW MATERIALISM 
 
 
 In the above section, I critiqued genre theory from a materialist perspective.  I claimed that by 
focusing exclusively on the formal and discursive—and ignoring the messiness of lived experience—it 
limits our potential for connection and creativity.  As I’ve tried to make clear, at this cultural moment 
especially, we need theory which allows for maximum interaction.  And this sort of theory will, by 
definition, be intimately bound to lived experience.  Of course, I’m not alone in wishing to tap the 
generative power of the situated and embedded.  As noted, we are in the midst of a “material turn” within 
rhetoric and composition.  This is good.  To its credit, new materialism makes plenty of room for the 
excess.  My concern, though, is that in doing so, it too underestimates the individuated, thinking-feeling 
writer.  In short, whereas genre theory renders the writer a mere product of discursive relations, new 
materialism dissolves her in a flux of material and affective relations.  I’d like to suggest that in both 
cases, the outcome is the same: an artificial limit on what can be thought and felt. 
To see how the new materialist conception of the self may be limiting, it’s useful to look at one of 
the earlier and more sophisticated presentations of new materialist ideas in rhetoric and composition: 
Byron Hawk’s A Counter-History of Composition: Toward Methodologies of Complexity.  In this wide-
ranging work, Hawk rehabilitates the philosophical concept of vitalism, arguing that it can help map our 
hyper-connected digital world.  He unites thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, Coleridge, Gilles Deluze and 
Paul Kameen within a new paradigm he labels “complex vitality.”  The complex vitalist paradigm, Hawk 
writes, is characterized by a focus on “systems, dynamic change, complexity… an emphasis on 
situatedness, and an acceptance of the unconscious or tacit elements of lived experience” (223).  In this 
description, we spy the “relational ontology” which Laura Micciche claims defines new materialism.  
Simply put, for Hawk, relations, rather than individuated subjects or objects are primary.  We should let 
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this idea guide our practice, he suggests.  In our teaching and in our theory emphasis should be placed on 
“the material and affective ecologies that exist in and link” our lives and classrooms (224). 
 What becomes of identity in Hawk’s complex vitalist world?  Well, first off, it must be noted that 
“identity,” as such, doesn’t appear in Hawk’s book.  (Perhaps the term carries too many echoes of the 
fixed and stable, the self-contained and knowable.)  What sort of beings interact in the classroom then?  
Hawk provides a hint in a discussion of ethos in the digital age.  He quotes complexity theorist Mark 
Taylor’s description of “the self—if, indeed, this term any long[er] makes sense,” as “a node in a complex 
network of relations” (188).  A node, as used here, is a knot comprised of different threads or fibers; it 
represents a brief moment of coherence in a field of randomness.  Such an entity, Taylor writes, emerges 
“without any centralized agency or directing agent” (188).  Building on this idea, Hawk argues that in a 
networked world, “the image of a single, central, stable subject,” must give way “to a multiplicity of 
selves,” emerging through relations with other bodies (189).  In a discussion of Giles Deluze and Felix 
Guattari, he hits a similar note.  The contemporary subject, he writes, is a “molar residual, off to the side, 
a side effect of desiring machines, not a single center from which desire is born” (165).  Expression, in 
turn, is a “function… of ecological potential” (165). 
 In sum, we must say that the self, as presented in A Counter-History, is defined from without.  It 
emerges in relation with others and objects, becoming “real” through (material) changes to its 
environment.  Integrally, those changes come about not through self-generated force, but through the 
redirection of force already present in said environment (the actualization of “ecological potential”).  The 
self, in this view, is like a prism, focusing energy received from the sun.  As with much new materialist 
thought, such a take decentralizes agency.  It turns our focus away from the individual, and towards what 
John Dewey would call coordinations: networks, systems, ecologies.  It encourages us to study the 
movement of sunbeams, in other words, and not the construction of the prism. 
 Hawk’s interest in systems is not necessarily a bad thing.  I have previously accused postcolonial 
theory and genre theory of using thought to keep objects and others at a distance.  By foregrounding 
relational networks, Hawk, and other new materialists, seek to bring the world closer, to allow for more 
lines of connection.  This is good.  That said, in terms of identity, Hawk basically says what Trimbur and 
Bruffee said twenty years before—nothing starts with the writer, there is no individual, no agency.  Now, 
as I read him, Hawk is primarily a rhetorician; perhaps his complex vitalist paradigm does important work 
in capturing the (necessarily abstract) nature of contemporary rhetoric.  When applied to actual writers 
and writing instruction though, I’d like to suggest that his ideas fall short.  In the writing classroom, after 
all, we don’t engage “molar residuals” or “desiring machines.”  Instead, we engage students and student 
texts.  We need a theory of identity geared towards helping us productively intervene at this level of scale.  
And as I’ve made clear, to allow for maximum interaction and invention, such a theory would have to 
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start with and in lived experience.  It would have to acknowledge the reality of the individuated body, the 
individuated self and something that feels a hell of a lot like agency.  Feminist theorists often make 
similar demands.  Laura Micciche, for example, criticizes certain strains of new materialism for treating 
human bodies merely as “depoliticized effects” of complexity and networks (491).  Such thought, she 
argues, shows an aversion to the “diverse fleshiness” of real people, in real spaces (491).  Hawk is 
certainly not the worst offender in this regard.11  I do think, though, that like new materialism writ large, 
his thought fails to sufficiently theorize life as it is lived. 
 So what’s the alternative?  How can we formulate a theory of identity which acknowledges the 
felt reality of individuation, while simultaneously refusing to constitute the writer as a mere “social atom, 
an accounting unit” (Trimbur, qtd in Santos 5).  The work of William James is instructive.  James posits a 
world of relations—of reciprocity and interaction—but at same time, makes the thinking-feeling body the 
vibrant, generative center of experience.  In doing so, I’d argue, he provides the blueprint for a new new 
materialism, one which operates on a human scale—the scale on which the work of writing and writing 
instruction actually takes place. 
To better understand James’s vision, I’d like to turn to one of his well-known attacks on the 
“mechanical materialism” of famed social Darwinist Herbert Spencer.  In “Great Men, Great Thoughts, 
and the Environment,” James considers the nature of social development.12  What causes communities to 
change over time?  Spencer and his followers, James writes, believe that such changes occur independent 
of individual will or agency.  “They are due to the environment, to the circumstances, the physical 
geography, the ancestral conditions… to everything, in fact, except the Grants and the Bismarcks, the 
Joneses and the Smiths” (218).  In short, the Spencerian school holds that all change, social or otherwise, 
is the result of impersonal material forces.  Individuals, their constructions and desires are mere effects. 
 While Hawk’s complex vitalism is not mechanical in nature, it resembles Spencer’s brand of 
materialism in that it privileges systems over agents, fields over figures.  Yes, but so what?  What’s 
wrong with taking a big picture view?  Nothing in itself.  Per James’s radical empiricism, remember, 
different, even opposing lines of thought and story can be equally valid.  The key, when determining 
validity, is to find out who is asking and for what purpose.  In making this point, James presents an image 
of a sparrow found dead on a city street.  Certainly, he writes, that if we were to “alter the milky way, 
alter our federal constitution, alter the facts of our barbarian ancestry,” then the universe would be so 
different that the sparrow might still be alive (220).  But he continues, if the purpose of our inquiry is 
punishment, say, it would be foolish to overlook the boy who threw a stone at the sparrow “as too 
11 As discussed in chapter two, Sydney Dobrin represents the apogee of “anti-subject” comp theory. 
12 This was originally a lecture, given to the Harvard Natural History Society.  It was published in its current form in 
the October 1880 edition of the Atlantic Monthly. 
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personal, proximate, and… anthropomorphic an agent” (220).  There are “different cycles of operation in 
nature” (220).  Sometimes, to get the job done, “we have to regard them as disconnected and irrelevant to 
one another” (221).   
Always an empiricist, James works from the bottom up, takes parts and make wholes.  In the case 
of the sparrow, this leads him to privilege the concrete and local over the abstract and distant.  He narrows 
his field of focus, concentrates his energies on the most relevant parts of the coordination (with relevance 
determined by the goal of his inquiry).  This mode of thought, when applied to social theory, causes him 
to look to the individual as an agent of change.  Now, once again, this is not to say that the sparrow’s 
death cannot be classified as the molar residual of a desiring machine.  It’s simply to say that within 
human affairs, this sort of abstraction is often not particularly useful.  Depending on the purpose of our 
inquiry, it may be best to believe that a boy is simply a boy. 
Of equal import is how James conceives the relationship between human thought and broader 
systems.  Drawing on his psychological studies, he rejects the idea that the human mind is “passively 
plastic,” capable only of responding to and reproducing environmental stimuli (247).  In doing so, he 
directly challenges Hawk’s conception of the individual as a “node” or prism which simply redirects 
external forces.  Instead, in “those mental departments which are the highest,” new conceptions constantly 
appear in the form of “random images, fancies [and] accidental out-births of spontaneous variation” 
(247).  The individual mind-body, in other words, inevitably alters those forces which work upon and 
through it.  Social change, James concludes, is more than anything else, a result of the accumulated 
influence of these spontaneous, unpredictable perversions. 
 In the above argument we see the full-flowering of the ideas James hit upon in his moment of 
“death and rebirth.”  We again see the individual as an active, world-making force.  In his youth, 
remember, James was paralyzed by the idea that he was nothing but a “node.”  Through resistance to this 
idea, he proved himself capable of agency.  The same ability of embodied, embedded humans to 
overcome their embeddedness is now imputed to society as a whole.  If we are to follow James, we must 
view writing and writing instruction through a similar lens.  What, after all, is the writing act, but an 
attempt to overcome the limitations of our shared cultural forms?  When we write, we strive to take 
ownership of language, make it ours, however provisionally.  When we teach writing, we strive to help 
our students do the same.  James assures us that this struggle is not in vein.  Yes, our actions are limited, 
local.  They may implicate the milky way, but they ultimately take place on the individual level, at the 
interface between self (or selves) and world.  Though localized, such acts can have massive social 
consequence.  Contra Hawk, James believes that the network does not make the node.  Instead, the nodes 
make the network.  Whatever potential may be inherent in discourse or desiring machines is only 
actualized, only becomes capable of impact, through the actions of (always situated, always embodied) 
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individuals.  The boy throws the stone and the sparrow dies.  The writer types the tweet and Trump 
becomes president.  Of course, the structure of the milky way plays a role in each event; but it is not 
necessarily the prime mover.  James allows us to believe this.  And thus believe in ourselves. 
 Returning to the work of Byron Hawk, we can now see how, from a Jamesian perspective, a 
failure to account for the individual compromises his project.  In a pedagogical call to action, Hawk 
writes that composition theorists should strive to “develop methods for situating bodies within ecological 
contexts in ways that reveal the potential for invention” (206).  I agree completely.  As discussed in 
previous chapters, to disrupt ossified thought structures we must find ways to unlock the excess inherent 
in the material world.  We must remember, though, that this sort of change can only occur at the local 
level.  As James makes clear, it is from real, individuated bodies—not discourses or fluxes—that 
“spontaneous variations” arise.13  My claim is that Hawk and other new materialists, in privileging wholes 
over parts, abstract systems over lived experience, fail to sufficiently account for this fact.  Now, 
admittedly, at least in regard to Hawk, it’s plausible that we don’t so much disagree, as his attention is 
directed elsewhere (to the ethereal heights of rhetorical theory, perhaps).  He criticizes James Berlin, for 
example, for failing to recognize that “the body is the critical, epistemological link between situation and 
invention” (120).  Yes.  My claim is that those of us working in the materialist tradition need to do more 
to theorize this link.  This will require a theory of identity which respects both relations and the 
inscrutable power of the individual self. 
*** 
 So are Brianna and I nodes?  Are we brief moments of coherence in a field of randomness?  
Certainly, I sometimes feel like a node, a point of intersection of Bob Dylan lyrics, humid Kansas 
summers and opaque biological processes.  Then I try to repeat a story I’ve heard, or paraphrase some 
philosophical theory, and it comes out so peculiar and twisted that if I take a moment, I’m surprised at its 
singularity.  My coherence is fleeting, but I read old emails and immediately recognize the language as 
“mine.”  I have habits that I cannot break.  And I’m quite certain that Brianna—such a conscientious 
dresser—imagines some sense of self-direction in her life, some sense of agency that does important 
work, and is thus “real” in the pragmatic sense.  There are indeed different cycles of operation in nature.  
And in the classroom.  Perhaps it is best to conceive of Brianna and Matt as simultaneous node and not-
node, emanation from a field, and self-sustaining lines of force.  The key, I suppose, is a theory of identity 
which allows for such complexity. 
 
13 I’m not claiming that bodies act alone.  Variations always arise from the interaction of body and world (of 
course).  My claim is simply that the role of the individual in the process of creation/invention has been devalued to 
too great of a degree by new materialist thought. 
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4.7   A JAMESIAN THEORY OF IDENTITY 
 
 
 The preceding sections have hinted at a new theory of identity for rhetoric and composition.  
We’ve seen that such a theory, to do its job, must respect both the singularity of lived experience and the 
broader contextual forces which shape that experience.  It must acknowledge that the I is many and 
mutable—an ongoing performance—but also remarkably stubborn.  William James can help us fill in this 
outline.  In doing so we must keep two goals in mind.  First, we need to strive for accuracy: we want our 
theory of identity to reflect life as it is lived by composition students and teachers.  Second, we want our 
theory to open up new possibilities, to allow for increased intimacy, interaction and growth.  So in short, 
the Jamesian theory of identity presented here should be understood as both descriptive and prescriptive.  
It is meant to reflect what is and what should be. 
 William James’s primary contribution to notions of identity occurs in the chapter labeled “The 
Consciousness of Self,” from his 1890 masterwork, Principles of Psychology.  This chapter follows, and 
builds upon, James’s idea of consciousness as a “stream of thought,” in which each conscious pulse is 
both singular, and in unbroken sequence with those pulses before and after.  Like that previous chapter, 
James’s discussion of the self has proven widely influential (see Comello).  His first, and perhaps boldest 
move, is to reject the need for any subject of experience, any essential self or “soul.”  Instead, he declares 
that “the passing thought… is itself the thinker” (PP 342).  Each pulse of consciousness, he explains, 
knows its predecessors and all that they knew.14  Apart from this “functional identity,” there is no 
connection, no relation, between the I of the moment and the I of five minutes ago.  In line with James’s 
general approach in Principles, this is a very materialist move.  From a material perspective, every 
thought occurs in a different place, at a different time, in a (slightly) modified brain: in a strictly physical 
sense, every thought is therefore utterly new, utterly distinct.  As is every I.  
 It’s easy to see how such a conception of self corresponds with James’s idea of the individual as a 
singular, generative force.  Because the thinker is always thinking itself anew, the possibility of mutation 
and invention is injected into every moment.  By doing away with a transcendent subject or soul, James 
also allows for multiplicity, for conflict even, within the self.  “The sense of our own personal identity,” 
he writes, is nothing more than a felt perception of sameness, and “must not be taken to mean more than 
these grounds warrant” (PP 334).  Even within the same individual, in other words, sameness exists 
alongside difference.  I am, in a very real sense, the same man I was ten years ago.  But I’m also different 
14 James uses the metaphor of ownership to describe the relationship between pulses.  Each thought, he writes, is 
“born an owner, and dies owned, transmitting whatever it realized as its Self to its own later proprietor” (PP 339).  
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now than I’ve ever been.  We’ve all felt similar sentiments.  This conception of identity explains how this 
can be. 
 James’s next move is to parse the self into the knower (the I) and the known (the Me).  Taken 
together, this “duplex” self-conception frames our engagement with the world.  “Whatever I may be 
thinking of,” he writes, “I am always at the same time more or less aware of myself, of my personal 
existence.  At the same time it is I who am aware; so that the total self of me, [is] as it were duplex, partly 
known and partly knower, partly object and partly subject” (BC 176).  As this indicates, the self is present 
in every thought, every action.  The self is also multiple: both subject and object.  As discussed above, as 
subject or knower, the self is pure thought.  But what of the self as object or known?  What is the Me?  
“In its widest possible sense,” James writes: 
…a man’s Me is the sum total of all that he can call his, not only his body and his psychic 
powers, but his clothes and his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation 
and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account” (BC 177). 
So a Me can contain any object.  The decisive factor, what separates Me from not-Me, as James sees it, is 
emotional connection.  Whenever a subject affectively bonds to an object—whenever his fortunes seem to 
get mixed up or bound to that object—it becomes part of that subject’s Me.15  It becomes part of his self, 
something that he carries with him and which shapes his engagement with the world. 
 Earlier, I referred to the Jamesian self as an “assemblage,” a loosely bound set of disparate 
elements.  We now see how this can be the case.  The self for James is simultaneously material, social and 
spiritual, with the things we care about—whatever they may be— literally becoming part of us.  Identity 
becomes a function of our body, our possessions, our relationships, our ideals.  These all work together to 
shape our perception and how others perceive us.  Understood in this way, the self emerges as both 
private and public, both solid and liquid. 
 Regarding the first point, for James, as we’ve seen, there’s always an I.  This I is utterly singular, 
utterly personal.  The experience of the I is “subjective,” in other words.  The self, though, is not just the 
I, but also the entire web of affectively bound objects and others which constitutes the Me.  These others 
and objects are largely “objective,” in that they are available for empirical inspection.  This duality allows 
the self to be both singular and plural, a monad and a network.  It allows us to acknowledge that lived 
15 It’s important to note that for James, feeling is material.  It is the result of physical processes and is 
intersubjective in that it can spread from body to body.  Personal experiences, Livingstone writes “are not the stuff 
of sovereign subjectivity but rather after-effects of impersonal and material processes that involve nerves, synapses, 
and guts,” along with broad networks of things, crowds and moods (13).  The latter trio impacts the former, 
producing what we know as sensation and emotion.  Seen in this way, the Me can expand through (physical) 
encounter. 
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experience is utterly unknowable, but also communal.  In short, it allows us to balance respect for the 
individual with respect for contextual forces. 
 James’s theory of identity performs a similar balancing act in regard to fluidity.  The Jamesian 
self is not a mere eddy, structural effect or “node.”  At the same time, though, it’s boundaries are wildly 
indeterminate.  The I as thinker is constantly thinking itself and its Me anew, remember.  The Me is also 
in constant flux, as various objects enter and exit our emotional orbit.  This indeterminacy allows for 
reinvention.  But the self is not a total free agent.  At all times, a hard nucleus of experience—our bodily 
welfare, for example—remains near the center of our attention, assuring continuity of the Me from one 
moment to the next.  So identity is both mutable and stubborn.  We are a collection of objects and 
opinions, constantly being reshuffled and rethought.  Some arrangements may come easier than others, 
but alternative arrangements are always possible.   
If we accept James’s conception of identity, so what?  What does this understanding of the self 
do?  I’d argue that it does quite a lot.  Political theorist Alexander Livingston, for example, argues that 
James’s notion of identity allows for radical new forms of social organization.  “In foregrounding the 
priority of felt relations,” Livingstone writes, James “sketches the outlines of democratic individualism 
that is not atomistic but rather molecular: material, relational, porous, and conjunctive” (2).  In other 
words, James presents a new way for humans to come together to get things done.  Instead of the 
autonomous liberal/Cartesian subject or the structurally determined Marxian one, we have humans as 
emergent, attuned beings.  For James, each individuated body is a “sounding board,” immersed in a 
“cloud of experience” (Livingston 13).  In such a world, agreement is not found in ideology, gods or 
metaphysics.  Instead, it comes about through practice, through myriad acts of making that involve “the 
concerted effort of individuals constructing connections between a plurality of ‘little worlds’” (Livingston 
13).  This is an embodied, material, local process.  And integrally, it doesn’t require conscious 
understanding.  Instead, what is key is the encounter, the physical collision of ways of being.  For James, 
remember, the self is indeterminate, in motion.  When such beings collide, melding inevitably occurs. 
 Turning to the writing classroom, we see how James’s notion of identity might inform our 
practice.  As noted, for James, the world is riven, and the self is riven.  Integrally, though, this plurality is 
a source of strength.  At every level, alterity conditions growth.  In our struggles to unite disparate forces 
within ourselves and our texts we gain strength and agency (like James in his moment of death and 
rebirth).  Likewise, in the encounter with otherness, we are forced to look beyond what we know, thereby 
creating new conceptions, finding new sources of meaning, and ultimately, growing our selves.  “Not 
only the people but the places and things I know enlarge my Self,” James writes (PP 308).  Yes.  Exactly.  
This sort of expansion is what writing instruction should encourage: it’s how we smash the hegemony of 
the fragments.  If James is right, it occurs first and foremost through the avoidance of conceptual barriers 
 115 
to intimacy.  In short, we have to think and act in ways which allow singular selves to come into contact 
on singular terms.  If we can do so, selves will expand and fragments will dissolve. 
*** 
 So what would William James make of Brianna?  What would he make of me?  Well, through a 
Jamesian lens, Brianna is first and foremost an individual.  She’s a thinking-feeling being, constantly 
(re)constructing her self and her world.  Within this reconstruction there’s bound to be mutation, 
invention—absolutely original creation.  There’s also bound to be fissure, fracture.  This plurality is 
generative, though.  Through the struggle to unite her disparate selves—and attune those selves to a 
fractured world— Brianna can gain strength and purpose.  She can expand her Me, come to know and 
care for more people, places, ideas and ideals.  
 James would also draw our attention to all that Brianna carries into my classroom.  She is 
extravagant necklaces, iced coffee, Isiah Berlin, Black Lives Matter, a sharp (rather acerbic) wit, a mother 
in the Army, AP English, Jim Crow, her classmates’ perception of her, my perception of her, Tumblr, 
Stevie Wonder, press-on nails, etc., etc.  This is the assemblage which is Brianna.  It shapes how she 
moves through the world and it shapes my interaction with her.  Of course, the center of Briana is always 
shifting—she doesn’t care much for Stevie Wonder anymore, perhaps—but all these elements are there, 
to some degree.  And they are always open to reevaluation. 
 As Brianna’s teacher, my task is to guide Brianna’s arrangement of self into the most expansive 
form possible.  I encourage critique and creation, draw attention to the fact that Brianna is very much in 
process.  I provide alterity—in the form and content of the texts we read, in the ideas we discuss, and in 
my own physical presence.  (Alterity, remember, acts as a stimulus to growth.)  Here, James would be 
quick to remind us that truly intimate relations are defined by reciprocity.  Growth can and must be 
mutual.  Through the collision of open systems, melding occurs.  My fortune gets bound up with my 
students, they become “mine,” part of my Me, and hence part of my self.  Long after the semester ends, 
the trace remains.  This, I suppose, is why months after our final class, I’m still trying to make sense of 
my encounter with Brianna.  In Jamesian terms, our relationship was one of great intimacy.  It was 
therefore of great import. 
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5.  WRITING THE FRAGMENTS 
 
 
 
 
5.1   THE RHETORIC OF THE FRAGMENTS 
 
 
 I begin this chapter eight months after the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the 
United States. As noted in the introduction, for many writing teachers, Trump’s election was a traumatic 
event.  The intervening months have been equally so.  Reared in filter bubbles and fueled by feedback 
loops, voices have only grown more shrill, more extreme.  Glancing at the Washington Post, I see 
legendary political reporter Carl Bernstein claiming that America is in a “cold civil war,” in which “fact-
based debate” between opposing viewpoints has become impossible.  Whether the topic is tax policy, 
vaccines or TV shows, the conventional wisdom is that “America is more divided than ever.”  Survey 
data supports such a view (see Pew).  In chapter one, I argued that this fragmentation both arises from and 
contributes to the ossification of cognitive practices.  Simply put, it is now harder than ever for the 
average citizen to engage productively with difference.  This is the hegemony of the fragments, and it 
represents a state of affairs with which composition, as a socially engaged enterprise, must contend.  
 That’s the bad news.  The good news is that as writing teachers, every time we step into the 
classroom we have a chance to challenge this state of affairs.  The stakes are high.  The struggle will be a 
difficult one and success is not guaranteed.  From a Jamesian perspective, though, adversity is to be 
cherished because it allows for heroism.  James, remember, found moral courage in “the self-governing 
resistance of the ego to the world.”  In asserting his free will in the face of forces which sought to deny 
him that right, he proved himself an active agent.  His life and language thus took on meaning which to 
this day resonates throughout the socius.  It seems to me that the hegemony of the fragments presents 
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writing teachers with a similar opportunity.  Here is an idea, a cause, a mission with the ability to knit 
together and enrich innumerable everyday acts of teaching and learning.  In doing so, it gives us a reason 
(or another reason) to keep engaging whole-heartedly in such acts.  Of course, any gains had will be 
small.  No matter.  To follow William James is to recognize the power of the local, to take solace and 
strength from “disseminated and strung-along successes” (P 117).  Little victories are an integral part of 
teaching.  Resistance to the hegemony of the fragments can endow each with new meaning. 
 If we agree that social fragmentation is a problem, what should we do?  What should we not do?  
Let’s take the latter question first.  I suggest that writing teachers, if we are to challenge the fragments, 
must scrupulously avoid discursive practices which merely exploit fragmentation.  We see such 
exploitation in political rhetoric that seeks to gin up hate or fear, for example.  We also see it, though, 
anytime a writer denies the world’s complexity in order to promote his interests or those of groups he 
claims to represent.  Now, admittedly, when tensions run high and gaps in perception seem unbridgeable, 
there is a strong incentive to turn inward, to ignore complexity and more fervently embrace the thought 
and story of our side, our tribe.  If I’m right though, and if William James is right, we can’t challenge 
fragmentation via exclusion.  The other’s desire, even if seemingly evil or illogical, is real.  It’s a real 
force in the world and every self must learn to take account of it.  Writing teachers can help students do 
this, I believe, by promoting discursive practices which bend and flex, and thus open up new, more 
inclusive ways of thinking and being.  In short, we need to engage in pedagogical practices which help 
students come to terms with the perplexing, often repulsive ways of the other.  In the previous pages I’ve 
argued that William James provides a philosophical system—a metaphysics, an ethical scheme and a 
theory of identity—which makes plurality both inevitable and desirable.  My claim now is that a similar 
inflection can work to revitalize composition.  It can provide writing teachers with a renewed sense of 
purpose, both in the classroom and on a disciplinary level.  Turning to James once again, this chapter will 
present a model of composition—specifically first-year composition—which connects our field to the rich 
tradition of liberal arts education (of which James is an integral part).  Such a model makes it our mission 
to help students develop the habits of mind necessary to deal productively with difference.  In short, it 
seeks to help them live and write in a fragmented age.  
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5.2   TO KNOW A GOOD PERSON WHEN YOU SEE THEM 
 
 
 As noted, the work of William James cannot (and should not) be translated directly into a lesson 
plan.  One of his core principals, remember, is the singularity of every situation, the utterly contextual 
nature of all knowledge.  It is therefore up to the individual teacher to find the right pedagogical formula, 
the right name for her particular case.  In his Talks to Teachers lecture series, in fact, James takes pains to 
remind teachers of this responsibility.  His psychological theories are science, while “teaching is an art,” 
thereby requiring an “intermediary inventive mind” to adapt one to the other (TT 7).  To think otherwise 
is a “very great mistake” (TT 7).  Of course, James has specific views as to the nature of education and 
the educational enterprise; he devotes, after all, an entire lecture series to the topic.  The following pages 
will survey some of these opinions.  In accord with James’s wishes though, they will be treated as 
catalyst, rather than dogma.  I will use James’s thought to sketch a writing pedagogy uniquely suited to 
the classroom as I know it.  I encourage my reader to do the same. 
 Talks to Teachers is an apt place to begin formulating a Jamesian-inspired writing pedagogy.  As 
previously discussed, in this series of lectures, published as a book in 1899, James sought to put recent 
advances in academic psychology to educational use.  In a fond remembrance written in 1911, a year after 
James’s death, Bird Baldwin, one of his former students, credits James with being among the first to take 
an “empirical and experimental” approach to educational theory (369).  Baldwin describes James, in 
Talks, as adopting the “biological point of view,” holding first and foremost that “man is a practical being 
whose mind is given him to aid him in adapting… to this world’s life” (375).  The text’s discussion of 
habit, instinct, and the child’s “native tendencies,” in Baldwin’s view, have proven particularly 
influential.1  As this line indicates, Talks deals primarily with the learning processes of school children.  
Still, no matter the learner, the biological can’t be discounted.  As such, an examination of this text’s core 
principles can prove useful. 
  So within Talks, how does James understand education?  First off, it should be noted that 
education, for James, is more than just the transfer of information or the mastery of discrete skills.  
Instead, its central aim is to help students respond to their world in more productive ways.  In Talks, 
James phrases this idea in terms of “training to behavior.”  Education, he writes: 
1 One-hundred years on, the influence of James’s educational thought is harder to judge.  Pajares, in the most 
thorough examination of the subject, views James as a forerunner of the child-centered progressive education 
movement (largely through his influence on John Dewey).  That said, James, unlike Dewey, clearly has what would 
today be considered old-fashioned tendencies.  As Pajares puts it, he takes a “no-nonsense approach,” stressing 
freedom and compulsion in equal measure (55). 
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…consists in the organizing of resources in the human being, of powers of conduct which 
shall fit him to his social and physical world.  An 'uneducated' person is one who is 
nonplussed by all but the most habitual situations.  On the contrary, one who is educated 
is able practically to extricate himself…from circumstances in which he never was placed 
before.  Education, in short, cannot be better described than by calling it the organization 
of acquired habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior (TT 29). 
In this definition, we sees hints of James’s Darwinian influence.  Humans in this view are practical, 
embodied creatures, constantly required to respond to novel environmental demands.  Through trial and 
error, communities have developed systems to help their members respond to such demands.  Education 
is the transmission of this cultural legacy.  But what exactly is transmitted?  Education, James writes later 
in Talks, involves the organization of “determinate tendencies to associate one thing with another” (83).  
So, for James, learning is learning how to read situations, how to make the most productive connections.  
Certain environmental cues implicate certain conceptual and affective webs, triggering certain behaviors.  
The goal of education is to make these reactions more “numerous and perfect” (TT 38).  “The more 
copious the associative systems, the completer the individual’s adaptions to the world” (TT 83).   
   Integrally, learning as James’s understands it, implicates both body and mind.  By focusing on 
habits and behavior James captures both the conscious and unconscious, conceptual and tacit elements of 
the learning process.  It is not enough for a student to think in certain ways.  To “fit her social and 
physical world” she must also learn to feel and act in certain ways.  For James, these different elements of 
experience inevitably intertwine, with concepts spurring action, action spurring feelings, feelings spurring 
concepts, etc.  In short, James’s vision of education, as presented in Talks, can be said to be radically 
holistic.  We learn in order to live in the world.  And life, by definition, is always intellectual, affective 
and material.  Learning must be likewise. 
 Apart from Talks, James most direct statement of educational principles can be found in “The 
Social Value of the College Bred,” an address delivered at Radcliffe in 1907.  This work differs from 
Talks in both context and content.  In Talks, James speaks as an psychologist dispensing practical advice 
to a paying audience.  In “Social Value,” delivered late in his career and to a group of college alumni, 
James assumes the role of philosopher and general man of letters.  This pose allows him to take a more 
prescriptive approach.  The forum also allows him to address college education directly (a rare occurrence 
for James).  For our purposes, then, “Social Value” is a key text. 
 The question addressed in “Social Value” is simple: what does a college education do?  James’s 
answer is equally simple: a college education “helps you know a good man when you see him.”  This 
answer is pithy, a bit glib even, but I’d argue it hints at James’s investment in a tradition which shapes 
university education to this day.  In particular, James signals his commitment to what we might call the 
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liberal arts or liberal education.  He makes this investment clear via a comparison of the “colleges” with 
business or professional schools.  At the latter, he writes, a student receives a narrow, practical education, 
becoming an “efficient instrument for doing a definite thing,” and thus capable of judging “a good job in 
his own line” (MS 132).  The former, on the other hand, “although they may leave you less efficient for 
this or that practical task, suffuse your whole mentality with something more important than skill” (MS 
131).  They leave you with “the critical sense,” the ability to judge “a good human job anywhere” (MS 
133).  What the colleges teach, in other words, “is a general sense of what, under various disguises, 
superiority has always signified and may still signify” (MS 133). 
 James admits that the above definition is vague (necessarily so).  At first blush, it also doesn’t 
seem particularly original, echoing, for example, Matthew Arnold’s fetishization of culture.  For James 
though, we can say that process, rather than product is key.  He doesn’t claim that Harvard, for example, 
teaches the good: only that it teaches students how to identify the good.  This distinction is key.  As is the 
fact that for James, an understanding of the good, arises not from purity, but from plurality.  In the 
university as James conceives it, students are exposed to different types of excellence, different forms of 
human achievement.  They engage these objects “humanistically,” which means putting them in context, 
understanding how and why they came to be.  Such thought is humanistic because for James, how and 
why always implicate human desire, human ideals.  This recognition results in a general broadening of 
sensibly.  “All our arts and sciences and institutions,” he writes, 
are but so many quests for perfection on the part of men; and when we see how diverse 
the types of excellence may be, how various the tests… we gain a richer sense of what 
the terms "better" and "worse" may signify in general.  Our critical sensibilities grow 
both more acute and less fanatical.  We sympathize with men's mistakes even in the act of 
penetrating them; we feel the pathos of lost causes and misguided epochs even while we 
applaud what overcame them (MS 133). 
In Talks, James spoke of education as providing students with “more copious associative systems.”  Here 
we see the same idea presented in literary form.  The college bred subject, as described here, sees (and 
feels) the big picture.2  She becomes more sympathetic, capable of recognizing the good in all its various 
guises.  This new perspective entails deep personal change.  And for James, such change results from 
exposure to (and entanglement with) alien desire as encapsulated in diverse forms of human excellence.  
Of course, this sort of education is affective as much as conceptual.  This is the reality that he tries to 
capture with his quip that a college education “helps you know a good man when you see him.” 
 
2 Referencing chapter four, we can say that this process involves an “expansion of the Me.” 
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*** 
 Earlier, I said that I wish to use James’s educational thought as a catalyst.  Given our current 
political situation, “Social Value” feels particularly catalytic.  Perhaps my reading is skewed, but near the 
midpoint of this text, William James—typically upbeat, an American optimist—actually seems to be 
angry.  “Democracy is on trial,” he writes, “and no one knows how it will stand the ordeal” (MS 134).  
Undoubtedly referring to America’s newfound imperialistic impulse (against which he fervently agitated), 
he laments that “the picture-papers of the European continent are already drawing Uncle Sam with the 
hog instead of the eagle for his heraldic emblem” (MS 134).  It is against this backdrop that James frames 
the mission of liberal education.  He recognizes that “critical sense… is hardly a banner to carry in 
processions,” but sees such sense as integral to the survival of democracy (MS 135).  He compares the 
role of teachers, and the educated class in general, to the pilot of a ship.  Though reactionary habits and 
vulgar self-interest are powerful forces, like wind and waves, they are inconsistent, often contradictory.  
The pilot’s hand upon the tiller, though a much smaller force, is steady.  This grants it great power.  “The 
ceaseless whisper of the more permanent ideals,” he writes, “the steady tug of truth and justice, give them 
but time, must warp the world in their direction” (MS 135).  
I’d like to suggest that in his reference to a “ceaseless whisper” James locates both the goal and 
method of liberal education.  College educators are not partisans, he would say, but philosophers, defined 
first and foremost by generosity of spirit.  Though attentive engagement with the widest possible array of 
goods, we provide a model, an example, of what the world could be.  Though the immediate results of 
such practice are small, James is certain that they accrue over time.  The key, he suggests, is to maintain a 
steady course.  Liberal educators can’t get carried away by “currents of self-interest, and gales of passion” 
(MS 135).  We can’t let the din of the present (and our desire to change that present) distract us from 
larger truths, bigger pictures, more permanent ideals.  This is something that I believe every writing 
teacher, fed up with fake news and filter bubbles, would do well to keep in mind.   
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5.3   COMPOSITION AS LIBERAL EDUCATION 
 
 
 In the previous section I discussed some of William James’s thoughts regarding education.  
We’ve seen that education, for James, is the organization of habit, with the goal being to allow the 
individual to better respond to his or her environment.  College education is distinguished by its scope.  
Here, students learn more productive modes of evaluating experience writ large.  The changes sought by 
such a program have deep moral implications.  They also serve practical ends.  As we’ve seen, for James, 
the mode of thought cultivated in the university is intimately tied to democratic politics.  At the most 
basic level, we can’t have one without the other. 
 I believe that James’s educational thought, when read in light of his larger body of work, provides 
a blueprint for what we should be doing in the writing classroom, circa 2017.  Because he was a 
psychologist and philosopher, though, and not a writing teacher, we must be the ones who build a 
Jamesian writing pedagogy.  What form might such a pedagogy take?  Frank Pajares, in a recent summary 
of James’s educational thought, provides a hint.  He agrees that James would reject what we today call 
“the banking model” of education.  Instead of merely transmitting information, the goal of a Jamesian 
pedagogy is “to help students learn how to evaluate the information available to them” (55).  In the 
writing classroom, I’d suggest, this translates to a focus on the student and the student’s interpretive 
systems.  Not a focus on text or tools.  Right away, such a statement might seem counterintuitive.  
Writing is a tool.  Hence, writing instruction must focus on tools, right?  Not necessarily.  Thinking with 
James, I envision a more humane mode of writing instruction.  It would recognize that changes in writing 
ability are, at heart, changes in people.  While outside of mainstream comp thought at the moment, such 
an approach has links to both existing composition pedagogies and broader traditions within higher 
education.3  In fact, as I envisioned it, a Jamesian writing pedagogy connects to ideas that have animated 
the modern American university since its founding.4  I speak here of the tradition of the liberal arts. 
A useful history of the liberal arts can be found in Louis Menand’s The Marketplace of Ideas: 
Reform and Resistance in the American University.  Surprisingly, Menand claims that what we know as 
the liberal arts education isn’t some holdover from the deep past.  Instead, it’s a twentieth-century 
invention, corresponding with the rise of the research university (1880 to 1920).  The research university 
is defined by specialization; it’s basically a machine for sorting researchers by discipline and students by 
3 In chapter one, we saw that Scott and Welch have recently lamented composition’s “textual fixation.”  Robert 
Yagelski, drawing on Donald Murray and the dawn of the process era, has made similar claims. 
4 Considering that William James was an influential figure at the nation’s top university during the development of 
the modern university system, this is not surprising. 
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major.  The idea of “liberal education” emerged to counter complaints that such a system encouraged 
over-specialization and a focus on esoterica.5  Of course, at different times and sites, what constitutes 
such an education has varied.  As we’ve seen, for James, a liberal education involves exposure to 
plurality, to differing conceptions of excellence, which in turn promotes intellectual and ethical growth.  
According to the classification scheme Menand presents, such a view corresponds with the “distribution 
system” of general education.  This mode of structuring curriculum holds that liberal education is not 
reducible to any specific body of knowledge or product (familiarity with the Iliad and Wordsworth, for 
example).  Instead, “liberal learning is the sea in which the various departmentalized fields of study, from 
physics to poetry, all swim.  It’s a background mentality… a kind of intellectual DNA” (24).  
Transmission of this mentality or disposition, over and above any specific skill set or body of knowledge, 
is the primary goal of the college experience.  Of course, the exact attributes associated with a “liberally 
educated disposition” change from time to time.  The key, from this perspective, is that however loosely 
defined, there is some shared way of being among educated people, this way of being can be transmitted 
(or more specifically, reproduced), and that doing so can have positive social impact.6  As we’ve seen, 
James would agree with each of these claims.   
 I mention the tight bond between William James and certain notions of liberal education to 
suggest where a composition pedagogy informed by James might take us.  A Jamesian writing pedagogy 
is not going to be about the transfer of a body of knowledge (regarding the nature of the written discourse, 
for example), and it’s not going to be about the mastery of discrete skills (performance of textual 
conventions, say).  Instead, it’s going to be more holistic, more generalist, more eclectic.  Its subject is the 
student and the student’s experience understood in the broadest sense possible.  A Jamesian writing 
pedagogy uses writing as a means to explore and enrich this experience, with the goal being to create the 
kind of people we want to see more of in the world: more generous, thoughtful, creative people.  Of 
course, as we work towards personal transformation, we impart knowledge about discourse, spur the 
mastery of textual conventions.  James would hold though that these aspects of our work, while 
important, are secondary.  Or perhaps more accurately, in light of the holistic nature of his educational 
thought, he would hold that this “practical” aspect of writing instruction can’t be separated from the 
transformative aspect.  Changes in writing ability are, after all, changes in people. 
5 So the idea of a broad-based, liberal education developed as a means to fight fragmentation.  This makes it a 
natural ally in the struggle against the hegemony of the fragments.  
6 The existence of a shared disposition doesn’t mean one disposition.  For James, context is king, remember.  That 
means that whether a certain thought or action corresponds with a “liberal disposition” can only be determined with 
reference to a specific time and place.  Despite this indefiniteness, James would argue that the concept is “real” (in a 
pragmatic sense) because it is of consequence.  For example, it can give us a felt sense of a shared mission, an ideal 
by which to evaluate specific ideas or actions. 
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*** 
 Though, as noted, the idea of writing instruction as a holistic, transformative venture isn’t exactly 
the norm these days, it’s not totally alien either.  A Jamesian vision of composition, we can say, isn’t 
about destroying our field in order to rebuild it anew; instead it’s about evolution.  The compatibility of 
my proposal with some of composition’s core values can be illustrated with reference to 2011’s 
Framework for Success in Postsecondary Writing.  Drafted by a panel of writing teachers and drawing on 
the latest research in writing and writing pedagogy, this document is a joint publication of the field’s three 
top administrative bodies: The Council of Writing Program Administrators, The National Council of 
Teachers of English, and the National Writing Project.  It’s goal is to define what it means for a student to 
be “college ready.”  Integrally, it does so not with reference to typical academic standards, but through a 
discussion of “habits of mind”—intellectual and behavioral tendencies.  According to the Framework, to 
succeed in higher education, students must display curiosity, openness to experience, creativity and 
cognitive flexibility, among other habits.  Rather than being extraneous, it argues that these personal traits 
are essential to both good writing and general academic success.  It also holds that such habits can be 
cultivated in the writing classroom.  Kristine Johnson, in an analysis of this document and the motivations 
behind it, writes that through a focus on habits of mind, “the Framework reframes a widespread narrative 
about written products and quantified achievements with an alternative narrative about writers and their 
development” (518).  It “asks writing teachers to address the person behind writing products and 
processes,” to consider “who writers should become and why they should become that way” (527).   
Right away, the connection between the Framework and my own project is apparent.  As with 
James, here we have education understood not as the transfer of information or mastery of skills, but as 
the cultivation of behavioral tendencies.  We also see a focus on development, transformation even.  In 
other words, underlying the Framework is the idea that via experiences in the writing classroom, students 
can be changed and that these changes—though not necessarily predictable or even identifiable except in 
vague terms—can be of impact far beyond the page.  A Jamesian vision of writing instruction is based 
upon the same principles.  Within this scheme, it’s not that either we teach writing or engage in a more 
holistic process of development.  Instead, as the Framework shows, we can and must do both.  James is 
particularly relevant at the moment, I’d argue, because he provides guidance as to how we can satisfy this 
dual charge.  He shows us how to think in ways which refuse to separate mind from body, writing from 
writer, word from world.  In doing so, a Jamesian approach, we can say, both draws from, and works to 
advance, ideas very near to composition’s heart.   
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5.4   FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL & ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 So a Jamesian writing class is developmental in nature, focusing on the whole person as a 
opposed to disciplinary knowledge or discrete skills.  Such a move aligns composition with the tradition 
of liberal arts education.  To James, as we’ve seen, this tradition means the development of a more 
nuanced system of evaluation, the ability “to know a good person when you see them.”  Similar 
sentiments run throughout defenses of liberal education.  Historian William Cronon, for example, writes 
that the liberally educated person should be capable of “reading” the world—as in appreciating, if not 
understanding—myriad aspects of experience, from A Room With a View to the National Enquirer to 
extraordinary athletic achievement.  “More than anything else,” he writes, to be liberally educated entails 
“being able to see connections that allow one to make sense of the world and act within it in creative 
ways” (5).  To see connections and mobilize them—this aptly describes the sort of enhanced meaning-
making ability necessary to disrupt the hegemony of the fragments.  And as is apparent, it demands 
practice in both reading and writing.   
So if we take Cronon’s description to be a suitable goal for composition pedagogy, what next?  
How can we get a better grasp on what a Jamesian-inspired, composition-as-liberal-arts class might look 
like?  One way is to examine educational environments and educational theories influenced by William 
James.  William Perry’s Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years: a Scheme is 
one such work.   
Originally published in 1970, and drawing on interviews of Harvard undergraduates from the 
1950s and 1960s, Perry’s Forms seeks to chart the cognitive changes spurred by a college education.  The 
book has proven widely influential.  To my knowledge, though, no one has explored the connection 
between William James and Forms.  This is odd, because James is everywhere in the text.  Only two 
generations removed from James’s lifetime, the Harvard of Forms is still very much a Jamesian place.  
Perry quotes James; students mention reading James; and interviews are conducted in the shadow of 
William James Hall (home of the psychology and sociology departments).  By paying close attention to 
the environment described and the changes it spurs, we can get a better picture of what exactly a Jamesian 
education entails. 
Perry himself acknowledges his pragmatist legacy, writing that his study “shares the assumptions 
of modern contextualistic pragmatism” (226).  This view holds that humans are purposeful actors, seeking 
to think in ways which help them survive and thrive.  “The students' ultimate purpose,” Perry writes, is 
“to find those forms through which they may best understand and confront with integrity the nature of the 
human condition” (226).  The goal of education, in turn, is to help students develop more productive 
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forms of thought, modes of thinking (and thus acting) best suited to the context in which they dwell.  So 
right away we see in Perry, as with James, a focus on adaptation, on learning to think in ways which serve 
productive ends.  Such a valuation is always context determinate, of course.  Hence Perry’s claim that he 
adheres to the “contextualistic” paradigm. 
The idea of forms, or structures of thought, is essential to Perry’s project.  Forms, he writes, are 
“the structures which the students explicitly or implicitly impute to the world” (1).  In simple terms, we 
can say that forms are baseline assumptions—they tell a thinker how the world is, thus providing 
guidance for thought and action.  Perry is particularly interested in the ways in which students understand 
knowledge, value and responsibility.  What is the origin and nature of knowledge?  How do items or ideas 
acquire value?  When and why might one be responsible to another?  Perry’s primary claim is that 
through the four years of a liberal arts education, how students answer such questions passes through an 
identifiable series of changes.  Forms is based on the premise that via student interviews Perry and his 
team can suss out and taxonomize these changes.  
Perry’s taxonomy contains nine potential positions, or stages, with each successive stage capable 
of perceiving and coming to terms with a greater level of complexity.  The stages are grouped as the 
dualist, multiplistic and relativistic positions.  In the early stages (dualism) the student perceives the world 
in unqualified, absolute terms: an idea is either right or wrong, an action is either good or bad.   In the 
middle stages (multiplicity) her world is fragmented: she believes there’s no right or true answers, only 
different, equally valid interpretations.  In the final stage (relativism), the student realizes that claims as to 
truth and value can indeed be judged, and that some claims are inevitably better than others based on 
context and coherence.  Finally, according to Perry, the most advanced sort of student reaches a place of 
“committed relativism.”  From such a position she is able to “affirm his own commitments in a world of 
contingent knowledge and relative values” (3).  In short, she’s able to believe wholeheartedly, while 
recognizing that she could (and others do) believe otherwise. 
Upon its publication, Perry’s scheme received a good deal of attention in the composition 
literature (see Berthoff, Burham, Hays).  Some, like Janice Hays, praised Perry’s idea of stages as a useful 
way to gauge students’ abilities and thus tailor instruction appropriately. Others, like Ann Berthoff 
criticized Perry, and developmental models in general, as too rigid and linear, and thus not respecting the 
complexity of the learning process.  In what is perhaps the field’s most widely read critique—“William 
Perry and Liberal Education,” from 1984—Patricia Bizzell takes a compromise position.  She warns 
against applying Perry’s scheme too rigidly, but ultimately finds his work useful.  Perry reminds us, she 
argues, that teaching is always a value-laden endeavor: we’re not just teaching students to think, but 
teaching them to think in certain ways.  By charting the modes of thought that the academy values, Perry 
provides “a sort of philosophical map of the changes liberal education seeks to induce” (160).   
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I generally agree with Bizzell.  As she suggests, taken in the abstract, Perry’s scheme provides a 
good overview of what intellectual and ethical growth—which, per chapter three, is composition’s 
ultimate imperative—might look like.  Integrally, though, Forms also provides particularly well-timed 
guidance as to how we can spur such growth.  The problem we face in the Trumpian age, remember, is a 
widespread inability to make productive use of difference.  This sort of sense-making is something at 
which the Harvard of William Perry, shaped by the thought of William James, excels.  At its core, liberal 
education in the James-Perry mode is about bringing young people into a controlled encounter with 
difference.  Through this process, students develop the habits of mind necessary to operate in a pluralistic 
universe (which for both Perry and James represents the very essence of the human condition).  I see this 
sort of program as highly relevant to our current social milieu.  As I have argued, constantly confronted 
with “more,” our thought has grown ossified; it has become more difficult to conceive “the other guys” as 
anything but other.  Perry shows us what it looks like to overcome such solipsism. 
By way of illustration, let’s look at a student interview.  Near the mid-point of Forms, Perry 
writes of a freshman who describes himself as coming from a “small town.  Midwest… where… 
everyone believed the same things.  Everyone’s a Methodist and everyone’s a Republican” (78).  In his 
dormitory at Harvard this student encountered, much to his amazement, “quite a variety” of people: 
“Catholic, Protestant,” even “a Chinese boy whose parents follow the teachings of Confucianism” (78).  
He speaks of late-night discussions about religion and politics, some of which he found “quite 
disturbing.”  Though this student can’t quite articulate it, he knows that the encounter with difference 
represented by these discussions did something, and that this something is related to “the academic 
situation,” to the “attitudes of the professors” and the texts he’s been assigned (78).  Not coincidentally, 
his answers to an accompanying survey reveal a sudden wavering in his belief in a single absolute truth.  
Given these data points, Perry sees a young person on the verge of a transition from position one 
(dualism) to position two (multiplicity).  Put another way, here is an individual emerging from a 
fragment.  As of yet, he can’t make sense of the change.  Likewise, he’s not quite willing to accept the 
reality of utter difference (there may be students in his dorm who say they’re atheists, but they’re really 
not).  Still though, here’s a student clearly on his way to more flexible, open, creative modes of thought.  
So how do the liberal arts promote this sort of development? 
 The first thing we learn from examining the Harvard of Forms is the importance of exposure to 
difference.  Whether in the courses they take or the makeup of their dormitories, students are physically 
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confronted with the reality of different ways of thinking and being.7  As Perry puts it, for these students, 
“pluralism forcefully demands legitimacy” (79).  And it is the granting of legitimacy to that which is 
other—a process compelled by both authority and practical reality—that first allows the parochial nature 
of one’s own views to come into consciousness.  The students see that there are indeed other ways of 
thinking and doing.  To account for this fact, their interpretive systems must change. 
 Of course, simple exposure to difference—what we could call pure practice—doesn’t act alone.  
Instead, exposure only works to bring the student’s set of baseline assumptions into the foreground 
“where transformations in its structure may occur” (79).  So how does transformation actually occur, 
then?  It seems to me that in the Perry model thought structures are transformed when students are moved 
to actively account for the disparate elements in their environment.  Perry makes this clear when he writes 
of the pedagogical implications of his study.  If development is seen as the goal, he argues, “the good 
teacher becomes one who supports in his students a more sustained groping, exploration, and synthesis” 
(237).  The term synthesis is key here.  The student must learn to account for, to make sense of—to 
synthesize—that which was previously unaccountable (or simple ignored).  For example, the student in 
the above interview must develop a set of baseline assumptions which allow for the existence of atheists 
at Harvard.  Simply put, in his new reality, this is a fact of which he must account.  A liberal arts 
pedagogy provides him the opportunity to do so. 
 The above analysis indicates that growth, as Perry sees it, requires engagement with the world.  It 
requires inquiry (“sustained groping”) and constant striving to make sense of what one finds.  As noted 
though, meta-cognition—the ability to think about one’s own thinking—is also integral to the 
developmental process.  In fact, for Perry, meta-cognition seems to underpin the whole affair.  The 
progression through the various developmental stages, he writes, “is from thinking to meta-thinking, from 
man as knower to man as critic of his own thought” (79).  Likewise, the end product—the liberally 
educated person—“be he a graduate of college or not, is one who has learned to think about even his own 
thoughts, to examine the way he orders his data… and to compare these with other thoughts that other 
men might have” (44).   
Perry seems to think that metacognition cannot be taught.  But this is not to say that it can’t be 
encouraged.  How?  Metacognition is a habit, a tendency towards behavior; it is thus encouraged by 
modeling, mimicry, and other indirect forms of instruction.  Time and time again Perry notes the 
importance of the student feeling he is part of a community of learners.  The student must be confirmed as 
a member of this community; he must consider himself a fellow meaning-making, part of a larger project.  
7 I recognize that for moderns, the idea of Harvard of the 1950s being “diverse” may seem a bit ridiculous.  We must 
remember though that the notion of diversity is relative.  As the interview with the above student shows, compared 
with many students’ home cultures, Harvard is decidedly polyglot. 
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This “enjoins upon educators a certain openness—a visibility in their own thinking, groping, doubts, and 
styles of Commitment,” Perry argues (239).  Displays of uncertainty—and reflection on the potential 
limits of one’s cognitive machinery—are essential to this sort of socialization.  Indeed, developmental 
change, Perry writes, often comes from seeing professors in the “act of puzzling” (99).  Here, once again, 
Perry echoes James.  For James, remember, learning is more than the accumulation of information: it’s a 
full-bodied process, affective, material and intellectual.  In recognizing the importance of being together 
and thinking together, Perry presents learning as a similarly holistic affair. 
 So professors and peers act as models for the student to draw upon in his efforts to make sense of 
the world.  Textual resources are also made available.  The student in the above transcript, for example, 
mentions reading Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and of course, William James.  Perry himself writes that 
college should “present to the students' attention in concentrated form all the questions that the 
sophomore in man has raised for himself through the ages” (37).  Indeed, engagement with complex, self-
reflective texts seems essential to the development traced in Forms.  Such texts present varied modes of 
excellence in human achievement, William James would say.  Integrally though, the excellent is not in the 
answers they provide.  Instead, it’s in the questions they raise, and the processes by which the authors go 
about resolving these questions.  So reading, we can say, once again, help situate students in a 
community.  This community, though, is larger than a single college or culture.  It’s a global community 
of writers and thinkers, of humans endeavoring to make sense of the world.  At the most basic level, 
liberal education is an effort to integrate young people into this community. 
*** 
 From dualism, to multiplicity, to relativism, to committed relativism: earlier I said that Perry’s 
developmental scheme is most useful when understood in the abstract.  Indeed, while still widely 
respected, some of Perry’s specific claims have been challenged.  For example, some now believe that 
students don’t so much “stage” as utilize different baseline assumptions in different contexts (see King).  
It also seems to me that in the digital age pure dualism is rare among college students.8  That said, there 
seems to be a commonsense element to Perry’s work.  He himself writes that the often traumatic 
discovery of diversity is part of “the folklore of adolescence” (3).  It’s certainly a part of my story.  
 In the late-1990s, someone taped the Modern Library’s list of the 100 best twentieth-century 
novels to the end of a bookshelf in the Augusta, Kansas public library.  At maybe eighteen, I came across 
this list and it was a revelation.  Here, finally, I thought, were the facts, the best novels, not some high 
school teacher’s mere preference.  I made it my mission to read all 100.  It seems ridiculous now, but I 
8 Interestingly, Perry predicts this, noting that the switch from dualism to multiplicity appears to be occurring 
“earlier and earlier in life” (4).  Another sign of the fragmented nature of our world, perhaps? 
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never thought of the Modern Library’s list as opinion, as something that could be contested.  Then I left 
Augusta and went off to the University of Kansas.  It didn’t happen overnight, of course, but at some 
point I started to realize that most people—even people who liked to read—hadn’t seen this list.  They 
had their own ideas about which novels were important, often based on completely different criteria.  This 
revelation, for lack of a better term, fucked me up.  It made me not want to talk about novels, or even read 
them, for quite a long time.  If there’s no set standard, I remember thinking, what’s the point in investing 
my time in a novel?  How can I be sure it’s any good? 
 I did eventually start reading fiction again.  I developed criteria by which to judge whether a book 
is of value and though I can’t force anyone to feel the same way, I do think I can make a pretty good case 
that say, Kim, is truly a great work of fiction. This change represents intellectual and ethical growth, Perry 
would say.  And I’m inclined to agree.  Through education in the broadest sense—though exposure and 
adaptation to the excess inherent in the world—my perception grew both broader and more acute.  
Though the details will differ, I suspect that many of my readers can trace a similar movement in their 
own lives.  Perry’s work captures this shared experience.  That’s why it remains relevant. 
 
 
 
 
5.5   THE HUMANIST HOPE 
 
 
The above argues that William Perry’s mid-century Harvard provides the beginnings of a 
blueprint for a Jamesian writing pedagogy.  Of course, caveats apply.  I recognize that the world I’ve been 
describing is now often understood as elitist, exclusive, dominated by a narrow (white, male) form of 
subjectivity.9  I suspect that this reading is accurate.  I also believe, though, that the underlying logic of 
the system is sound: something off which we can build.  And besides, in turning to the Jamesian tradition 
we’re looking for inspiration, remember, not instruction.  We should therefore feel free to take what we 
like from Perry, or James even, and discard the rest.  
So what might a writing course based on the principles of liberal education look like?  Well, as 
we’ve seen, it would emphasize the pluralistic nature of both perception and reality.  It makes this 
pluralism real by staging encounters with difference (in the form of the teacher, fellow students, alien 
9 A useful correlative to the masculine nature of Forms can be found in Mary Field Belenky, et. al’s Women Ways of 
Knowing.  Here, the authors, inspired by Perry’s work, interview hundreds of women of different ages and social 
positions regarding their understandings of self and mind.  
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texts, alien objects), but also encourages reflection on differences already present in the student’s 
environment (those dorm room conversations, for example).  In all cases, such a course moves students to 
engage that which they previously overlooked, the excess they had “flattened” in order to maintain 
cognitive equilibrium.  Students attempt to account for this excess.  
The course I propose involves both reading and writing.  Reading must be conceived broadly.  It 
includes, in essence, all acts of perception.  How is writing conceived?  I will discuss student writing in 
detail below, but for now we can say that in a Jamesian composition course, writing is conceived, first 
and foremost, as a medium of development.  The textual world, in this view, is a space in which to enact 
more expansive, more creative modes of thought.  Student learn to think on the page.  And they learn to 
think in certain ways.  The idea is that by becoming accustom to more expansive, creative acts of meaning 
making, they develop habits of mind, tendencies to behavior, that carry over to other situations.  “All of 
our life, so far as it has definite form,” James writes, “is but a mass of habits” (TT 64).  The point of a 
Jamesian writing course is to expose students to liberally educated habits.  For a variety of reasons (the 
nudge of authority, the fact that these habits are fundamentally useful), they will slowly work to reshape 
the entire mass.  This sort of change—change in habit and therefore in people—is what we seek.10  
The moral thrust of the pedagogy I propose should be apparent.  This makes sense, because as 
previously discussed, William James is quite the moralist.  It must be noted, though, how divergent such a 
view is from current mainstream conceptions of writing instruction.  Rather than a medium of 
development, writing, in rhetoric and composition, we can say, is most often conceived as a medium of 
communication, or at best, a medium of creation.  Note the difference.  In the first conception, the 
individual student—and her intellectual and ethical growth—is the center of pedagogical interest; in the 
last two, texts and tools are the focus.  As argued in chapter one (and again in chapter four), I believe that 
this focus on text and tools at the expense of “bodily impacts” is a problem.  To highlight why, and to 
illustrate the difference between a Jamesian writing pedagogy and popular modes of writing instruction, 
I’d like again to turn to Byron Hawk’s award-winning A Counterhistory of Composition.  In particular, 
I’d like to examine the sections in which he addresses Paul Kameen’s (also award-winning) 
Writing/Teaching: Essays Towards a Rhetoric of Pedagogy. 
Hawk’s ideas about writing instruction are best understood through the lens of “postpedagogy.”  
Closely related to composition’s “postprocess” moment (discussed in chapter one), postpedagogy is based 
on the premise that teaching is inevitably open-ended; outcomes can’t be predicted or controlled in any 
meaningful sense.  One upshot of such a view is that writing teachers should stop trying to promote 
10 Of course, the alterations will be small, maybe even invisible to the naked eye.  By encouraging students to write 
in certain ways, though, we tilt the world ever so slightly towards certain ideals. 
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certain (critical/anti-hegemonic) types of student subjectivity.  A postpedagogy, Thomas Rickert writes, 
doesn’t ask students to “join the Cause” (2007, 175).  Instead of trying to move students to realize the 
contradictions inherent in capitalism, for example, a post-pedagogy would attempt to promote new, 
creative ways of thinking and writing about capitalism.  Of course, there’s risk in such an approach.  The 
“basic postpedogogical move,” Paul Lynch writes, is the “co-op(t) method,” in which teachers present 
students with a certain environment and a certain set of resources, and ask them to “co-opt our designs for 
their own occasions” (2013, 54).  The goal is to allow space for surprise, for constellations of thought and 
story “whose connections we did not and could not anticipate” (2013, 55).  Being by nature unpredictable, 
though, such constellations may take any form (even those opposed to the teacher’s values). 
In A Counterhistory, Hawk assumes a typical postpedogogical stance, positioning himself against 
the critical pedagogy of James Berlin.  As discussed in chapter two, Berlin is aggressively political; 
working in a postmodern mode, he seeks to move students to “resist hegemonic discourses” (and adopt 
left-wing political views).  To get students to join the cause he has them use certain preset invention 
heuristics, typically involving the identification and deconstruction of binaries.  Hawk argues that such a 
method doesn’t promote either good writing or liberation.  In a writing class, the application of a preset 
strategy “inevitably becomes law” (208).  And you can’t undo law via law.   
As an alternative to preset heuristics, Hawk promotes “linking.”  Instead of trying to get students 
to “save the world,” he argues, quoting Lawrence Grossberg, we should get them to “invent and link… 
make connections and map articulations” (216).  This requires attention to the specific ecologies in which 
learning takes place.  Writing teachers, Hawk writes, should view classrooms as “ambient interfaces,” 
constellations of bodies, things and texts, which “produce the conditions of possibility for emergence, for 
invention” (249).  It is from the combination of these factors, he believes, rather than any preset plan or 
critical strategy, that the fruits of writing instruction will arise.  He presents Kameen, and the pedagogy on 
display in Writing/Teaching, as an exemplar of an appropriately attuned method. 
It should be apparent that I am sympathetic to postpedogogical practice.  I agree with Hawk (and 
Rickert) that quasi-Marxist critical pedagogies like Berlin’s are too structuralist; they attempt to impose 
alien forms on lived experience and will inevitably be resisted and repelled.  The pedagogy I propose, as 
we’ve seen, emphasizes meaning-making, which is always a situated, embodied practice, drawing on the 
resources available at a specific place and time.  It too promotes “linking over law,” and recognizes that 
the meanings made (in student writing, for example) can be never be predicted or controlled.  So, in short, 
we can say that Hawk’s interests and my own are closely aligned.  My complaint is that in the service of 
challenging Berlin’s overly deterministic stance, Hawk goes too far in the opposite direction.  Writing 
instruction should not seek to clone little socialists.  Yes.  Hawk goes beyond this claim though, arguing 
that the field should abandon the “humanistic hope” that writing instruction can spark any sort of 
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articulable change in our students (255).  He writes, for example, that a commitment to a contextually 
aware, complex vitalist paradigm means that we must surrender any “pre-set desire for student 
subjectivity” (255).  Is this correct?  Context is key, of course, and the future is never certain.  It seems to 
me, though, that writing teachers need some conception of the ways of being we are trying to promote.   
This sort of ideal, while never actually realized, helps guide our practice.  Besides, that ideal is always 
there, always influencing our behavior (even if, as in Hawk’s case, it’s not acknowledged).   
While Hawk’s analysis is more sophisticated than most, his move to deny writing instruction any 
articulable telos reflects the dominant trend in materially inflected composition studies.  Not surprisingly, 
given his erasure of individuated bodies, here we see writing understood as a medium of communication 
and creation, rather than (human) development.  Though he denies an undue interest in product, Hawk’s 
main concern seems to be in allowing for the production of creative, inventive texts.  To further this end, 
he discredits top-down, decontextualized pedagogies like that of Berlin.  Fine.  My concern is that in 
focusing on the importance of the now, of the lived moment (from which inventive texts arise) Hawk 
elides engagement with the actually consequences of writing instruction.  This is not a progressive move.  
Though the framing is different, such positioning is no different, in the main, from reductionist 
conceptions of writing as a simple “skill.”  In both cases, we see a failure to fully consider what writing 
instruction actually does.  In both cases, we see student writing theorized as a medium of communication 
and creation, but not a material force, capable of bodily impacts. 
Can writing instruction change how people think and act?  If so, can these changed be identified 
(in the abstract, at least) and made visible for debate?  William James and the tradition of liberal 
education would say yes.  Hawk seems ambivalent.  At points he seems to dismiss the possibility of even 
semi-predictable behavioral change.  He qualifies this claim, though.  “The subject,” in the world of 
complex vitalist pedagogy, “becomes a side effect of the pedagogical-machine that cannot be completely 
determined” (255).  But at the same time, a properly structured “pedagogical-machine” can help students 
“build a new well of knowledge…that will inevitably change the way they see the world” (228).  So 
changes in perception, in individuated being, can occur and are implicitly desirable, but they can’t be 
definitively charted, and must always come from the “outside in”—as side effects of immersion in certain 
environment.  OK.  But what might such changes look like in lived reality?  And how and why should I 
seek them?  Because he is primarily interested in rhetorical production—in “invention,” as in the creation 
of new, unexpected textual objects—Hawk is unable to answer such questions.  Writing theorized only as 
a medium of communication and creation, in other words, proves insufficient. 
Hawk’s use of Kameen to promote his posthuman, anti-teleological vision of writing instruction 
is somewhat ironic. Not that his description of Kameen’s classroom is off the mark.  He writes that 
Kameen “invites academics to see classroom ecologies as open spaces that produce knowledge” (225).  
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This is correct.  In Writing/Teaching Kameen shows how he and his students engage in a communal 
process of meaning making.  Kameen shows himself grasping, puzzling, and in general, demonstrating 
the process of “linking and building a constellation” out of the various resources available in a particular 
time and place (231).  This is, as Hawk suggests, a remarkably situated pedagogy.  It seems to me, 
though, that Hawk fails to consider the larger purpose of the activities depicted.  “Kameen’s book is 
genuinely hopeful,” Hawk writes, “not necessarily about what teachers can help students do or even 
become… but about that moment of emergence in the classroom” (225).  Emergence, yes, but so what?  
What’s the actual material impact of this activity?  Hawk, unwilling to think in terms of individuals, and 
individual development (what students can become), is unable to theorize what some call “transfer.”  He’s 
unable to explain how what happens in the classroom—the frission of bodies and ideas and objects which 
leads to new ideas—resonates beyond that space.  
I say Hawk’s use of Kameen is ironic because Kameen has a rather clear conception of how 
reading and writing relate to lived experience.  Moreover, I’d argue that Kameen values classroom 
invention precisely because of these extra-curricular effects.  In a discussion of Plato’s Protagoras 
contained within Writing/Teaching, for example, Kameen notes that while “to be good is impossible… to 
become good is not only possible but what we are here for” (127).  We become good, he writes, “by the 
good we do,” as an result of certain types of behavior, certain practices (127).  Classroom activities 
promote these practices and thus promote the good.  The “value of teaching and learning in this view,” he 
writes, “is measured in terms of what changes and how much, not in terms of knowledge-as-commodity” 
(127).  What changes, of course, are individual teachers and students.  Through shared engagement with 
poetry, for example, the frames by which we make sense of the world shift.  Our thinking becomes a little 
more flexible, a little more fluid.  Kameen himself notes such changes within himself.  As a teenager, he 
writes, he spent much time thinking about the value of poetry.  Why read it?  “The answer I came up 
with,” he writes, “was a simple one: It increased my capacity to experience” (99).  In this single line, I’d 
argue, we find perhaps the ultimate justification for liberal education.  We also find the antidote to the 
hegemony of the fragments.  While mindful of Hawk’s warning about preset formulations, a Jamesian 
writing pedagogy recognizes that such growth—in experience, in being—is possible (if not predictable), 
and makes its achievement the telos of writing instruction. 
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5.6   WILLIAM JAMES IN FYC 
 
 
 A Counterhistory of Composition is an important book: award-winning, written by a major figure 
in our field.  Nick Tingle’s Self-Development and College Writing is less well known.  It’s received few 
reviews, and to my knowledge, no awards.11  I think, though, that Self-Development is equally important.  
Here, Tingle argues that the first-year writing classroom should be reconceived as a “transitional space” 
in which students are brought into a new relationship with writing, and via writing, the university and the 
world.   His approach is unique among recent comp scholarship in that it is informed by psychology 
rather than rhetoric or French critical theory.  The result is a laudable focus on individual students and 
their holistic development.  All told, Tingle offers a refreshing counterpoint to postpedogogical claims 
that writing instruction is of no (identifiable) consequence.  
 Like Perry, Tingle believes that sense-making practices evolve in identifiable patterns, with late 
adolescence—and thus the first-year writing class—being a key point in the developmental process.  He 
frames the changes which may (or may not) occur at this point in terms of “self-authoring.”  The self-
authored individual, we can say, recognizes the social forces that impact her, but refuses to be defined by 
those forces.  She refuses to see her self as merely “a theatre in which things happen” (17).  In turn, she is 
able to conceive of discourse as a tool, as a human construction, and thus gain some measure of control 
over thought and language.   
 Now, though Tingle is certainly a materialist, a doctrinaire new materialist would likely accuse 
him of a regressive fixation on “the subject.”  In centering his analysis on the sense-making practices of 
individuated, embodied humans, he draws our attention away from ecologies, networks, fluxes, etc.  Yes.  
I think this is a valuable move, though.  In focusing on writing’s relationship to human development he 
helps us better understand what we’re doing in the classroom and why.  Interestingly, he sees the 
movement towards self-authorship as both closely connected to academic writing and utterly holistic.  
When we ask a student to write a critical essay, he argues, we ask them to detach word from world in a 
manner at odds with (conventional) common sense.  We ask them to perform self-authorship.  To do so 
with authority, Tingle believes, students must ultimately come to change their “beliefs, ideas, ethical 
principles, thoughts, notions, and basic affective attitudes towards reality” (7).  Writing is thus intimately 
linked to broader developmental change.  As he sees it, the main goal of the freshman writing class should 
be to support students as they transition to self-authorship. 
11 Tingle himself, unlike Hawk, is not a tenured professor; he is a lecturer, teaching, by his own account, seven or 
eight writing classes each year for the past twenty-five. 
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 If Tingle is right, writing well in an academic mode requires seeing, feeling and thinking in new 
ways.  It requires taking on an entirely new mode of being.  Can we “teach” new modes of being?  This is 
an open question.  Such changes certainly occur though.  Indeed, every day, in every community, people 
enter into new relationships with thought and language, come to know and care for things previously 
ignored.  Much of this sort of learning (if we can call it that) is, of course, tacit.  It occurs through a 
process akin to osmosis, as a result of being immersed in environments in which bodies do certain things 
in certain ways.  William Perry, we can recall, writes that to spur development, students must feel that 
they are part of a community.  From a Jamesian perspective, this is understandable.  Education, for James, 
remember, is the shaping of tendencies to behavior, the cultivation of habit.  It’s undisputed that we 
acquire habits from those around us.  This includes both bad habits, like cigarettes or cursing, and more 
productive ones, like coming to know and care for a wider array of experience. 
 Tingle argues that to position the writing classroom as a transitional space, teachers must both 
demonstrate the value of a more expansive mode of being and support students as they struggle to make 
such a move.  If we value tacit learning, we see that much of this demonstration and support must come in 
the form of doing and thus of modeling.  Byron Hawk provides a model in the form of Paul Kameen.  
Integrally though, Hawk doesn’t ask us to recreate Kameen’s classroom (that’s impossible, as each 
teacher will inevitably face a different set of contextual resources).  Instead, he draws our attention to 
Kameen’s method.  William James also displays a singular method.  How might a Jamesian method of 
engaging the world inform our pedagogical practice?  
 More than anything else, a Jamesian method, I’d say, is marked by generosity.  When others 
describe William James, either as a man, or as a writer and thinker, a term often used is “resonate.”  
James is notable for the way in which he resonates to the world.  This term is used, I believe, because it 
captures the intense, full-bodied nature of his engagement with objects, others and ideas.  James’s desire 
to really know is cognitive, of course, but also deeply affective, and (some suggest) pseudo-sexual.  “So 
great was James's appreciation of philosophical ideas,” Richard Gale writes, “that it bordered on 
philosophical satyrism.  It seemed that he never met a philosophy to whose charms he did not succumb” 
(20).  Fascinatingly, James seems equally capable of resonating to conflicting, even oppositional, 
positions.  Gale notes, for example, that James often treats his opponents’ ideas more generously—and 
makes them seem more appealing—than their own defenders.  This striking ability to feel multiple sides, 
to be truly interested in diversity of experience, defines the Jamesian method. 
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What does resonance look like in the classroom?  Fortunately, Bird Baldwin, one of his former 
students, provides a first-hand account.  Baldwin writes: 
James's lectures and recitations were usually informal and of a conversational nature; he 
would walk into the room, take his seat, begin talking about the subject and soon all 
members of the class were eagerly taking part…. His strongest points as a teacher were 
that he made his students think because he was thinking, and that he treated each topic 
with such richness, vividness and intensity that it became the most important and 
interesting topic of the year (372). 
In this early version of a teaching evaluation, we see one of Byron Hawk’s “pedagogical machines” at 
work.  When Bird Baldwin and his classmates converse with William James, information is transferred, 
of course.  That is only a small fraction of what occurs, though.  Through his own resonance James sparks 
a similar state of interest and engagement in those present.  James, as Sarin Marchetti notes, “always aims 
at making us do something” (26).  He is, in essence, a catalyst.  In the classroom, he makes his students 
think by engaging in thought.  He makes them interested by being interested.  This requires a sustained, 
yet casual intimacy with both his collaborators and the ideas at hand.  Like many Jamesian concepts, such 
intimacy sets the conditions for its own possibility.   It both stems from and facilitates a collapse of 
boundaries: between teacher and student, individual and community, thinker and thought. 
 Baldwin writes that James, as a teacher, “thrilled the imagination… and led one into unexplored 
regions” (372).  In our fragmented world, the image of the teacher as a sort of expedition leader is 
particularly instructive.  I’ve previously argued that intellectual and ethical growth requires exposure to 
difference.  We grow when we encounter the alien, and must bend and flex to make room for it within our 
reality.  For an encounter to be transformative, though, we must be willing to engage the alien on terms 
we can’t fully control.  This sort of openness can be uncomfortable, frightening even.  In the figure of 
James as a confident, casual explorer of the excess, we see one way that teachers might be able to help 
students overcome fear of disruption.  
Placing the above insights beside William Perry and Nick Tingle, we can imagine the writing 
classroom as a space in which teachers and students, working together, confront and try to make sense of 
that which they don’t understand.  The teacher acts as a sort of tour guide or expedition leader.  She may 
not resonant like William James, but she can still perform active engagement.  She can make a show of 
being interested, of turning towards rather than away from the unknown and even the distasteful.  Via this 
lack of fear, she demonstrates the value of the developmental move she is inviting students to make.  
Through her example, students come to feel, on an intuitive level, that the excess—though it may appear 
as a danger—is actually an opportunity.  Like James, they begin to welcome disruption, because they 
realize that disruption is essential to more inclusive, more expansive, and more productive, modes of 
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understanding.  In short, they realize that it is in their own best interests to look beyond their fragment.  
The writing classroom thus becomes a truly transitional space.  
*** 
 I’m obviously not William James.  That said, I’ve had some success implementing the kind of 
pedagogy described above.  Advice?  Drawing on the work of Nick Tingle again, I’d suggest that one of 
the best ways to start coming terms with difference is to encourage students to recognize and analyze their 
affective states.  Tingle finds that students aren’t often aware of how singular, how subjective, their 
responses to a particular poem or essay or image might be.  I think there’s truth in this; in a fragmented 
age it’s easy to consign the other, the alien, to a dark corner, and to convince yourself that your own 
perspective is the norm.  A focus on the affective helps break this habit. 
  To make plurality real—and to allow the singular nature of perception to emerge as an object of 
inquiry—I like to do a simple exercise.  I present my class with a provocative stimulus and ask them to 
write about it.  “How does this make you feel?” I ask.  “What does it make you think about?”  The 
stimulus can be anything—Mary Ellen Mark’s famous photo of a young girl smoking a cigarette, for 
example.  After a few minutes of free-writing, I ask another question: “Why?  Why do you think you feel 
this way?”  We write for a few more minutes, then we share what we’ve written.  I say “we,” because I 
too am free-writing, I too am trying to understand.  This image of the teacher scratching in his notebook, 
puzzling, is essential to the whole process, I believe.  As is the idea that no one response or interpretation 
is more right or true than another.  The goal is simply to: 1) note what we think and feel; and 2) consider 
how this came to be. 
 The conversations this simple activity sparks are fascinating and often quite revealing.  They 
bring forth assumptions about morality, knowledge and perception which I find can’t be addressed 
without some concrete point of reference.  “That must be in the south,” one girl said of the Mary Ellen 
Mark photo.  A classmate from Alabama was shocked.  He thought that the photo was from Hollywood, 
of a young Drew Barrymore perhaps.   In this one exchange, we see a striking disparity in understanding: 
not just regarding the photo, but in assumptions about the world.  The process of communal introspection 
and inquiry makes these assumptions visible.  The next step—the one we engage with throughout the 
course—is what to make of such difference? 
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5.7   WRITING THE FRAGMENTS (IN THEORY) 
 
 
In the above section I outlined some ways in which William James might inform pedagogical 
practice.  Following the tradition of liberal education, I argued that the writing classroom be conceived as 
a space in which to model productive engagement with difference.  Of course, in composition studies, 
how we understand—and therefore teach—reading and writing is also important.  How does Jamesian 
thought inform these activities?  As we’ve seen, reading should be conceived broadly.   Students might 
“read” architecture, an apple, a Kinks song, or an internet meme, in addition to traditional academic texts.  
In each case, the goal is to discover something new.  We can do this by thinking about the object, the 
frames by which we give meaning to the object, and most importantly, how and why these frames may 
vary among individuals, between communities, or across time.  Such analysis involves attending to both 
cognitive and affective responses.  It involves putting an object in deep context, tracing its causes and 
consequences and the various meanings it can spawn.   
How is writing conceived in a Jamesian classroom?  Given the current state of composition 
theory, this is a complex question.12 As a starting point, I’ve argued that we should conceive student 
writing as a medium of development.  Rather than focusing on technical qualities or even rhetorical 
impact we should give pride of place to the behavioral tendencies displayed in a text.  Does a student 
recognize complexity and plurality?  Do they make an attempt to engage the excess rather than dismissing 
it in the name of clarity or rhetorical expediency?  In practice, writing of this sort often involves the 
interrogation of language.  How do certain ways of speaking relate to certain ways of seeing?  What 
interests and investments are at stake?  Such analysis is, of course, relentlessly self-reflective.  To 
recognize plurality is to recognize that your way of writing is just that—your way of writing.  Rather than 
being natural or given, writing, like thinking, is always an active construction, with both causes and 
consequences.  Strong student writers, from a Jamesian perspective, recognize this.  They take ownership 
of language and per this new-found authority, use writing as a tool to make sense of the world.   
As discussed in chapter one, the ultimate goal of a Jamesian writing pedagogy is to increase 
students’ meaning-making ability.  Meaning-making, as I understand it, is to see one thing as a sign for 
another.  One’s meaning-making ability grows when she is able to incorporate more of the miasma which 
12 I recognize that “writing” is a contested term, with many in our field arguing that students need to learn to 
compose in a variety of media: sound, image, assemblage, computer code (see Shipka, Selfe, Ceraso, Vee).  
Personally, I think that multi-modal composition pedagogies show great promise; I don’t mean to suggest that 
complex, self-aware meaning making can only occur via alphabetic text.  That said, the liberal arts tradition, as 
embodied by James and Perry, privileges text (perhaps due to the intimate connection between language and thought 
as discussed in chapter two).  As such, the following presumes a form of writing which is primarily textual. 
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surrounds every object and idea: when she is able to make room in her conceptual framework for that 
which was previously unacknowledged.  On the page, meaning often takes the form of connection 
between disparate bits of experience.13  As a simple example, consider my cat, Boots (currently asleep at 
my feet).  “Animal” is one potential meaning of the sensory stimulus she presents.  “Catches mice” is 
another.  Starting from this baseline understanding, a student creates a more expansive meaning when she 
is able to associate Boots, in addition to these two meanings, with “worshipped by ancient Egyptians” or 
“feared by my classmate, Becky.”  By being able to find a place for these additional connections—to 
recognize and incorporate a bit of the excess—a student’s thinking grows a little more complex and her 
world a little richer.  This sort of movement is ultimately what we should seek in student writing.  By 
encouraging more expansive, more generous acts of meaning-making on the page, the thinking goes, we 
encourage the same in the world at large.  
Of course, there’s no dogma when thinking with William James.  Therefore, the exact form 
student writing takes will inevitably vary based on teacher, student, and other contextual factors.  To me 
though, it seems that the excess most often reveals itself in the details.  As I teach it, therefore, a Jamesian 
writing pedagogy emphasizes the concrete, the use of exacting description and definition.  What exactly 
did you see?  What exactly did you feel?  What does that word or phrase really mean?  Similarly, based 
on the premise that discourse often hides more than it reveals, I encourage students to come down from 
the conceptual clouds, to use real-life examples, to think about the real-life consequences of words and 
ideas.  Content-wise, much of my students’ writing is admittedly “personal,” in that it takes lived 
experience as its subject matter.  Students also incorporate outside texts and ideas into their writing 
though, using them as provocations (Gerald Graff’s “they say” arguments) as well as lenses through 
which to filter their own experience (Bartholomae and Petrosky’s “ways of reading”).  
So a Jamesian writing pedagogy is eclectic.  As it must be.  I suspect, though, that certain forms 
of writing simply wouldn’t work with the goals I propose.  Any mode which fetishizes structure or 
technical correctness, for example.  To be able to make the most generous meanings possible, it seems to 
me, students need to use writing as a means of exploration.  The fetishization of form limits this ability.  
Essays in the traditional argumentative mode may do the same.  It’s not that one shouldn’t make forceful 
arguments (otherwise, James and I would be great hypocrites!).  The problem is that in doing so there’s 
too much of an incentive to ignore that which complicates your case, that which is confusing or doesn’t 
quite fit.  These elements are, of course, the excess; they are exactly what students must engage. 
 
13 This may occur through metaphor, the application of a frame or concept to an example, or by placing objects in 
context (tracing their causes and consequences).  As discussed in chapter two, abstraction—the identification and 
grouping of qualities—typically underlies the meaning-making process.   
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*** 
To demonstrate how the above ideas might shape pedagogy—and to better position myself within 
the field—it’s useful to turn to an example.  In chapter one, I noted that only two rhet-comp texts have 
dealt with William James in any substantial manner.  One of these texts is The Performance of Self in 
Student Writing, by Thomas Newkirk.  Here, Newkirk uses James to argue for the pragmatic value of 
personal writing.  Towards this end, he presents and comments upon a student essay originally found in 
David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky’s Facts, Artifacts and Counterfacts: Theory and Method for a 
Reading and Writing Course.  I’d like to present a reading of the same essay.   
To set the scene, I’ll note that the point of contention is commonplaces.  Bartholomae and 
Petrosky, in describing a basic writing course focused on introducing students to academic discourse, 
argue that a key component of such a course must be learning to “problematize” our standard narratives, 
our commonplaces.  Newkirk, drawing on James, argues that this sort of pedagogy doesn’t sufficiently 
respect the use value of the commonplace.  
The essay at issue arises from an assignment early in Bartholomae and Petrosky’s course.  It is 
offered as an example of the sort of problems basic writers face in the university.  The prompt is simple, 
asking students to describe a significant life experience and explain its significance.  In response, a certain 
student writes: 
When I went to South Catholic I became friends with my spanish teacher, his name was 
Brother Larwarance Dempsey. He was a great teacher and was also assistant Coach to the 
wrestling team. One day he invited me down to the weight-training room, he showed me 
a few of the machines and how to use them. Since he was just starting to lift weights I 
wanted to start to. That October he wanted me to go out for the wrestling team. I was 
scared to death a little puggy kid like me….  
The writer goes on to describe how “brother Larry” helped him get interested in lifting weights, resulting 
in a position on the varsity wrestling team.  A crisis occurs when brother Larry leaves the school, but the 
writer is able to overcome this setback.  In a one-sentence final paragraph, he explains the significance of 
the experience thusly: “If you work hard and follow the rules things will get better and better” (32). 
In these lines, Bartholomae and Petrosky see the failure of a writer to think and write in an 
academic mode.  The description of his experience, they argue, remains trapped within a premade “Boys 
Life narrative of struggle and success,” and the subsequent “reading” of that experience seems oddly 
detached from the description (33).  The authors believe that the problem lies in the writer’s failure “to 
see his relationship to a way of talking, a discourse” (33).  He’s unable to realize that the story he tells 
about his relationship with brother Larry is only a story, one interpretation among many possible 
interpretations; he takes the Boys Life narrative as “what is.”  Deprived of the “critical authority” that 
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comes from the recognition of his own interpretative power, he resorts to secondhand moralism to 
establish his right to speak, hence the aphoristic and decidedly non-academic nature of his analysis.  
 Newkirk takes issue with this interpretation.  He suggests that Bartholomae and Petrosky unfairly 
dismiss the student’s life experience.  The student is “testifying to beliefs that have meant something in 
[his life]” and that act in itself, Newkirk seems to believe, is worthy of praise (91).  Furthermore, the 
underlying mode of thought—by helping the student make the varsity team—has paid off.  Why should 
the student think differently?  If he can survive and thrive with borrowed thought and story, why should 
he seek more complex conceptualizations? 
 I respect Newkirk’s query, but in light of the preceding pages, my rejoinder is obvious: because 
material reality demands it.  Jamesian thought, remember, is rooted in the belief that the world is a place 
of multiplicity and change.  To not grow, attune, adapt, is to die.  Now, neither myself, nor James, nor 
Bartholomae and Petrosky, would deny that the student’s belief in the value of hard work has served him 
well in the past.  Bartholomae and Petrosky’s simple claim is that the mode of thought by which he 
arrived at that belief is not well-suited for success in the university.  My contribution, via James, is to 
show that the changes they (and I) seek are intimately related to who and what we are as embodied 
beings.  Of course, it might still be useful, at times, for a writer to conceptualize his world in simple, 
commonplace terms.  Liberal education, though, ensures that these terms are not his only option. 
 As the above indicates, I see Bartholomae and Petrosky as working in the tradition of liberal 
education as I’ve defined it.  When they speak of the ability to “see discourse as discourse” there are clear 
echoes of William Perry and the epistemological changes he seeks to induce, along with Nick Tingle and 
his interest in “self-authorship.”  Along with William James, all these thinkers ask that we learn to 
distance ourselves from our thought and language, to see reality as something other than story (and hence 
story as malleable).  In chapter two I drew attention to Bartholomae’s pragmatist bent.  Once again here, 
in his belief that language must be worked on and against, we see that influence on display. 
 Though I suspect Newkirk is a good teacher, we clearly read James differently.  Yes, in the “Will 
To Believe,” James does famously hold that faith in a fact can sometimes help create that fact. We must 
keep in mind, though, that in addition to being a generous thinker, James was also a remarkably rigorous 
one; the will to believe, he is very clear, may only be invoked in certain exceptional circumstances.  
Otherwise, as Bartholomae and Petrosky suggest, we must push against our thought and story, constantly 
on the lookout for the unexplained or incongruent.  “What mankind at large most lacks is criticism and 
caution,” James writes, “especially when the conception has instinctive liking at its back” (qtd. in Barzun 
240).  The project of liberal education, at its core, entails imparting a measure of the critical and cautious.  
On the whole, this entails challenging commonplaces, not embracing them. 
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 As is apparent, my project shares many of the same assumptions as that of Bartholomae and 
Petrosky.  I too see the primary goal of the writing class as the cultivation of meaning-making ability, and 
the text (or any object, I’d add) as an opportunity to make meaning.  To learn to write better, we agree, is 
to learn to make more expansive and richer meanings.  Likewise, our courses are structured in a similar 
manner; in both cases students study a single topic using “the basic methods of university inquiry” (30).  
From this position of first-hand knowledge, they begin to work outward and to abstract upward.   
So, how does my response to the brother Larry essay differ?  I’ve argued that we should view 
student writing as a medium of development.  Instead of fetishizing the text, we should seek to identify 
and work upon the behavioral tendencies displayed.  Here, the tendency is to force the fulsomeness of 
lived experience into a restrictive conceptual frame.  How can we encourage more generous thought?  
Among other moves, Bartholomae and Petrosky would have the brother Larry writer imagine his 
experience through different “interpretive frames” (34).  They would have him consider how Audre Lorde 
or Walker Percy might think and write about those events in the high school weight room.  Putting such a 
pedagogy in terms of my project, we can say that they believe that looking and writing via Lorde or Percy 
allows the student to glimpse some of the excess, some of the miasma which surrounds his experience.  
This can disrupt his original frame, thus allowing for new thought and story. 
In general, I support the above method.  I agree that the use of texts as “lens” can be productive.  
My Jamesian pedagogy moves beyond this, though, by suggesting that an equally productive way of 
disrupting the commonplace is to move the student to connect his experience of brother Larry to other 
disparate bits of experience.  This involves acknowledging other realities, thus creating a web of meaning 
(via the text) that is able to reconcile what seems irreconcilable.  Like Bartholomae and Petrosky, I would 
not tell the student that “if you work hard you will succeed” isn’t true.  Instead, I would move him to 
acknowledge that other, even contradictory claims are also true.  For example, I would draw his attention 
to police shootings, wherein young black men—some “hard working” and “rule-abiding,” no doubt—
were gunned down.  Or stories of the working poor.  Or times in which he himself worked hard only to 
fall short.14  Again, the point is not to “change his mind” about his previous claim; it is simply to bring 
him to the realization of multiplicity, of complexity, and to make him account for this fact.  The world is 
both X and Y, I ask, how can this be?  To answer this question, the student must draft a new, more 
complex meaning.  Overtime, this sort of additive thinking becomes habitual.  By being moved to wrestle 
with the very real fact of plurality, of irreconcilable difference, his meaning-making ability grows.  His 
relation to language and thought changes, and his world expands.  
14 I use “I” here merely for dramatic effect.  Per my pedagogy, the student would in fact discover these conflicting 
positions on his own, through research.  His teacher simply urges him to keep looking. 
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5.8   WRITING THE FRAGMENTS (IN PRACTICE) 
 
 
 It’s only fitting that a chapter on the teaching of writing should end with a discussion of student 
work.  In the preceding pages, I’ve argued, at least implicitly, that what I’ve termed a Jamesian writing 
pedagogy is capable of furthering abstract ethical and political ends (combating the hegemony of the 
fragments, thus safeguarding democracy, basically), along with satisfying writing instruction’s more 
practical remit (helping students become better writers).  In my discussion of Bartholomae and Petrosky’s 
brother Larry essay, I’ve shown how my ideas build upon that which has come before.  The writing of my 
own students can further illustrate how a Jamesian writing pedagogy might play out on the page. 
 I teach freshman writing at a large public university (the same university that the brother Larry 
writer once attended).  In the fall of 2017, I designed and taught a course based on Jamesian principles, 
the goal being to help students both improve their writing and better cope with our fragmented world.  
Towards this end, they engaged otherness both on and off the page.  In chapter three, I discussed an 
embodied activity in which my students were asked to “become an animal” and thus (hopefully) 
experience some of the excess which their standard modes of perception had been concealing.  Earlier in 
this chapter, I showed how we engage the excess as a group, in the classroom.  Now, we move to the 
second, and primary, part of what I previously described as a “double-barreled” course: essay writing.   
As noted in chapter three, in my class, each student writes a total of four essays.  All the essays 
are on a single topic of the student’s choosing.  My only requirement is that the topic involve an “ethical 
conflict,” described simply as a situation in which there’s no easy answer.  In the class under discussion, 
students wrote about cultural appropriation, whether to medicate hyperactive children, and if and when 
suicide might be justified.  Two things are worth noting about my essay requirements.  First, I think 
allowing students to pick their own object of inquiry is essential to my larger goals.  I want students 
writing and thinking at the very limits of their ability; this sort of engagement can only occur, it seems, if 
they’re genuinely interested in a topic.  Second, I think it’s equally important that students stick with the 
same topic throughout the course of the semester.  When a writer is writing from a shallow pool of 
knowledge, they are more likely to rely on easy commonplaces; it is only when they devote some time, 
attention and mental energy to a topic that nuanced, original thought becomes possible.  Or put 
differently, the more we look and listen, the more likely we are to notice the excess, the details that 
disrupt the story we usually tell.  Writing, speaking and thinking about the same topic for fifteen weeks 
facilitates this sort of movement. 
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As also noted in chapter three, my essay prompts are sequenced to gradually promote more 
complex forms of meaning making.  They move from personal reflection, to the application of course 
readings, to the application of outside research, to a combination of all these elements.  I structure the 
course this way to encourage students to ground abstract inquiry in lived experience.  I also want them 
thinking about the ways in which experience shapes understanding.  The same logic explains why in my 
class academic writing assignments run parallel with embodied activities and classroom encounters with 
otherness.  Simply put, as they write and research, I want my students constantly thinking about the 
troublesome interface between selves and world. 
In a very real sense, the class I propose builds up to the final essay, which is inevitably written 
and revised multiple times.  The larger goal—though I may not phrase it in these terms—is for students to 
use all that we’ve read, done and discussed to try to come to terms with a little bit more of the world’s 
complexity.  Their ethical conflict provides a concrete point of reference.  Integrally, though, they’re not 
expected to solve the conflict (if it’s a true ethical conflict, that’s impossible).  Instead, I simply want to 
see that they can write and think it with more depth and nuance.  This entails being able to recognize and 
synthesis more perspectives, more data points.  It entails capturing some of the excess. 
Let’s look at some student work.  I will center my discussion around Jenny, a first-year nursing 
student.  Jenny was tall, blond, athletic and one of the most outgoing students in my class.  As we’ll see, 
over the course of the semester her writing got significantly more sophisticated.  Some of her early 
writing didn’t turn out so well, though.  In that regard, her work represents a unique opportunity to 
display both want we want, and don’t want, when we think about student writing from a Jamesian 
perspective. 
Early in the course, as part of my efforts to make real the always-embodied nature of perception, I 
had Jenny and her classmates visit a local museum and document their encounter with a piece of artwork.  
My prompt asked that they consider both the artwork and their response to it, to track what it made them 
think and feel.  In short, I wanted them to practice noticing. 
Now, this is a slightly unusual assignment.  It demands a degree of exposure.  Perhaps used to 
less personal forms of writing, Jenny was caught off-guard.  She recognized that she was to track her 
response to the artwork and try to get at the why behind that response.  But the language and ideas she 
uses to capture this “why” seem oddly borrowed: unoriginal and facile.  Similarly, though she begins with 
the specific—“The room was silent, but my thoughts were deafening.  As I stared up at the sea foam 
green sculpture, my shoulders grew heavy…”—the essay could be written in response to just about any 
prompt.  Something happened when she stood in front of that sea foam green sculpture, but apart from 
one brief mention of “feeling troubled,” Jenny doesn’t engage her actual experience.  Instead, she retreats 
to a series of clichéd reflections on the meaning of America.  “Established upon values of liberty,” she 
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writes, “America has… given me the freedom to think as I please, the freedom to see as I see, the freedom 
to simply be myself.”  This freedom, she goes on to argue, has made her fundamentally optimistic, and 
determined to work hard to achieve her goals.  Growing up in America, she concludes, has given her “the 
important qualities of determination, motivation, and persistence,” thus “provide[ing] me the means by 
which I can respond to failures, learning and growing from them, and ultimately allow myself to view all 
things through the lens of an optimist.”  This optimistic lens, it is suggested, shaped how she experienced 
the sculpture.  
Here, as with the brother Larry essay thirty years before, we see the type of student writing a 
Jamesian pedagogy must resist.  Rather than using writing as a mode of inquiry, Jenny uses it to avoid 
thinking, either about her specific experience or about the discourses she’s been taught.  As noted, she 
fails to delve into the details of her interaction with the sculpture—what she saw, felt and thought—and 
how and why (or why not) these details might be singular.  Instead, she retreats to the safety of pre-
approved abstraction.  She also fails to consider why she might be moved to turn to certain discourses in 
certain situations.  Why does it feel so natural, for example, in an essay for English class, to speak of 
overcoming adversity?  Simply put, in the above lines we see a student refusing to step outside what she 
already knows, refusing to engage the excess.  The result is a technically sound, but vacuous piece of 
writing. 
 Now,  I like Jenny.  I wanted to give her the benefit of the doubt.  She’s busy, has only limited 
intellectual energy, and to fulfil this alien assignment turned to the first narrative which came to mind: a 
college admissions essay.  This is OK.  It’s early in the semester.  In my comments, I sought to draw her 
attention to the ways in which language can hide as much as it can reveal.  I did this by trying to get her to 
focus on her actual experience with the sculpture.  What did she think and feel in the moment?  Why?  
This is based on the (Jamesian) assumption that at that specific moment in the museum she had thoughts 
and feelings which aren’t exhausted by the dominant clichés.  To get her experience to fit into a pre-made, 
socially (and intuitionally) approved mold, she had to ignore a lot of important information.  I wanted to 
draw her attention to that which was left over. 
 Let’s skip forward at bit.  Being interested in medicine, Jenny choose stem-cell research as her 
ethical conflict.  She wrote of her experience with this issue (her grandfather had died of Parkinson’s 
disease—potentially curable via work with stem cells) and did various forms of research (collecting and 
analyzing a range of opinions, for example).  Jenny had strong “pro-research” sympathies.  Like many 
students, I had to urge her to abandon the argumentative mode of essay writing and instead focus on 
simply trying to understand.  Why and how do people disagree about this topic, I asked repeatedly?   
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Early on, as with many of my students, Jenny displayed a tendency to frame the conflict in stark 
terms.  Work with a particular line of stem cells, she wrote in her second essay, can “find the cure to my 
grandfather’s illness,” but will also “inflict severe anguish to the family—the potential mother and 
father—of the embryo that was deprived of a fair shot at life.”   Here, I’d argue, we see a common 
symptom of the hegemony of the fragments.  Simply put, Jenny is unable to articulate why someone 
might oppose her position.  She papers over her ignorance with the implicit claim that sometimes 
embryos are “stolen” from would-be parents; this is why some people are anti-research, she argues.  
“Think about what you’re saying here,” I wrote in my comments, “stem cells used in research don’t come 
from babies people want, yes?  What’s the real point of contention?” 
 Over time, through engagement with and response to difference (in the form of my presence, 
course readings, our various in-class activities, and her own research), Jenny began to think about her 
conflict in more complex terms.  She began to understand, and integrate, more perspectives.  In turn, her 
writing became more sophisticated.  Now, instead of simply parroting that which she had heard 
elsewhere, she was able to make original insights.  I think her final essay, while in no way perfect, 
demonstrates a clear increase in meaning-making ability.  Jenny writes: 
 
The passage  of time is inevitable. No matter what you do, the clock keeps ticking, and 
the world keeps moving. With it, come constant changes, innovations, and growth. 
Sometimes we get ahead of ourselves in the midst of all this rapid change, and approach a 
blank page with a pen that has run out of ink. 
 
What next? 
 
If you ask German Philosopher Martin Heidegger, he'd tell you us humans are "encircled 
more tightly by the forces of technology...[which have] outgrown [our] capacity for 
decision." All of the headway we have made with technology has now brought us to a 
dead end where there is just no "right" answer- no ink to fill the blank page.   
 
Among one of these dead ends is the topic of stem cell research, which gives rise to many 
ethical issues. Stem cells come from embryos, and in order to retrieve them, the early 
embryo must be destroyed. The embryos that are used would otherwise be discarded, 
however people still see this as a life that was deprived of a fair shot. Embryonic stem 
cell research, however, has shown promising results for the potential discovery of new 
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medical treatments. This ethical conflict forces us to prioritize human lives- that of an 
embryo, or that of someone with an illness. How do we decide which one to favor? 
 
Answers given to this question simply represent opinions. These standpoints will be 
influenced by a wide array of areas, including religious beliefs, culture, and personal 
experiences. Interestingly enough, though, just because two people have synonymous 
backgrounds does not mean their opinions on this topic, or any controversial topic for 
that matter, will necessarily coincide. 
 
For example, my roommate and I were both raised devout Christians. Our upbringings 
are nearly exact, and we have many of the same values. One would most likely guess that 
our stance on this issue would be the same, however that is clearly not the case. When 
speaking to Alyssa about this topic, she stated "You are taking a life. How can you place 
more value on the life of someone who is older? That is like saying someone who is 21 is 
3 times as important as someone who is 7. It just does not work like that." 
 
I think two factors that cause the difference in our opinions on this topic are our career 
interests and personal connection to the issue. My roommate is a business major and 
takes no particular interest in anything healthcare related. She also has a very superficial 
connection to this topic, because although she lost a grandparent to cancer, she was too 
young to remember. The lack of attachment to her grandparent is most likely a supporting 
reason for her take on the topic. As a current nursing student, I take a specific interest in 
healthcare and research because I see how important it is to the medical field. I also am 
currently watching my grandfather suffer from Parkinson's disease, which stem cell 
research had shown promising results for curing.  
 
In my first essay, I speak much about the importance of failures in shaping your mindset. 
Not solely failures necessarily, but more specifically how we respond to failures. When 
we respond with determination and keep trying, that defines an optimistic mindset- one 
that believes that success is possible.  On the other hand, a more pessimistic view would 
neglect continual efforts because they do not have hope for a success. These two 
mindsets are exemplified by myself and my neighbor, and have something to do with 
upbringing. 
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Growing up, my parents constantly stressed the importance of never quitting. I was 
taught to work hard for what I wanted, especially in school. Although my parents never 
required me to, I always had job as a teenager to have my own money. There was a stress 
on academics in my household, and we were taught that school should be our top priority. 
While the same academic importance was stressed to my neighbor, she was handed 
everything by her parents. If she wanted a new phone, her parents would buy it for her. 
Anything she wanted, she got. This type of upbringing, I feel, shortchanged her because 
now she lacks important qualities to reach her fullest potential. She lacks resilience. In 
college now, her parents are no longer there to fight her battles and she never learned 
how to do so herself, so she gives up. When I spoke to her about stem cell research, I 
found her response particularly interesting, "I feel that if something were to come of it, it 
would have happened already. Funding for stem cell research should be decreased, and 
instead put towards new research ideas." This reflects her tendency to give up and jump 
to something new if she does not see immediate results, which is a result of her lack of 
resilience. Instead of giving something another shot, or trying to think deeper about ways 
that stem cell research could be used, she immediately jumps to starting a new project. 
She loses hope for this option, and therefore negates it. I differ from her completely on 
this topic. I feel that since such promising results have already been shown by this 
method of research, it should be used more. Who is to say increasing funds couldn't help 
with a breakthrough in this research?  
 
… 
 
[Former president Obama] makes a good point when he states, "Rather than furthering 
discovery, our government has forced what I believe is a false choice between sound 
science and moral values." I feel that many religions have also done this as they shut out 
the idea of stem cell research.  I can relate to Obama's stance when he states, "As a 
person of faith, I believe we are called to care for each other and work to ease human 
suffering. I believe we have been given the capacity and will to pursue this research and 
the humanity and conscience to do so responsibly." Most religions take a stance on the 
contrary to stem cell research because they see more negatives than positives with it.   
Rather than focusing on the negatives associated with stem cell research, Obama and I 
are focusing on the potential that stem cell research has. That is the type of mindset that 
will lead to something great .  
 150 
So maybe it is that period of time dedicated to modification and retrying that gives the 
pen enough time reload its ink. Maybe that is how we finally are able to fill the last page 
from corner to corner and everywhere in between. Either way, you can't just crumble up 
the page and throw it out in frustration. What does that leave you to do? Grab a new 
page? What would that solve? The pen isn't going to magically work the second it 
touches a brand new sheet of paper.  
 
There’s a lot to like about this essay: the artful opening and closing metaphor; the confident tone; the 
relatively sophisticated framing of the conflict; the skillful use of quotation.  Perhaps most of all, though, 
I like this essay because here I see a student actively seeking out and trying to understand difference.  She 
interrogates, to the best of her abilities, how she thinks and why, and how others think and why.  This 
entails both empirical inquiry (interviews with her roommate and neighbor, for example) and a certain 
generosity.  She listens to other voices, for example, and is willing to include them in her text, though 
they inevitably complicates her position. 
Interestingly, the writer doesn’t abandon the main idea from her earlier writing assignment (about 
optimism, remember).  Instead, she re-thinks it, and in doing so, I’d argue, takes ownership of it.  With 
this movement, I’m reminded of the final stage of William Perry’s developmental scheme, what he terms 
“committed relativism.”  From this position the student is able to choose among a variety of options and 
justify her choice.  Though I wouldn’t want to assign a student (or even a paper) to a specific “stage,” I 
think this is basically what Jenny has done here.  Her opinion has remained the same, but now it takes 
into account a much broader field.   
The key section in this essay, I think, is the long paragraph in which she ties together optimism, 
her neighbor and stem cell research.  Here she’s using one bit of experience to inform another.  In short, 
she’s making connections.  This is what a Jamesian writing pedagogy is designed to encourage.  Linking, 
seeing one (seemingly different) thing in another, as I’ve argued, is thinking in its most fundamental 
form.  It’s the engine of meaning, and here, Jenny finds fuel for this engine in various corners of her 
lifeworld. 
In particular, I see this writer starting with a certain narrative—we can call it “optimism.”  She 
also has a web of thoughts and feelings about her neighbor.  She uses the former to interpret the latter.  
Then she uses this personal experience to inform the stem cell research debate.  She concludes that our 
thoughts about what humans can accomplish (optimism v. pessimism) determine where we stand on the 
issue.  The point here is not that this conclusion is somehow right.  What’s important is that she takes an 
object of study (the stem cell research debate), and by connecting it with other pieces of experience, 
began to see it (and think it and write about it) in a more nuanced, complex and creative way.   
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It should be clear that the alphabetic essay, as a technology, is key to the sort of movement this 
pedagogy hopes to accomplish.  And make no mistake, the prompt for the final essay is designed to 
encourage a specific type of written product: one which approaches its query from many different angles, 
seeks the “why” behind the “what,” and ties together seemingly disparate bits of experience (the trip to 
the museum, personal interviews, the ethical conflict, etc.).  The goal here is to make the student perform 
(via the essay) the type of thinking I value and wish to cultivate.  As noted, my hope is that by creating a 
more expansive meaning for one specific object, in one specific space, my students general meaning-
making ability will increase.  They will begin to approach difference a little more productively.  This, in 
turn, strikes a blow against the hegemony of the fragments 
*** 
 To conclude, a Jamesian writing pedagogy is a liberal pedagogy in the most expansive sense of 
the term.  Following the American tradition of liberal education, it places students into a controlled 
encounter with difference, and provides them with the resources and opportunity to make sense of what 
they experience.  Based on materialist principles, it focuses on both individuated, embodied perception, 
and textual meaning-making.  The ultimate goal is to help students think more generously, more 
creatively, and ultimately, live better.  In the above pages I’ve tried to show that such a pedagogy is both 
feasible and at this point in history, desperately needed.  What comes next is up to the reader. 
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